Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[smcder]

On the SEP entry 'theories of consciousness', it stands alone as one of the main specified models.
How the heck did that happen?

Good question!

 

[Soupie]

Actually, this quote from Panksepp is anti IIT:
"Metaphorically, cortical columns resemble the monotonous random-access memory (RAM) chips of digital computers. Can intrinsic biological consciousness originate there? Can the subjective aspects of mind really be computed? There is no consistent body of credible data to support either of these guiding assumptions of modern cognitive science. The prevailing Computational Theory of Mind seems fundamentally flawed. It remains a torso in search of a sophisticated neurobiological Affective Theory of Mind. The neocortex, the supposed repository of consciousness, is intrinsically unconscious, notwithstanding its remarkable capacity to generate the detailed and refined “mental solids” that obscure all else from view." p. 165 (Id paper)

I haven't read any detailed critics of the theory, but I've seen other internet commenters call it complete rubbish.

What specifically would you point to about the theory/model that is a fundamental flaw? Also, is it accurate to call it a computational theory of mind? The theory involves information of course, but I'm not certain Tonini is saying the mind is a computation per se. He is certainly saying the mind is information however.

Of what do you think the mind is constituted?

 

[Constance]

The phrase "just so story" is often leveled at evolutionary explanations ... especially evolutionary psychology and some (non-falsifiable) story can always be told, but even Dawkins very early on talked about selfish genes launching the brain away from immediate self interest in its ability to make decisions "freely".

But chaos happens ... see the Information Philosopher's entry on Ergod.

So the point is you don't have to explain everything evolutionarily, evolution is a process of selection from variation. It shapes the chaos up a bit and other forces are at work too.

I'm not sure you have to transcend determinism ... at any rate I would want to see you fight a little harder than that for your free will ... we are probably tickling the edges of compatibilism about which I know nothing, but let's go ahead and invent it on the fly ... it's not like we have sensors that can detect free will, it's not like we feel bound, we generally feel free or we can ... that's often the reaction to thinking about not having free will, is suddenly we don't feel free ... on the other hand, total freedom - would be maddening ... at the practical level, we can usually do something to open up our options.

Creativity and meta-cognition aren't mechanisms, that would be contradictory: here is a mechanism for free will! similarly, if you have a mechanism for creativity, you will know what's going to come out the other end, so it's not creative, because there is no surprise ... now if you're saying it's something like a function that produces a complex behavior with feedback then we are talking about the same kind of freedom ... and there is a surprise, but not in theory ... so let's call that something else; at any rate what you are running into is a "gaps" problem of where to stick free will as the brain gets more and more explained and already it looks like meta-cognition is no more or less amenable to explanation than cognition, it just takes cognition a level below as its input - rather, I think, the freedom is in there at each step, it doesn't go anywhere as the explanations increase - make sense?

"Man must first be free enough from his egoistic emotions if he is to make real use of the idea that the cosmos is impersonal. Otherwise, he equates impersonality with lifelessness, causal order with indifference."

"It is as much a presumption to believe we are able to grasp the idea of the body as a machine as it is to believe we are able to bear the idea of an infinite universe. We cannot bear either truth until we have a more intelligent grasp of reality as a conscious organization of laws and purposeful energies to which man may become openly receptive."

Needleman A Sense of the Cosmos

That's a different relation then to the universe than either science or common conceptions of religion offers.

Excellent.

 

[Constance]

I gave it some detailed consideration:
I just thought that it is so fundamentally flawed, and obviously so, that nobody would be giving it a second glance. I am hoping it will disappear into the ether of its own accord

** ouch **

Why ouch? Pharoah is referring to IIT.

 

[smcder]

I haven't read any detailed critics of the theory, but I've seen other internet commenters call it complete rubbish.

What specifically would you point to about the theory/model that is a fundamental flaw? Also, is it accurate to call it a computational theory of mind? The theory involves information of course, but I'm not certain Tonini is saying the mind is a computation per se. He is certainly saying the mind is information however.

Of what do you think the mind is constituted?

The mind IS green.

 

[Soupie]

The mind IS green.

Haha, what do you mean here? I'm pretty certain pharaoh isn't a dualist. Right?

Also, interestingly there doesn't seem to be any commentary on Tonini or IIT at the Information Philosopher.

 

[Soupie]

The mind IS green.

Yes, and the question is: of what is the qualia green constituted? Isn't that the hard problem, or part of it?

 

[smcder]

Yes, and the question is: of what is the qualia green constituted? Isn't that the hard problem, or part of it?

I think you mean, of WHOM is the qualia constituted?

 

[Constance]

Pharoah said: ↑

"On the SEP entry 'theories of consciousness', it stands alone as one of the main specified models.
How the heck did that happen?"

Good question!

I think the answer lies in the continuing dominance of the materialist/physicalist/objectivist paradigm in science and accordingly in the general mindset of western culture in our time. The desire to find the explanation for what-is somewhere outside and beyond our experience in the world -- outside and beyond all subjectively protoconscious and conscious experience in and of the world -- continues to constrain our thinking about reality, about what-is. Information theory can and is being used as a final refuge for those still grasping for an exclusively objective and remote account of the world's being, including our own being.

 

[Soupie]

The phrase "just so story" is often leveled at evolutionary explanations ... especially evolutionary psychology and some (non-falsifiable) story can always be told, but even Dawkins very early on talked about selfish genes launching the brain away from immediate self interest in its ability to make decisions "freely".

But chaos happens ... see the Information Philosopher's entry on Ergod.

So the point is you don't have to explain everything evolutionarily, evolution is a process of selection from variation. It shapes the chaos up a bit and other forces are at work too.

I'm not sure you have to transcend determinism ... at any rate I would want to see you fight a little harder than that for your free will ... we are probably tickling the edges of compatibilism about which I know nothing, but let's go ahead and invent it on the fly ... it's not like we have sensors that can detect free will, it's not like we feel bound, we generally feel free or we can ... that's often the reaction to thinking about not having free will, is suddenly we don't feel free ... on the other hand, total freedom - would be maddening ... at the practical level, we can usually do something to open up our options.

Creativity and meta-cognition aren't mechanisms, that would be contradictory: here is a mechanism for free will! similarly, if you have a mechanism for creativity, you will know what's going to come out the other end, so it's not creative, because there is no surprise ... now if you're saying it's something like a function that produces a complex behavior with feedback then we are talking about the same kind of freedom ... and there is a surprise, but not in theory ... so let's call that something else; at any rate what you are running into is a "gaps" problem of where to stick free will as the brain gets more and more explained and already it looks like meta-cognition is no more or less amenable to explanation than cognition, it just takes cognition a level below as its input - rather, I think, the freedom is in there at each step, it doesn't go anywhere as the explanations increase - make sense?

"Man must first be free enough from his egoistic emotions if he is to make real use of the idea that the cosmos is impersonal. Otherwise, he equates impersonality with lifelessness, causal order with indifference."

"It is as much a presumption to believe we are able to grasp the idea of the body as a machine as it is to believe we are able to bear the idea of an infinite universe. We cannot bear either truth until we have a more intelligent grasp of reality as a conscious organization of laws and purposeful energies to which man may become openly receptive."

Needleman A Sense of the Cosmos

That's a different relation then to the universe than either science or common conceptions of religion offers.

You're definitely right regarding mechanism/function. Honestly, when it comes to talking about such things I struggle with the exact definitions/use of words like function, mechanism, process, system, model, etc. I'm sure it's created confusion. Apologies.

Re free will. I suppose I was thinking of this as a higher order capacity that not all organisms possess.

What you explain does make sense. It wouldn't make sense to say free will emerges from a completely deterministic/casual background. It does seem that there must be some freedom (randomness?) intrinsic to reality and from this free will can emerge.

There's an interesting entry at the information philosopher about Jacques Monod's concept of teleonomic purpose arising with living systems. The idea that living systems operate with purpose.

I'm not sure if this is synonymous with free "will" or not, but does suggest that life posses a "freedom" that inanimate objects do not. It's a good, short read:

Jacques Monod

 

[Soupie]

I think you mean, of WHOM is the qualia constituted?

I never claimed that the mind was only green. The mind is also red, cold, angry, sad, confused, 3, calm, solemn, shrill, salty, vanilla, and scratchy as well.

In any case, there was the paper posted a while back - with which I agreed - the described the (mental) self as a "thing" that existed for about, I believe, 30 seconds.

From these distinct, temporal instances of mental self is derived our perceived historical, unified sense of mental self.

 

[Soupie]

Pharoah said: ↑

"On the SEP entry 'theories of consciousness', it stands alone as one of the main specified models.
How the heck did that happen?"



I think the answer lies in the continuing dominance of the materialist/physicalist/objectivist paradigm in science and accordingly in the general mindset of western culture in our time. The desire to find the explanation for what-is somewhere outside and beyond our experience in the world -- outside and beyond all subjectively protoconscious and conscious experience in and of the world -- continues to constrain our thinking about reality, about what-is. Information theory can and is being used as a final refuge for those still grasping for an exclusively objective and remote account of the world's being, including our own being.

But can't the information generated by an objective, physical system be subjective?

That is, there is no objective way for physical system A to access the information created by physical system B.

I don't think IIT denies the subjectivity of the mind, but I may be completely wrong. I'm also pretty certain that IIT denies the idea that a mind can be produced via an algorithm.

IIT seems to entail that mind (integrated information) requires a physical system activity interacting (exchanging information) with other physical systems.

Such a dynamic, evolving process cannot be captured via a static algorithm.

 

[Constance]

I haven't read any detailed critics of the theory, but I've seen other internet commenters call it complete rubbish.

What specifically would you point to about the theory/model that is a fundamental flaw? Also, is it accurate to call it a computational theory of mind? The theory involves information of course, but I'm not certain Tonini is saying the mind is a computation per se. He is certainly saying the mind is information however.

That notion is the fatal flaw. The mind is not simply or merely 'information'. The mind, like the conscious being-in-the-world from which it emerges, is first an affective and then a creative response to continuous embodied experience in and of the world. The ground of consciousness and mind and human meaning, according to Mitchell, originates deep down in nature in the quantum substrate in which interaction of particles and waves of energy begins and proliferates as a habit of nature, yielding the increasing systemic complexity of the physical world and of the mind.

FORGOT THIS PART OF YOUR POST:

Of what do you think the mind is constituted?

'The mind'? As Steve might ask, 'whose mind'?

To give you a more direct response, any mind is a fluid 'work in progress' because what it works with is ongoing temporal experience of the world and, in our case and maybe others, of ideas about the nature of what-is in the world. When we think we've reached a complete account or representation of what-is we've stopped thinking, closing the conduit of our natural, existential openness to what-is, which continues to unfold in its temporality.

Stevens has a poem expressing this, as you might expect. I'll copy it next or link it from the post in which I previously copied it.

 

[Soupie]

That notion is the fatal flaw. The mind is not simply or merely 'information'.

Information is not simple. And the information flowing between organism and the rest of reality is certainly not simple. Thus, I don't think reducing the mind to information is a mere or simple thing. But of course others disagree.

The mind, like the conscious being-in-the-world from which it emerges, is first an affective and then a creative response to continuous embodied experience in and of the world. The ground of consciousness and mind and human meaning, according to Mitchell, originates deep down in nature in the quantum substrate in which interaction of particles and waves of energy begins and proliferates as a habit of nature, yielding the increasing systemic complexity of the physical world and of the mind.

Yes, but of what is phenomenal affect constituted? Energy? Atoms? Neurons? Brain regions?

I don't think mind, affect, or consciousness can be constituted of any of these physical objects. I do think though that the mind arises from the physical processes described above. I also happen to think that information arises from the physical processes described above. And thus I think that the mind is information. Information that arises from dynamic, evolving, and continually unfolding physical processes.

The mind consists (in part) of the qualia green, and the qualia green consists of information. Information that arises from the interaction of physical systems such as organism with physical systems such as the sun and grass.

'The mind'? As Steve might ask, 'whose mind'?

There is the body self and the mental self. The physical body self produces the mental (informational) self.

However, I do think this is an area ripe for paranormal experiences. Just as the physical boundaries between the physical body self and the rest of the physical world are not as clear as we might think from our macro perspective, the same may be the case for our perceived mental sense of self.

 

[Constance]

The poem is "Landscape with Boat." Even the title expresses its meaning. It's the last Stevens poem I copied in this post a little while back:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2 | Page 26 | The Paracast Community Forums

 

[Constance]

Information is not simple. And the information flowing between organism and the rest of reality is certainly not simple. Thus, I don't think reducing the mind to information is a mere or simple thing. But of course others disagree.

I'm not saying that information theory is 'simple', only that it appears to me to avoid and thus to miss the ground of the concrete interactions that constitute the world as we are able to comprehend it through embodied consciousness, embodied mind. Those interactions condition and constitute (always temporally, always within temporality) what is thinkable for us, much as we'd prefer to believe otherwise. The ground of experience is the ground of what we can think. James recognized this in the protophenomenological thinking expressed in his last lectures, papers, and book, Essays in Radical Empiricism.


An excellent guide to James's late thinking is provided in this book by John Wild:

Yes, but of what is phenomenal affect constituted? Energy? Atoms? Neurons? Brain regions?

I don't think mind, affect, or consciousness can be constituted of any of these physical objects. I do think though that the mind arises from the physical processes described above. I also happen to think that information arises from the physical processes described above. And thus I think that the mind is information. Information that arises from dynamic, evolving, and continually unfolding physical processes.

You seem to be holding fast to the premise that that which enables the evolution of organic life, embodied experience, consciousness, and thinking is equivalent to life, embodied experience, consciousness, and thinking. I've given up for a while now trying to change your mind about that.

The mind consists (in part) of the qualia green, and the qualia green consists of information. Information that arises from the interaction of physical systems such as organism with physical systems such as the sun and grass.

There is the body self and the mental self. The physical body self produces the mental (informational) self.

However, I do think this is an area ripe for paranormal experiences. Just as the physical boundaries between the physical body self and the rest of the physical world are not as clear as we might think from our macro perspective, the same may be the case for our perceived mental sense of self.

 

[smcder]

Why ouch? Pharoah is referring to IIT.

The good kind of ouch.

 

[Constance]

The good kind of ouch.

Gotcha.

 

[Soupie]

I never claimed that the mind was only green. The mind is also red, cold, angry, sad, confused, 3, calm, solemn, shrill, salty, vanilla, and scratchy as well.

In any case, there was the paper posted a while back - with which I agreed - the described the (mental) self as a "thing" that existed for about, I believe, 30 seconds.

From these distinct, temporal instances of mental self is derived our perceived historical, unified sense of mental self.

Re the mind is green.

So I was looking for the Strawson paper referenced above. Here it is:

Galen Strawson: The Self

However, I also found another Strawson paper that explains the concept I was trying to capture with my "the mind is green" statement.

Galen Strawson and Radical Self-Awareness - waggish

... Strawson continues:

But one can also go beyond this, I propose, into a state of direct thetic having-is-the-knowing acquaintance, a state of holding the sensation of blue in full attention, in which one’s experience ceases to have, as any part of its content, the structure of subject-attending-to-something. The Kantian conclusion is then triggered: ‘nothing which emerges from any affecting relation can count as knowledge or awareness of the affecting thing as it is in itself ’ that this awareness precisely is identical with the subject itself.

[and thus, after some argument]

[15] the subject of awareness (that which wholly constitutes the existence of the subject of awareness) isn’t ontically distinct from the awareness of which it is the subject

[16] the subject of awareness is identical with its awareness.

Galen Strawson, “Radical Self-Awareness”

So what you end up with is a metaphysical identity of a seeming process with a seeming object. (Or, likewise, the identity an object with the sum of its modalities and properties.) I think this is exactly right. The problem with traditional “Cartesian” views is that they seek to establish the existence of a distinct subject having the experiences, metaphysically separating the two and requiring the existence of the subject through either entailment or just as a pure free lunch.

And I think that it does reveal that a major part of the problem has been linguistic, or even grammatical, as nouns like “subject” and “self” have been used that we usually take to imply metaphysically autonomous entities rather than extremely loose linguistic concepts that do overlapping duty in metaphysical, epistemological, phenomenological, and socio-cultural contexts. ...

 

[Constance]

Re the mind is green.

So I was looking for the Strawson paper referenced above. Here it is:

Galen Strawson: The Self

However, I also found another Strawson paper that explains the concept I was trying to capture with my "the mind is green" statement.

Galen Strawson and Radical Self-Awareness - waggish

... Strawson continues:

But one can also go beyond this, I propose, into a state of direct thetic having-is-the-knowing acquaintance, a state of holding the sensation of blue in full attention, in which one’s experience ceases to have, as any part of its content, the structure of subject-attending-to-something. The Kantian conclusion is then triggered: ‘nothing which emerges from any affecting relation can count as knowledge or awareness of the affecting thing as it is in itself ’ [,] that this awareness precisely is identical with the subject itself.

[and thus, after some argument]

[15] the subject of awareness (that which wholly constitutes the existence of the subject of awareness) isn’t ontically distinct from the awareness of which it is the subject

[16] the subject of awareness is identical with its awareness.

Galen Strawson, “Radical Self-Awareness”

So what you end up with is a metaphysical identity of a seeming process with a seeming object. (Or, likewise, the identity [of] an object with the sum of its modalities and properties.) I think this is exactly right. The problem with traditional “Cartesian” views is that they seek to establish the existence of a distinct subject having the experiences, metaphysically separating the two and requiring the existence of the subject through either entailment or just as a pure free lunch.

And I think that it does reveal that a major part of the problem has been linguistic, or even grammatical, as nouns like “subject” and “self” have been used that we usually take to imply metaphysically autonomous entities rather than extremely loose linguistic concepts that do overlapping duty in metaphysical, epistemological, phenomenological, and socio-cultural contexts.

Soupie, you seem to think that the above extracts from Strawson (esp the ones I've highlighted in blue) somehow rescue Tononi's theory. Can you explain why or how? Perhaps it's monism that you are holding out for and you think that T's integrated information theory alone can support it. You continue to resist phenomenology not realizing that that philosophical turn itself overcame Cartesian dualism in an intricate new exploration of the integration of consciousness with the subject's environment. MP thinks it through to what he calls the 'chiasmic' relation of consciousness/mind with nature, as expressed in the physical world and the mind's own embodied awareness within it.


Addendum:

Strawson is correct in calling attention to the way in which most of our human languages have perpetuated the misunderstanding of the interrelationship of mind and nature, especially in the sciences (which, uninterested in consciousness and mind, have until very recently pursued a wholly objectified account of 'reality').