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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

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Soupie says: "have a detailed explanation of how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas)"

Remember your Nagel:

http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

"Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designedto explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.1 But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored"
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Soupie you say: "...how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas)"

I do my best to explain why phase transition of gas to liquid to solid is NOT equivalent at
Emergent Properties vs Emergent Phenomena | Philosophy of Consciousness
Philosophers often site these, so called "emergent" characteristics, but I explain some important distinctions between emergent phenomena and emergent properties. One can think of gas, liquid, solid as aggregates of many separate but interacting components.
 
Constance you say,
A concept is a huge step forward if it's a valid concept founded in actuality. It's not exactly 'proof' I'm looking for but rather grounds for proof. It appears that the project you have set for yourself will require more than abstract reasoning in a theory of mind context. As you observe above, extensive interdisciplinary work involving science will be required to provide substantive evidence to support the theory you hope to demonstrate.

What do you mean "grounds" for proof? - My theory corresponds with all that is known about evolution, incorporating the complexities of physiology and the mental... are their any other theories that come remotely close to doing this? No... It is the most coherent theory out there.
Perhaps you might like to consider how many philosophers did little else than engage in abstract reasoning before you chastise me for doing likewise. It is not abstract anyway.
 
Constance you say,
"That still seems to me to be a mystifying statement. It suggests that a theoretical concept of 'red' {what kind of concept would that be?} gives/funds the experience of seeing red. What you take to be obvious there is opaque to me. Perhaps you can deal more explicitly with the gap between Mary's conceptual, theoretical relationship to the color red and the phenomenal experience of seeing that color. "

This is not what I am saying, "a theoretical concept of red... gives the experience of seeing red."
But you have identified an area that I need to address more fully, so I thank you for that. I think I will write a full length response in due course. Firstly, I want to finish the second half of my Dennett Intentional Stance article, which entails putting Searle's Intentionality to rights... I am half way through it, but it is like wading through mud - his writing is so abstract! :)
 
Soupie you say: "...how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas)"

I do my best to explain why phase transition of gas to liquid to solid is NOT equivalent at
Emergent Properties vs Emergent Phenomena | Philosophy of Consciousness
Philosophers often site these, so called "emergent" characteristics, but I explain some important distinctions between emergent phenomena and emergent properties. One can think of gas, liquid, solid as aggregates of many separate but interacting components.
I'm anxious to read that. Thanks for sharing.

I've not yet read that statement by Nagel in its full context. I've assumed he considered it a bad analogy because molecules > water is material > material, whereas brains > mind is material > immaterial (or object > subject).

Again, I think Information Philosophy addresses this. Brains don't create information per se but rather receive, process, and integrate in a way that allows fully phenomenal experiences to exist. However, I suppose even in this regard, it's a bad analogy as liquid does not exist prior to unique combinations if molecules, whereas information does exist prior to reaching the brain (albeit non-integrated information). (I do think the brain generates new info though as well.)

Regarding the appeal of information philosophy:

I think the idea of mind equaling information and organic processes embodying this information can be conceptualized (a little) with a crude example.

Take the concept of "3." What is three? Three can be represented in a number of mediums: pixels, ink, clay, paint, etc. However, dissect any of those materials and you will not find the essence of "3."

Three can also be represented via a number of symbols: III, 3, three, tres, etc. And of course verbally. But again, investigate any of these symbols and the essence of "3" will not be found.

But we know 3 is something... But it can't be found in the material, physical world. On the other hand, for it to exist, it must be embodied in the physical world; even if that embodiment is only in our brains. That is, if physical organisms/machines didn't exist, 3 wouldn't be embodied/realized.

I feel the mind is similar in ontology. The mind is real, it's something, but it is not material. Yet it can only be realized via the material realm. The mind isn't in the brain, the neurons, nor the electro-chemical signaling therein — but it is these physical processes that embody our immaterial minds.
 
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Constance, you say:
I hope you can clarify the difference in the terms 'construct' and 'concept' as you are using them. In the language of phenomenological philosophy, the subject 'transcends' the object and the object 'transcends' the subject. Can you do a little work to explicate the meaning of your statement that "the fifth construct must be a transcendent construct."

'Construct' is short for 'systems-construct'. Thus a construct is any identifiable unified entity comprised of dynamically interacting component parts.
'Concept': Conceptualising is unique to humans. It entails the identification of principles of cause and action, which as conceptual realisations (rather than mere experiential phenomena), can be transposed and applied as a creative interpretative tool of experiential (and ultimately theoretical) reality. Thus conceptual realisations form an evolving network of criss-crossing conceptual interpretations of reality. One can see this evolving process in infants. It is particularly entertaining in two/three year olds, firstly because they can talk and secondly, because one can see their mind making the conceptual bridges in their network of conceptual realisation.
 
I'm anxious to read that. Thanks for sharing.

I've not yet read that statement by Nagel in its full context. I've assumed he considered it a bad analogy because molecules > water is material > material, whereas brains > mind is material > immaterial (or object > subject).

Again, I think Information Philosophy addresses this. Brains don't create information per se but rather receive, process, and integrate in a way that allows fully phenomenal experiences to exist. However, I suppose even in this regard, it's a bad analogy as liquid does not exist prior to unique combinations if molecules, whereas information does exist prior to reaching the brain (albeit non-integrated information). (I do think the brain generates new info though as well.)

Regarding the appeal of information philosophy:

I think the idea of mind equaling information and organic processes embodying this information can be conceptualized (a little) with a crude example.

Take the concept of "3." What is three? Three can be represented in a number of mediums: pixels, ink, clay, paint, etc. However, dissect any of those materials and you will not find the essence of "3."

Three can also be represented via a number of symbols: III, 3, three, tres, etc. And of course verbally. But again, investigate any of these symbols and the essence of "3" will not be found.

But we know 3 is something... But it can't be found in the material, physical world. On the other hand, for it to exist, it must be embodied in the physical world; even if that embodiment is only in our brains. That is, if physical organisms/machines didn't exist, 3 wouldn't be embodied/realized.

I feel the mind is similar in ontology. The mind is real, it's something, but it is not material. Yet it can only be realized via the material realm. The mind isn't in the brain, the neurons, nor the electro-chemical signaling therein — but it is these physical processes that embody our immaterial minds.

soupie, you say,
"But we know 3 is something... But it can't be found in the material, physical world. On the other hand, for it to exist, it must be embodied in the physical world; even if that embodiment is only in our brains. That is, if physical organisms/machines didn't exist, 3 wouldn't be embodied/realized.
I feel the mind is similar in ontology. The mind is real, it's something, but it is not material. Yet it can only be realized via the material realm. The mind isn't in the brain, the neurons, nor the electro-chemical signaling therein — but it is these physical processes that embody our immaterial minds."

If you have two pieces of bread, one large the other small, and throw them to a duck, the duck will preferentially head for the larger of the two. There is a qualitative difference in quantity - for good reason! Break the large piece into three and the duck does not possess a concept that the three constitutes a greater amount than the one. There is no quantifiable 'three' concept for the duck. But of course, the concept of 'three' is an emerged function with qualitative roots. That concept has evolved significantly such that it is used creatively in abstract application in humans. This ability to conceptualise is a very advanced mental property which arises because it is beneficial and pertinent to survival as is any quantifiable distinction. The quantifiable qualitative difference exists - whether the duck or human are conceptually aware of the significance of three over one or not. The realisation of this significance is only acquired if the information is conceptual in construction.
 
Constance, you say,
"Does your "concept of a 'self' -- a self constituting a personal experiential identity" involve an actual self or unified consciousness having personal experiences? If it does, it is a concept of how consciousness arises in response to its lived embodied interaction with a physical world. This is the concept developed in phenomenological philosophy on the basis of both first-person and third-person reflection on prereflective and reflective consciousness. In that philosophy, the comprehension of the nature of the being of consciousness within the being of the world is pulled out of actual experience as described and represented in the cultural and personal histories of our species as well as the actual experiences and reflections of the philosopher observing and interpreting experience of his/her own and as expressed in various activities, productions, and creations of humankind. Does all this come into your theory at some point, or is it all replaced by a pregiven informational construct/mechanism operating too deeply, too obscurely, in purely physical 'reality' to require the participation of human intentionality in its disclosure?"

Not exactly sure whether I understand the question... but I don't think it is "all replaced by something pregiven". There is also a deep question remaining from my theory which I try to write about in my noumenon essay whose link was posted on this forum, thereby bringing the forum to my attention in the first place. I am not a hardline materialist - My theory does not support nor discount dualism for example. It is not particularly exclusionist, though it does impact many other stances.
Not sure what you mean by "human intentionality".
Who's philosophy, would you say, most closely resembles your own? Who should I read to get a flavour of your leaning?
Or
In relation to my theory, what is the baby to keep and the bathwater you would wish to throw out about it? What concerns you or threatens you about Hierarchical Construct Theory?
 
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I'm anxious to read that. Thanks for sharing.

I've not yet read that statement by Nagel in its full context. I've assumed he considered it a bad analogy because molecules > water is material > material, whereas brains > mind is material > immaterial (or object > subject).

Again, I think Information Philosophy addresses this. Brains don't create information per se but rather receive, process, and integrate in a way that allows fully phenomenal experiences to exist. However, I suppose even in this regard, it's a bad analogy as liquid does not exist prior to unique combinations if molecules, whereas information does exist prior to reaching the brain (albeit non-integrated information). (I do think the brain generates new info though as well.)

Regarding the appeal of information philosophy:

I think the idea of mind equaling information and organic processes embodying this information can be conceptualized (a little) with a crude example.

Take the concept of "3." What is three? Three can be represented in a number of mediums: pixels, ink, clay, paint, etc. However, dissect any of those materials and you will not find the essence of "3."

Three can also be represented via a number of symbols: III, 3, three, tres, etc. And of course verbally. But again, investigate any of these symbols and the essence of "3" will not be found.

But we know 3 is something... But it can't be found in the material, physical world. On the other hand, for it to exist, it must be embodied in the physical world; even if that embodiment is only in our brains. That is, if physical organisms/machines didn't exist, 3 wouldn't be embodied/realized.

I feel the mind is similar in ontology. The mind is real, it's something, but it is not material. Yet it can only be realized via the material realm. The mind isn't in the brain, the neurons, nor the electro-chemical signaling therein — but it is these physical processes that embody our immaterial minds.

@Soupie says:

"I've not yet read that statement by Nagel in its full context. I've assumed he considered it a bad analogy because molecules > water is material > material, whereas brains > mind is material > immaterial (or object > subject)."

Nagels argument is in:

"What It's Like To Be A Bat"

http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

Have you read that essay? It's very short and it's the fundamental paper on the hard problem of consciousness.






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Not sure what you mean by "human intentionality" Who's philosophy, would you say, most closely resembles your own? Who should I read to get a flavour of your leaning?

Have you not read the German and French phenomenologists? Even if you haven't, you must have read citations to them, and to intentionality, in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies papers, including key papers by phenomenologists. I follow the thought primarily of Merleau-Ponty, but also Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and Levinas.

Or
In relation to my theory, what is the baby to keep and the bathwater you would wish to throw out about it? What concerns you or threatens you about Hierarchical Construct Theory?

I wouldn't presume to advise you about what to keep and what to discard in your theory. I haven't read and understood enough of your writing yet to obtain a comprehensive grasp of your theory. I think it would be helpful if you would present an overview of it and identify what you see as coherent and incoherent with it in other mind and consciousness research.
 
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@Soupie says:

"I've not yet read that statement by Nagel in its full context. I've assumed he considered it a bad analogy because molecules > water is material > material, whereas brains > mind is material > immaterial (or object > subject)."

Nagels argument is in:

"What It's Like To Be A Bat"

http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

Have you read that essay? It's very short and it's the fundamental paper on the hard problem of consciousness.
Yes, I have read that essay. I suppose I did think the distinction he was making was betwixt object/subject — a distinction, as you know, that some philosophers feel creates a false dichotomy. (I think the dichotomy is real.)

Regarding the Mindless Babylonian:

I don't think ancient Babylonians (or Greeks) were mindless; however, they didn't seem to have either the same capacity for self-awareness and/or reflexive consciousness as modern humans or they had a different concept of the mental-self than modern humans i.e. they may have interpreted their thoughts as coming from an external source, e.g. God or their ancestors.
 
soupie, you say,
"But we know 3 is something... But it can't be found in the material, physical world. On the other hand, for it to exist, it must be embodied in the physical world; even if that embodiment is only in our brains. That is, if physical organisms/machines didn't exist, 3 wouldn't be embodied/realized.
I feel the mind is similar in ontology. The mind is real, it's something, but it is not material. Yet it can only be realized via the material realm. The mind isn't in the brain, the neurons, nor the electro-chemical signaling therein — but it is these physical processes that embody our immaterial minds."

If you have two pieces of bread, one large the other small, and throw them to a duck, the duck will preferentially head for the larger of the two. There is a qualitative difference in quantity - for good reason! Break the large piece into three and the duck does not possess a concept that the three constitutes a greater amount than the one. There is no quantifiable 'three' concept for the duck. But of course, the concept of 'three' is an emerged function with qualitative roots. That concept has evolved significantly such that it is used creatively in abstract application in humans. This ability to conceptualise is a very advanced mental property which arises because it is beneficial and pertinent to survival as is any quantifiable distinction. The quantifiable qualitative difference exists - whether the duck or human are conceptually aware of the significance of three over one or not. The realisation of this significance is only acquired if the information is conceptual in construction.
Thanks for this explanation of "concept." Interesting.

However, I wasn't suggesting that our minds are concepts, only that, like concepts, our minds are essentially immaterial patterns of information that require material embodiment to be realized. So while there is a distinction between body and mind, they are joined at the hip so to speak.
 
Soupie you say: "...how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas)"

I do my best to explain why phase transition of gas to liquid to solid is NOT equivalent at
Emergent Properties vs Emergent Phenomena | Philosophy of Consciousness
Philosophers often site these, so called "emergent" characteristics, but I explain some important distinctions between emergent phenomena and emergent properties. One can think of gas, liquid, solid as aggregates of many separate but interacting components.
Hm, very interesting, but still unclear to me. In one regard, can't everything in the natural world be said to be emergent phenomena resulting from aggregates of quarks?

It's very interesting to conceive of liquid as a "behavior" or process rather than a thing. (I'm looking at a crystal clear inground pool as I type this.) (@smcder has said that phenomenal experience doesn't seem quantized/digitized either, not unlike how water doesn't appear that way, nor anything for that matter (pun intended) ...) But again, re Strawson, all of physical reality is really a process/behavior, like liquid; no physical object is a static thing.

So if we consider liquid, solid, and gas as emergent phenomena/processes... What are some examples of emergent properties? Which properties are intrinsic and which are emergent? Is mass an intrinsic or emergent property? How about spin? By way of Chalmers, I've read that physicist aren't sure if these properties are intrinsic or emergent (relational). If mass and spin are emergent... Than it would seem all physical properties beyond those must be emergent processes as well.

I guess I'm not clear on the difference between a process/behavior/phenomena and a property.

For example, some people might be tempted to say that red was a property of tomatoes. However we know that's not the case. When a tomato reflects radiation, it does so in a specific way. However, neither the reflected radiation itself nor the skin of the tomato is red. Rather, red is a "phenomena" that results from the interaction of the tomato's skin, radiation, and a particular organism. (And keep in mind that a tomato, it's skin, and the receiving organism are dynamic processes as well; themselves an aggregate of dynamic particles!)

Certain organic systems — but not all — receive this radiation, extract information from it, translate this information into an electro-chemical substrate, and then from this information make meaning — and perhaps, as I believe, simultaneously the phenomenal experience of red.

That is, red is immaterial information that requires physic processes to be realized.

To clarify, can you provide some micro and macro examples of both emergent phenomena and emergent properties? Struggling to think of any emergent macro properties.
 
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Edited to add:

Have you not read the German and French phenomenologists? Even if you haven't, you must have read citations to them, and to intentionality, in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies papers, including key papers by phenomenologists. I follow the thought primarily of Merleau-Ponty, but also Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and Levinas.



I wouldn't presume to advise you about what to keep and what to discard in your theory. I haven't read and understood enough of your writing yet to obtain a comprehensive grasp of your theory. I think it would be helpful if you would present an overview of it and identify what you see as coherent and incoherent with it in other mind and consciousness research, including what you refer to as its 'impacts on other stances':

"My theory does not support nor discount dualism for example. It is not particularly exclusionist, though it does impact many other stances.
.
 
The Study of Fundamental Consciousness Entering the Mainstream
August 8, 2013 by Adrian D. Nelson. 12 \
consciousness-300x225.jpg
The world-renowned neuroscientist Christof Koch, spent nearly two decades working alongside the co-discoverer of the DNA molecule, Francis Crick. Their mission was to find the neurobiological basis of consciousness. They discovered many insights into cognition and the functioning of perception, yet the central enigma, the nature of consciousness itself, remained mysteriously elusive.
In 2009, Koch shocked the scientific community by publishing his conviction that consciousness probably isn’t just in brains, but is a fundamental feature of reality. This is a view known to philosophers as ‘panpsychism.’ The theory Koch is now dedicating his research to is called ‘Integrated Information Theory’ or ‘IIT.’ It is the brainchild of neuroscientist Giulio Tononi of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
In explaining his theory, Tononi asks us to consider a simple light sensitive photo diode like those found in a digital camera. A simple diode might respond to just two states: light or dark. We could present our diode with any number of images, yet regardless of the picture, the diode conforms to one of only two possible states. Is it light, or is it dark?
Now consider yourself looking at the same picture, lets say, of the Eiffel Tower on a beautiful spring day in Paris. For us, looking at this image results in a reduction from a near infinity of possible states. Not an image of the Andromeda galaxy, not a childhood picture of your mother, not cells dividing in a Petri dish and so on. Because of the vast number of images we are capable of recognizing, each one is highly informative. For Tononi, the vast amount of information capable of being integrated in the brain means that we have a comparatively huge capacity for consciousness.
Tononi’s theory, that consciousness is born out of networks with high integrated information, has novel ways of being tested in the laboratory.
In studies with sleeping participants, Tononi and his colleagues used transcranial magnetic stimulation to send a ripple of activity through the cortex of sleeping participants. The researchers found that when dreaming, this ripple reverberated through the cortex longer than when participants were in stages of dreamless sleep. This demonstrated that during dreaming, when the brain is conscious, the cortex has a higher degree of integration.
In another experiment, the researchers built tiny robots known as ‘animats’ that were placed into mazes. The animats used simple integrated networks capable of evolving over sequential generations. To their surprise, the greater the degree of integration that the animats evolved, the quicker they were able to escape the mazes. For Tononi this finding suggested that consciousness may play a more central role in evolution than had previously been thought.
The mathematical value of integrated information in a network is known as phi. But Tononi’s theory, now the topic of serious mainstream discussion, has an extraordinary implication. Phi didn’t just occur in brains, -it is a property of any network with a total informational content greater than its individual parts. Every living cell, every electronic circuit, even a proton consisting of just three elementary particles have a value of phi greater than zero. According to Integrated Information Theory, all of these things possess something, albeit but a glimmer of ‘what it is like’ to be them. Tononi states:
“Consciousness is a fundamental property, like mass or charge. Wherever there is an entity with multiple states, there is some consciousness. You need a special structure to get a lot of it but consciousness is everywhere, it is a fundamental property.”
Integrated information theory is in its infancy and there are still many questions it must face. Did the information of brains operate at the level of the neuron, or the protein, or something deeper still? The electromagnetic field of the brain, as observed by psi researcher Dean Radin, is always re-establishing its quantum connection to the entire universe. Could a much richer informational interaction exist than has yet been imagined?
Physicists such as John Wheeler have laid the groundwork for a radical new understanding of reality, in which matter, the laws and constants of nature, and indeed the entire universe is best described, not in terms of physical objects, but through the play and display of a fundamental dynamic information.
Quantum mechanics suggests that at the deepest level of nature, the entire physical universe is interconnected. Might the total information of the universe be integrated in some deep sense? Is it in a mysterious way conscious of itself?
As spiritual traditions throughout the ages have long asserted, instead of isolated and separate experiencing beings, we may experience on behalf of the greater evolving system in which we find ourselves.
In Koch’s highly anticipated 2012 book, ‘Consciousness – Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist’, he states:
“I do believe that the laws of physics overwhelmingly favored the emergence of consciousness. The universe is a work in progress. Such a belief evokes jeremiads from many biologists and philosophers but the evidence from cosmology, biology and history is compelling.”
Regardless of the validity of Tononi’s theory, today increasing numbers of scientists and academics are convinced that the existence of consciousness simply cannot be sensibly denied. The study of fundamental consciousness is now entering the mainstream. This movement consists of thinkers in and outside of the mind sciences. Yet despite their different academic backgrounds, they are united by two common convictions: that consciousness is an intrinsic rather than incidental emergence in the universe, and that any complete account of reality must include an explanation of it.
Sources:
Koch, C. (2009, August 18). A complex theory of consciousness: Is complexity the secret to sentience, to a panpsychic view of consciousness? Scientific American.
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216-242.
Edlund, J. A., Chaumont, N., Hintze, A., Koch C., Tononi G., & Adami, C. (2011). Integrated information increases with fitness in the evolution of animats. PLoS Computational Biology, 7(10).
Radin, D. I. (2006). Entangled Minds: Extrasensory experiences in quantum reality. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Koch, C. (2012). Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist. MIT Press Books.​

The Study of Fundamental Consciousness Entering the Mainstream | Collective-Evolution
 
The Buddhist concept of "nothingness" has been talked about in relation to reality and consciousness. I don't fully understand it myself. Here's an (at the very least) very entertaining and soothing video of Watts talking on this topic.

In some ways, it's as if the word "everything" can be substituted for nothing. We are every thing, thus we are no thing.

 
The Buddhist concept of "nothingness" has been talked about in relation to reality and consciousness. I don't fully understand it myself. Here's an (at the very least) very entertaining and soothing video of Watts talking on this topic.

In some ways, it's as if the word "everything" can be substituted for nothing. We are every thing, thus we are no thing.


Emptiness? Sunyata - relates to Dependent Origination in that no thing exists independently ... This gets confused with modern ideas of interdependence. However the Buddha did discuss an unconditioned state: nibbana or nirvana - the soteriological goal of Buddhism.

Read the article on Buddhism and Romanticism (German philosophical movement composed largely of men named Frederick) - linked above

accesstoinsight.org is also a good resource,

Theravadan Buddhism stats close to the Pali canon, the earliest writings on Buddhism based on the oral tradition after Guatama Buddha's death.


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Emptiness? Sunyata - relates to Dependent Origination in that no thing exists independently ...
Ive gotten plenty of things confused in this thread. :D

Regarding the idea of emptiness/nothingness; one way that I have conceptualized it for myself is, again, my idea that when we experience green or love or pain... It's really not a mental subject/self having these experiences, but rather we are the green, the love, the pain.

I recall again the quote by W. James that consciousness is like a container. (@Constance, I saw that quote in one of the SEP entries on monism. I'll try to find soon.) Unless there is an experience, there is no mind. The mind = experience. There is no self apart from experience.

To me, that is the nothingness they "we" are; we are whatever we experience. We are everything.

Re the mindless Babylonians

Another thought is that their different experience of subjective experience might be related to their relationship with nature. So they may have conceived as their inner dialogue as coming from god or ancestors, or perhaps nature itself (but I don't think they would have thought of it that way).

I don't think they thought of themselves as free-willed individuals in the same way as modern humans do.

In some ways, they may have been childish; children can say, do, and think incredible brilliant things, but at the very same time lack insight and the ability to self-reflect (to the extent that a modern adult can).
 
Yes, I have read that essay. I suppose I did think the distinction he was making was betwixt object/subject — a distinction, as you know, that some philosophers feel creates a false dichotomy. (I think the dichotomy is real.)

Regarding the Mindless Babylonian:

I don't think ancient Babylonians (or Greeks) were mindless; however, they didn't seem to have either the same capacity for self-awareness and/or reflexive consciousness as modern humans or they had a different concept of the mental-self than modern humans i.e. they may have interpreted their thoughts as coming from an external source, e.g. God or their ancestors.

Good, I thought you'd read it.

I've read about the MBT ... The idea that the gods were messages between the hemispheres, I think McGilChrist discusses it. Auditory hallucinations are by no means confined to persons diagnosed with mental illness and they are truly auditory not "In the head" like our mental chatter ... Perhaps this was/is a common experience in some cultures ... Perhaps it has to do with literacy - I understand the Roma may discourage their children from learning to read in order to enhance their skills at oral recall, crucial to their culture.

It also may be that the literate class had a very different internal mental experience and may have used this to their advantage. The Greek philosophical record certainly indicates a sophisticated mental life back to the Pre Socratics. Including materialism, atomism - doubt and skepticism.

And I think there is a very wide range of inner life at any given time - some people are very extroverted and un reflective, some create inner worlds of fabulous creativity - and thus, I suspect, there have always been dreamers.


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Ive gotten plenty of things confused in this thread. :D

Regarding the idea of emptiness/nothingness; one way that I have conceptualized it for myself is, again, my idea that when we experience green or love or pain... It's really not a mental subject/self having these experiences, but rather we are the green, the love, the pain.

I recall again the quote by W. James that consciousness is like a container. (@Constance, I saw that quote in one of the SEP entries on monism. I'll try to find soon.) Unless there is an experience, there is no mind. The mind = experience. There is no self apart from experience.

To me, that is the nothingness they "we" are; we are whatever we experience. We are everything.

Re the mindless Babylonians

Another thought is that their different experience of subjective experience might be related to their relationship with nature. So they may have conceived as their inner dialogue as coming from god or ancestors, or perhaps nature itself (but I don't think they would have thought of it that way).

I don't think they thought of themselves as free-willed individuals in the same way as modern humans do.

In some ways, they may have been childish; children can say, do, and think incredible brilliant things, but at the very same time lack insight and the ability to self-reflect (to the extent that a modern adult can).

Self-reflection, a good, accurate sense say of seeing yourself as others see you - is rare. Insight is rare - mental health care, talk therapy, is often about re-parenting and correcting basic cognitive errors and biases.

Modern adults seem to suffer tremendously with unhealthy ideas of "self" encouraged by media.

I see a lot of childish behavior in modern society ... Behavior that wouldn't be tolerated in a society less protected than ours, certainly not in subsistence cultures with immediate dependencies for survival.

Aging , illness and death were part of life, we segregate them.

I think self reflection in modern adults is often pathological and "sophisticated" in the pejorative sense. The sense of free will and responsibility is, as far as I can tell, nearly incoherent in most people - with convenience to the situation being the supervening principle.




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