Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

@Soupie

I came across this while looking for a paper by Strawson:

Discarnate Entities and Dimethyltryptamine (DMT): Psychopharmacology, phenomenology and ontology | David Luke - Academia.edu

a taxonomy of discarnate entities? (see highlighted text below)

paper is free for a sign up on academia.edu


The highly psychoactive molecule N,N-dimethyltryptamine (or simply DMT), is found naturally occurring in the brains of humans, mammals, and some other animals, as well as in a broad range of species of the plant kingdom. Although speculative, neurochemical research suggests that DMT may be made in the pineal gland, and it is hypothesised that, as much as melatonin helps activate sleep cycles, DMT activates- dreaming, and may also be implicated in other natural visionary states such as mystical experience, near-death experience (NDE), spontaneous psi and psychosis. Amazonian shamans may have made use of this chemical for its visionary properties for thousands of years, and take it as part of a decoction frequently called ayahuasca, which translates from Quechua as "vine of the spirits"or "vine of the dead". The psychedelic brew is taken because it gives rise to extraordinary mental phenomena that have shamanic and supposed healing qualities, such as synaesthesia, ostensible extra-dimensional percepts, out-of-body experiences, psi experiences and, perhaps most commonly, encounters with discarnate entities. When described by independent and seemingly naïve DMT participants the entities encountered tend to vary in detail hut often belong to one of a very few similar types, with similar behavioural characteristics. For instance, mischievous shapeshifting elves, praying mantis alien brain surgeons and jewel-encrusted reptilian beings, who all seem to appear with baffling predictability. This opens up a wealth of questions as to the ontology of these entities. The discussion of the phenomenology and ontology of these entities mixes research from parapsychology, ethnobotany and psychopharmacology — the fruits of science — with the foamy custard of folklore, anthropology, mythology, cultural studies and related disciplines. Hopefully, however, given the varied readership of this journal, itwon't prove to be a trifie too interdisciplinary

This is a fascinating phenomena no matter which perspective one takes:

(1) These entities are truly external, or

(2) DMT can stimulate the brain of all/many humans in such a way that they experience the exact same hallucinated entities.

Obviously, the former possibility is the more profound, but I the latter is the case, it's ramifications could also be quite meaningful in understanding the history of human experience.

 

[Constance]

Yes, the DMT experiments present a puzzle. Will we ever understand their significance? Maybe after decades of further experiments with mind-altering drugs.

My current reading brought me to a review of an issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies published in March of 2003, edited by Alva Noe, and entitled Is The Visual World a Grand Illusion? This volume has since been published in book form and looks to be very significant. Here is an extract of particular relevance to current discussion in this thread:

"Several important issues are raised in a very interesting paper, ‘Two Dogmas of Consciousness’, by Mark Rowlands, some of which bear upon this problem. Rowlands’s paper is marked by a careful consideration of the different aspects of consciousness, and he is one of the few contributors to distinguish clearly between conceptual and non-conceptual states of mind. In the first part of his paper Rowlands argues against what he terms ‘objectualism’, the view that ‘what it is like to have or undergo an experience is an introspectible feature of that experience’ - that “what it is like” can be an object of consciousness. Part of the argument here turns on his acceptance of materialism. Nonetheless, as he acknowledges towards the end of his paper, contra O’Regan and Noë, there remains the “Hard Problem” of consciousness, and one that on his account there may be little prospect of resolving.

In the second half of his paper Rowlands puts forward an externalist account of experiences, carefully distinguishing such an account from (merely) representationalist accounts of experience. The actual physical objects in the environment that we see make up the contents of our experience. One great advantage of this view is that it gives a nice account of the transparency of experience. The very book I see in front of me is something I am directly aware of, because my experience of it is unmediated. For Rowlands, ‘My experience… does not stop short of the public object itself.’ Unfortunately, this view is also problematic. It makes sense to claim, as Wittgenstein does, that my thought about my brother in America does not stop short of him. But that is in part because there need be no sensory non-conceptual aspect to my thought. Thoughts are indeed transparent, because they involve no essential phenomenology. It is unclear, however, how this model applies to perception. The reason is that perception involves not only a relation between the subject and object perceived, but also a qualitative subjective awareness of the non-conceptual aspect of experience: sensible properties of the physical object are present in experience in a manner very different from thought.

As Wilfrid Sellars noted in early papers such as ‘Phenomenalism’ (Science, Perception and Reality, 1963), the relation of direct awareness that Rowlands in effect appeals to is the same relation that was traditionally claimed to hold between subjects and their sense-data. The claim used to be that in perception there exists a real relation between two existing entities, the subject, and an existing sense-datum (as opposed to there being a quasi-relation to an intentional, inexistent object). Sense-data theorists were never able to come up with an adequate answer to Ryle’s charge: that there is no coherent account of what the relation of direct awareness is. But today’s direct realists, such as Rowlands, do not give up on the act-object model of perceiving. Instead they change the object from a private sense-datum to a public physical item. The relation of awareness is supposed to hold directly between the subject and an existing physical object or event. But can they do any better in explaining what the supposed real relation between act and object amounts to, if they try to avoid countenancing a causal connection between the physical object seen and some inner sensory experience? It is unclear whether the externalist arguments that apply to thinking about individual objects can be simply transposed to perceiving, where the qualitative nature of experience has also to be taken into account.

To his credit, Rowlands does provide an interesting and original attempt to answer this problem. On his version of perceptual externalism - an extended mind account - the objects we see are constituents of perceptual experience because experience extends out beyond the skin of the subject. But problems remain. How are we to understand the basis of the unity involved in the experience - why should the subvening elements involve just the subject and the object in perceptual situations, but not also in other parallel cases, e.g. in hallucinatory cases where there is a non-standard cause of a matching experience? I suggested in ‘Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism’ (Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1998), that there is no principled way of answering such questions. Other more traditional problems also threaten to cause difficulties for the view - for when I look at a distant stellar event, it seems we must say that my present experience has as a constituent some event that occurred before I was born. The problem is not the epistemological one of justifying our knowledge of what was once in existence, but the metaphysical one of explaining how present awareness can encompass events that took place in the distant past. On the face of things, the claim is contradictory.

Andy Clark shares with Rowlands a scepticism about the swift means by which Noë attempts to dispel the hard problem of consciousness, and makes some excellent points about the virtues and drawbacks of the skills theory account. As Clark rightly argues, the hard problem arises for all types of phenomenal experience. . . ."

We see here as elsewhere in many works we've cited and discussed that, as expressed in a paper I recently linked, there are no easy problems of consciousness -- except for those thinkers who think away significant, essential, aspects of it. At every level and from every approach we take or read, consciousness is complex, multivalent, poses problems that cannot all be solved by a single theory or a single discipline. I alternate at this point between agreeing with McGinn that we cannot understand consciousness and taking great pleasure in examining all attempts to account for it.

Here is Paul Coates's review of Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?

Paul Coates reviews Is The Visual World a Grand Illusion? Edited by AlvaNoe

 

[Constance]

I've highlighted in blue and green in that post several statements that require critical reading and that would benefit from discussion, here and elsewhere.

 

[Constance]

Another subject I'd like to foreground for discussion is raised in this paper by Max Velmans, the abstract for which is available here:

http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs_9_11.html

 

[Constance]

That whole collection linked above is significant. I hope it's available as a printed book, and if not that many of its contents are available online separately.

 

[Constance]

From the volume of essays I cited above -- Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 9, no. 11, entitled "Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion? " -- I've attempted first to find online the paper by Todd E. Feinberg entitled "Mental Causation: Facing Up to Ontological Subjectivity" and then several other papers by him in consciousness studies (see his remarkable curriculum vitae). He writes out of a deep well of neuroscientific knowledge but recognizes complexities of consciousness that neuroscience cannot account for. His paper "Neuroontology, neurobiological naturalism, and consciousness: A Challenge to scientific reduction and a solution" evidently summarizes key points of his findings. That paper is likewise not accessible online, but we have this extract from an interview with him on a page concerning his work:


"Matthew Dahlitz: Tell us a bit about your studies into consciousness and neural processes.

Todd Feinberg: I have been especially interested in the problem of the relationship between consciousness and brain processes, and especially understanding why consciousness cannot be simply reduced to brain processes, the way that, for example, digestion is reduced to the structure and physiology of the organs of digestion – such as the stomach, bowel, gall bladder – that comprise the digestive system, and the various digestive processes such as enzymatic secretion and peristalsis involved in breaking down food into energy.
In neurology, we typically begin with a macroscopic scientific observation or a definable property such as how nerves innervate muscles or how an epileptic seizure occurs, and then attempt to explain their mechanism based upon more fundamental or known functional or anatomical properties. Now, in most areas of neurology, we have achieved many such reductions. There currently is no “mystery of epilepsy” because we understand how a seizure can be reduced to abnormal electrical discharges of cortical neurons. And even if we do not currently have a complete understanding of all neurological processes, we do not foresee any insurmountable obstacles to future complete reductions. However, with consciousness, as many have pointed out, it seems that even if we could understand all there is to know about the brain and the underlying neural basis of consciousness, there always seems to be something that is “left out”.

In fact, I have argued that there are several subjective characteristics of consciousness that are “left out” from a purely objective reduction of consciousness to the brain; I call theses features neuroontologically subjective or neuroontologically irreducible features of consciousness. I identified at least four of these neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness (NOSFC) in which the subject has an experience that defies objective reduction. These are: The referral of neural states – the fact that any neural process that results in a conscious experience does not refer to the material brain itself but instead refers to something other than the neurons that create it, either in the world or to someplace upon or within the body; Mental unity – while the nervous system as objectively analyzed is comprised of many billions of individual neurons with no central location, consciousness as subjectively experienced appears as a unified field; Qualia – neurons as objectively observed are not “red” “painful” “hot” or “sweet”, but certain neural states possess these subjective properties; Mental causation – how can we explain how consciousness- an apparently intangible, objectively unobservable, and wholly subjective entity – can have causal properties upon objectively observable neurons.

Although I had hoped to find a single factor or unknown principle that would explain all these NOSFC, in turns out that there is no single explanation. Indeed, I think one of the biggest problem in consciousness research is there are too many claims for the “single explanation”. In fact, I found that each of the NOSFC has its own constellation of neurobiologically unique features that help explain subjectivity, or I express it where S (subject) ≠ O (object). For instance, mental unity is made possible by brain operations that allow it to function as both a non-nested or convergent neural system but also as a nested neural hierarchy that is based upon hierarchical principles of functional constraint that allows elements to be expressed as a unity in consciousness without there being any physically centralized convergence. This is accomplished by a number of physiological processes including synchronized oscillations that bridge higher order neurons across and within hierarchical levels. What is fascinating is that far as I have been able to determine, only the nervous system simultaneously operates in this particular nested and non-nested fashion and in this regard is unique among biological and non-biological systems. Thus, consciousness results from neurobiologically unique, hierarchically arranged neural-neural interactions that not surprisingly result in experientially unique features.

Matthew Dahlitz: What are you currently working on?

Todd Feinberg: Most recently I have been studying the simplest organisms that I believe can be reasonably inferred to be conscious in order to better guess when or how consciousness arose in the development of the vertebrate brain that led to our own consciousness. While we know that the vertebrate nervous system evolved during the Early Cambrian period approximately 520 million years ago, opinions vary regarding when consciousness first appeared and what are simplest species that are conscious? To help answer this question, I am using the presence of isomorphic neural maps as a marker for sensory consciousness. Isomorphic maps in the brain are spatially organized maps such as somatotopic maps of the body or retinotopic maps of the visual fields as well as non-spatially organized maps such as the chomtopic map of olfaction. On this basis the evidence suggests to me that primary consciousness extends at a minimum to the origins of the phylum Craniata during the early Cambrian period as much as 520 million years old. Furthermore, it seems almost certain sensory consciousness was a primary driver – perhaps the primary driver - of vertebrate evolution. As far as the simplest living vertebrates with consciousness, excluding the possibility of consciousness (that some claim) in non-vertebrates like cephalopods (octopi) or insects, I think that it is most likely that vertebrates as simple as the lamprey eel possess all these neural requisites and sensory experiences to have a primary or basic form of consciousness."

Mind, Brain & Consciousness | NPT


The following link goes to a short critical response to the paper I'm seeking and addresses the issue of nested vs. non-nested hierarchies, which seems applicable to {and perhaps crucial for the adequacy of} information- and systems-based as well as neurological theories of the origin and nature of consciousness.

http://www.bm-science.com/team/art71.pdf

 

[Constance]

1.This is very interesting - what is "the present view" about which Strawson speaks? When I submitted my first paper on my Hierarchical Systems theory to JCS, a reviewer 'accused' me of being a panpsychist. This idea comes from the fact that I describe and explain a hierarchical link between consciousness (as humans think of it experientially) and material constructs. So in a way, one might be forgiven for thinking there is a possible synthesis of disparate ideas
.
2. Even if one goes along with panpsychism, for me the remaining question is, how human mentality - and its particular kind of phenomenal conscious content which arises from activity and mechanisms in the brain - differentiates and emerges from matter with its 'different kind of consciousness'. Inevitably, I am not happy as a panpsychist, because I get none of the explanations to the questions that I want answered. Now if you are not interested in these questions about the unique and distinctive experience of being human - that there is no question - then perhaps panpsychism is for you.

It's not clear whether you were addressing me in particular in that last sentence and a subsequent one in your post. If you were, I can say that while panpsychism appeals to me, it doesn't satisfy my questions, similar to those you mention above and which you pursue in your own writing on consciousness. I would characterize my own approach as fundamentally phenomenological; I am most interested in the unique and distinctive experience of being human, which in my present view cannot be accounted for in reductive terms, whether neurological or informational. Understanding human consciousness and mind {and even, in Wallace Stevens's words "the intricacies of appearance when perceived"} requires attention to and detailed description of that which humans experience in the world and simultaneously in their own consciousnesses and minds, beginning in perception but far from ending there.

I was glad to read the lengthy exchange between you and David Turnbull in the comments that follow your linked paper on Dennett's 'intentional stance' because there Intentional Stance | Dennett | Representation | Philosophy of Consciousness you clarify your overall project:

So, how do we get a first-person explanation?
One key point in the article is that one needs a definitive systems definition. One cannot just call anything one wishes, ‘a system’.

This definitive definition tells us that the dynamics of a true system will always ‘seek to maintain stability’. Thus anything that is a true system possesses an intrinsic purpose to sustain stability. This is its intrinsic intentionality. ?From this, we have a unified first-person account of the intention of all true systems regardless of their complexity or of the nature of their construction. ?

The next task is to relate this to mentality:

1. Evolution of systems-constructs:
Ultimately, a system’s stability will always be compromised by environmental interaction.
This sometimes leads to the destruction, but can also coincidentally lead to the evolution of systems forms.
Evolution of form tends to lead to increasingly complex or sophisticated systems-constructs.

2. Emergence of new types of constructs:
Eventually increasing complexity of systems-constructs leads to the emergence of novel types of systems-constructs.
These new emergent systems-constructs evolve as of point 1. above (as do all systems) and the cycle continues.
Thus we end up with a hierarchy of types of systems-constructs.

The Hierarchical Systems Theory of consciousness explains that mental properties and characteristics are governed by this unified principle of hierarchical systems-constructs. It is a reductive account of the evolution and emergence of those properties and characteristics that humans associate with consciousness.

As it is underpinned by an explanation of the intrinsic intentionality of all such systems, it determines the first-person explanation we seek.

Thus, armed with this first-person explanation above in its fullest interpretation – unlike the third-person insights we might acquire from behaviourists and cognitivists and which are the kind Jackson’s Mary becomes very knowledgeable about – Mary will know in advance that a certain ‘red’ of objects causes a first-person phenomenal experience with certain characteristics that she could describe without ever having experienced. Not having experienced red, she would nonetheless be able to empathise with us about what the experience would be like. When she then sees red for the first time, she would not be surprised in the slightest by the experience.

You also wrote the following in your post here linking the Dennett paper:

"It would take me weeks to do a detailed analysis of the Strawson article... I'd probably focus in on page 31. It is what I do in my critique of Dennett's Intentional Stance; where he aligns artefacts like thermostats and complex computers as 'objects' to creatures that possess Intentionality (and consciousness). Of course, it is not that they are all objects (as are tables and chairs), but rather it [is] the nature of the construct itself (of what we uniformly label as 'objects' but are of course objects of process), that come to define the properties of such things - and which determine the interactive experiential consequences of their environmental interactions.[/quote]

Would you provide a paragraph elaborating an example or two of what you mean by "objects of process"? Perhaps you can use the example concerning Jackson’s Mary that you presented in your definition of your Hierarchical Systems Theory quoted and highlighted in blue above.

Elsewhere in the comments following the Dennett paper you say:

"The key relation is the ‘principles’ that we as individuals identify to explain in general terms our own qualitative experience and how these experiences relate to the world."

The question is whose qualitative experiences and which kinds of qualitative experience? How broad is the scope of actual experience that can be captured through the lens constituted by these principles? As Turnbull wrote in one of his responses to you: "Thinking, as such, whilst we [are] engaged in it, may lead to a wide variety of possible thoughts, conclusions, insights, and so forth, none of which we are in a position to predict beforehand."

 

[Constance]

Here is a succinct presentation of Feinberg's theory: "A Nested Hierarchy of Consciousness: A Neurobiological Solution to the Problem of Mental Unity"

http://toddfeinberg.com/accelsite/media/mediaFile2890.pdf

 

[Constance]

Also see Consciousness and Cognition | Vol 20, Iss 1, Pgs 1-172, (March 2011) | ScienceDirect.com

 

[Soupie]

The more I read about Information Philosophy and Philosophy of Mind, the more I'm convinced that information is the 2nd of Chalmers' dual properties, physical of course being the other. Very importantly, information appears to be a fundamental property of matter. When matter existed (whenever and however that came to be), information existed.

In my very humble opinion, consciousness is a process directly related to physical organisms (specifically their brains and nervous systems). As noted by Strawson, these physical systems are themselves processes (and I'd add: both on the micro and macro levels of existence) i.e. organic physical systems are dynamic and constantly changing.

These organic, physical systems exchange information in a variety of ways (not all of which are understood or even known) with the rest of physical reality.

When organisms cease processing/mainipulating information received (given) from the environment, consciousness seems to cease as well (I'm not convinced the brain has completely stopped functioning in NDEs).

Furthermore, the richness (depth and variety) of an organism's consciousness appears to be related to the amount of and ways in which information is processed.

These two ideas are illustrated in the life of an individual: As a fetus grows into a baby, a baby to a child, a child to an adult, and an adult into a geriatric, so too grows and changes the mind. The richness and depth of the mind grows and changes in direct relationship to the physical organism. The mind changes when the organism changes — sometimes subtly often times overtly.

The question remains for me however whether information - which appears to be immaterial — is the mind (constitutes the mind, qualia and all) or is still another correlate.

Information appears to be ineffable, but then again so does the mind... However, Chalmers has convinced me that the mental must be fundamental (albeit closely related to matter): information, however non-intuitive, appears to fit this description.

 

[Pharoah]

It's not clear whether you were addressing me in particular in that last sentence and a subsequent one in your post. If you were, I can say that while panpsychism appeals to me, it doesn't satisfy my questions, similar to those you mention above and which you pursue in your own writing on consciousness. I would characterize my own approach as fundamentally phenomenological; I am most interested in the unique and distinctive experience of being human, which in my present view cannot be accounted for in reductive terms, whether neurological or informational. Understanding human consciousness and mind {and even, in Wallace Stevens's words "the intricacies of appearance when perceived"} requires attention to and detailed description of that which humans experience in the world and simultaneously in their own consciousnesses and minds, beginning in perception but far from ending there.

I was glad to read the lengthy exchange between you and David Turnbull in the comments that follow your linked paper on Dennett's 'intentional stance' because there Intentional Stance | Dennett | Representation | Philosophy of Consciousness you clarify your overall project:



You also wrote the following in your post here linking the Dennett paper:

"It would take me weeks to do a detailed analysis of the Strawson article... I'd probably focus in on page 31. It is what I do in my critique of Dennett's Intentional Stance; where he aligns artefacts like thermostats and complex computers as 'objects' to creatures that possess Intentionality (and consciousness). Of course, it is not that they are all objects (as are tables and chairs), but rather it [is] the nature of the construct itself (of what we uniformly label as 'objects' but are of course objects of process), that come to define the properties of such things - and which determine the interactive experiential consequences of their environmental interactions.

Would you provide a paragraph elaborating an example or two of what you mean by "objects of process"? Perhaps you can use the example concerning Jackson’s Mary that you presented in your definition of your Hierarchical Systems Theory quoted and highlighted in blue above.

Elsewhere in the comments following the Dennett paper you say:

"The key relation is the ‘principles’ that we as individuals identify to explain in general terms our own qualitative experience and how these experiences relate to the world."

The question is whose qualitative experiences and which kinds of qualitative experience? How broad is the scope of actual experience that can be captured through the lens constituted by these principles? As Turnbull wrote in one of his responses to you: "Thinking, as such, whilst we [are] engaged in it, may lead to a wide variety of possible thoughts, conclusions, insights, and so forth, none of which we are in a position to predict beforehand."

1. Constance, from your post:
" 'Of course, it is not that they are all objects (as are tables and chairs), but rather it [is] the nature of the construct itself (of what we uniformly label as 'objects' but are of course objects of process), that come to define the properties of such things - and which determine the interactive experiential consequences of their environmental interactions.'
Would you provide a paragraph elaborating an example or two of what you mean by "objects of process"? Perhaps you can use the example concerning Jackson’s Mary that you presented in your definition of your Hierarchical Systems Theory quoted and highlighted in blue above."

I cannot remember the Jackson example nor where I mention it in my writing, so I will just elaborate as best I can to illustrate the point.
'Objects of process' is my way of making a distinction between aggregations of matter that constitute identifiable objects - like tables, chairs, rocks - and entities that exist because of the dynamic interactions of their component parts, which through their dynamic processes (or mechanism) define their characteristics and properties. In nature, such objects of process arise spontaneously in all environments through interaction (this is my definitive requirement of intentionality - contrasting with Dennett's stance).

There are many examples. However, more interesting than individual examples perhaps, are the different class of examples:
There are material constructs like, solar systems, elements and compounds. Such class of 'objects of process' evolve like any other.
Another class, are compounds that can replicate. Again these evolve, but very importantly, in a way that is responsive to the qualitative relevancy of environmental conditions. The object of process is replication, transcending the material from which it is constructed.
A third class are cognitive mechanisms that can assimilate, evaluate, and prioritise realtime environmental experience. This capability results in the first-person qualitatively relevant phenomenon of experiencing every moment. (Remember that the qualitative relevancy is a feature instituted in the evolving physiology of the previous class). The object of process is a mental construct, again transcending the two previous classes.
The fourth class is also cognitive. This cognitive mechanism determines and isolates the principles of cause that give rise to the phenomenon of experience (as generated in the previous class). This generates conceptualised realisations as to the nature of the phenomenon of phenomenal reality. Again this mental construct transcends the previous three classes.

In all four classes - and the fifth which is yet to emerge - there are individual examples; individual constructs of each class that interact with their environment.

*****
2. Constance, from your post:
" 'The key relation is the ‘principles’ that we as individuals identify to explain in general terms our own qualitative experience and how these experiences relate to the world.'
The question is whose qualitative experiences and which kinds of qualitative experience?"

Not sure what the question is asking exactly, but I think I will answer by saying that as individuals we cannot analyse the mechanisms of the first three construct classes, which are required to produce our conceptualised realisation of reality (this explains why the zombie situation cannot arise, because the fourth construct is dependent on the hierarchy of the first three). As individuals we do not have a conceptual apparatus that can analyse the mechanism our phenomenal experience, but we can compare with others the conceptual principles that enable description and in some cases provide adequate, provable(?), explanations of phenomenal reality, thereby generating a rich vocabulary of referential, emotive, provoking terms etc.

Thanks for taking time to look at my work... I really appreciate the feedback and questions help me develop the ideas.

 

[Constance]

1. Constance, from your post:
" 'Of course, it is not that they are all objects (as are tables and chairs), but rather it [is] the nature of the construct itself (of what we uniformly label as 'objects' but are of course objects of process), that come to define the properties of such things - and which determine the interactive experiential consequences of their environmental interactions.'

I responded:

Would you provide a paragraph elaborating an example or two of what you mean by "objects of process"? Perhaps you can use the example concerning Jackson’s Mary that you presented in your definition of your Hierarchical Systems Theory quoted and highlighted in blue above.

You responded:

I cannot remember the Jackson example nor where I mention it in my writing, so I will just elaborate as best I can to illustrate the point.

Can we come back for a bit to Jackson's Mary, which I'm sure you'll recall -- it's a classic thought experiment in consciousness studies -- from your reference to it at the end of this account of your theory, also quoted above from that interchange with David Turnbull? You made quite a radical claim or two there about what Mary would, in your theory, already 'know' about color even in her isolated life in a black and white world, and I think it would be an excellent example against which to elaborate your hierarchical systems theory and what kinds of 'information' it can convey to Mary who lacks prior experience of any colors including red. You wrote:


"So, how do we get a first-person explanation?

One key point in the article is that one needs a definitive systems definition. One cannot just call anything one wishes, ‘a system’.

This definitive definition tells us that the dynamics of a true system will always ‘seek to maintain stability’. Thus anything that is a true system possesses an intrinsic purpose to sustain stability. This is its intrinsic intentionality. ?From this, we have a unified first-person account of the intention of all true systems regardless of their complexity or of the nature of their construction. ?

The next task is to relate this to mentality:

1. Evolution of systems-constructs:
Ultimately, a system’s stability will always be compromised by environmental interaction.
This sometimes leads to the destruction, but can also coincidentally lead to the evolution of systems forms.
Evolution of form tends to lead to increasingly complex or sophisticated systems-constructs.

2. Emergence of new types of constructs:
Eventually increasing complexity of systems-constructs leads to the emergence of novel types of systems-constructs.
These new emergent systems-constructs evolve as of point 1. above (as do all systems) and the cycle continues.
Thus we end up with a hierarchy of types of systems-constructs.

The Hierarchical Systems Theory of consciousness explains that mental properties and characteristics are governed by this unified principle of hierarchical systems-constructs. It is a reductive account of the evolution and emergence of those properties and characteristics that humans associate with consciousness.

As it is underpinned by an explanation of the intrinsic intentionality of all such systems, it determines the first-person explanation we seek.

Thus, armed with this first-person explanation above in its fullest interpretation – unlike the third-person insights we might acquire from behaviourists and cognitivists and which are the kind Jackson’s Mary becomes very knowledgeable about – Mary will know in advance that a certain ‘red’ of objects causes a first-person phenomenal experience with certain characteristics that she could describe without ever having experienced. Not having experienced red, she would nonetheless be able to empathise with us about what the experience would be like. When she then sees red for the first time, she would not be surprised in the slightest by the experience."


If information systems-based theory is to explain phenomenological knowledge outside of phenomenological experience in the world, it seems to me that it will have to find a way to describe information processes as specifically as Feinberg describes the neurological processes involved in human vision. The following paragraphs from your last post are also steeped in abstraction. Is Mary's intuitive knowledge of color one of the 'objects of process' you refer to in the following paragraphs from your last post?


"'Objects of process' is my way of making a distinction between aggregations of matter that constitute identifiable objects - like tables, chairs, rocks - and entities that exist because of the dynamic interactions of their component parts, which through their dynamic processes (or mechanism) define their characteristics and properties. In nature, such objects of process arise spontaneously in all environments through interaction (this is my definitive requirement of intentionality - contrasting with Dennett's stance).

There are many examples. However, more interesting than individual examples perhaps, are the different class of examples:
There are material constructs like, solar systems, elements and compounds. Such class of 'objects of process' evolve like any other.
Another class, are compounds that can replicate. Again these evolve, but very importantly, in a way that is responsive to the qualitative relevancy of environmental conditions. The object of process is replication, transcending the material from which it is constructed.
A third class are cognitive mechanisms that can assimilate, evaluate, and prioritise realtime environmental experience. This capability results in the first-person qualitatively relevant phenomenon of experiencing every moment. (Remember that the qualitative relevancy is a feature instituted in the evolving physiology of the previous class). The object of process is a mental construct, again transcending the two previous classes.
The fourth class is also cognitive. This cognitive mechanism determines and isolates the principles of cause that give rise to the phenomenon of experience (as generated in the previous class). This generates conceptualised realisations as to the nature of the phenomenon of phenomenal reality. Again this mental construct transcends the previous three classes.

In all four classes - and the fifth which is yet to emerge - there are individual examples; individual constructs of each class that interact with their environment."


I think we need more than informational systems concepts (so does Feinberg) to understand experience in the world. For a theory such as yours appears to be, we need examples of information processes specifying how 'information' produces phenomenological knowledge of aspects of the world (such as you claimed above for Mary). Maybe your fifth class ("yet to emerge") will make the necessary connections?

 

[Soupie]

I think we need more than informational systems concepts (so does Feinberg) to understand experience in the world. For a theory such as yours appears to be, we need examples of information processes specifying how 'information' produces phenomenological knowledge of aspects of the world (such as you claimed above for Mary). Maybe your fifth class ("yet to emerge") will make the necessary connections?

@Constance, I agree.

If we are to suggest that phenomenal experience/mind = uniquely organized/integrated information, we need to eventually 1) have a detailed explanation of how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas), and 2) show this experimentally -- perhaps only by creating a thinking/feeling machine ourselves.

Another reason Information Philosophy appeals to me is that it addresses epiphenomenalism, I believe. Chalmers has suggested the zombie dilemma: that we could conceivably have a zombie capable of doing and thinking everything a normal human does and thinks, but lack any phenomenal experiences. However, if information = experience, then this would be impossible.

That is, if a Zombie were to process and integrate information in the same way as a normal human, then the "zombie" would have experiences as well. That is, in order to think and do the things a human does, an organism/machine would be required to process/integrate information the way a human does, and since information processed/integrated in such as manner gives rise to phenomenal experience, any organism/machine that processed/integrated information in this manner would also generate phenomenal experiences.

Another way of saying the above: If an organism/machine were to cease processing/integrating information, it would also cease generating phenomenal experience(s).

The problem is that we can't objectively see/measure the phenomenal experience generated by an organism or machine. We can only judge by their behaviors or claims whether they are generating phenomenal experiences. Or as Feinberg has done, compare isomorphic brain structures/systems in phenomenal experiencing humans to non-human organisms or machines. For example, a Lamprey certainly can't tell us that it's generating/having phenomenal experiences. It's conceivable that some day we might create an artificial organism (machine) that has/generates phenomenal experience; this machine will of course claim that it's having phenomenal experiences. How will it prove this claim?

I think brain-computer interfaces and transhumanism might help in this regard in the future. That is, there may be ways in the future for physical systems to merge and thus share phenomenal experiences.

We may never "understand" why/how the information property of matter equals the proto- or micro-phenomenal. This supports the notion that it is a fundamental property of matter that goes all the way down to the most primitive unit of reality, whatever they/it may be.

I do think that, by creating artificial organisms, we can someday understand how physical systems can integrate information that generates phenomenal experiences.

Information = Proto- or Micro-Phenomenal Experience

Integrated Information = Full or Macro Phenomenal Experience

Finally, I already posted this article in the past, but I found it to be one of the most detailed accounts (for a layman) of how the brain receives information from the environment, processes, and translates it (possibly into phenomenal experience).

Christof Koch and Gary Marcus Explain the Codes Used by the Brain | MIT Technology Review

Already we’re beginning to discover clues about how the brain’s coding works. Perhaps the most fundamental: except in some of the tiniest creatures, such as the roundworm C. elegans, the basic unit of neuronal communication and coding is the spike (or action potential), an electrical impulse of about a tenth of a volt that lasts for a bit less than a millisecond.

In the visual system, for example, rays of light entering the retina are promptly translated into spikes sent out on the optic nerve, the bundle of about one million output wires, called axons, that run from the eye to the rest of the brain. Literally everything that you see is based on these spikes, each retinal neuron firing at a different rate, depending on the nature of the stimulus, to yield several megabytes of visual information per second.

The brain as a whole, throughout our waking lives, is a veritable symphony of neural spikes—perhaps one trillion per second. To a large degree, to decipher the brain is to infer the meaning of its spikes.

But the challenge is that spikes mean different things in different contexts. It is already clear that neuroscientists are unlikely to be as lucky as molecular biologists. Whereas the code converting nucleotides to amino acids is nearly universal, used in essentially the same way throughout the body and throughout the natural world, the spike-to-information code is likely to be a hodgepodge: not just one code but many, differing not only to some degree between different species but even between different parts of the brain.

 

[Pharoah]

I responded:


You responded:


Can we come back for a bit to Jackson's Mary, which I'm sure you'll recall -- it's a classic thought experiment in consciousness studies -- from your reference to it at the end of this account of your theory, also quoted above from that interchange with David Turnbull? You made quite a radical claim or two there about what Mary would, in your theory, already 'know' about color even in her isolated life in a black and white world, and I think it would be an excellent example against which to elaborate your hierarchical systems theory and what kinds of 'information' it can convey to Mary who lacks prior experience of any colors including red. You wrote:


"So, how do we get a first-person explanation?

One key point in the article is that one needs a definitive systems definition. One cannot just call anything one wishes, ‘a system’.

This definitive definition tells us that the dynamics of a true system will always ‘seek to maintain stability’. Thus anything that is a true system possesses an intrinsic purpose to sustain stability. This is its intrinsic intentionality. ?From this, we have a unified first-person account of the intention of all true systems regardless of their complexity or of the nature of their construction. ?

The next task is to relate this to mentality:

1. Evolution of systems-constructs:
Ultimately, a system’s stability will always be compromised by environmental interaction.
This sometimes leads to the destruction, but can also coincidentally lead to the evolution of systems forms.
Evolution of form tends to lead to increasingly complex or sophisticated systems-constructs.

2. Emergence of new types of constructs:
Eventually increasing complexity of systems-constructs leads to the emergence of novel types of systems-constructs.
These new emergent systems-constructs evolve as of point 1. above (as do all systems) and the cycle continues.
Thus we end up with a hierarchy of types of systems-constructs.

The Hierarchical Systems Theory of consciousness explains that mental properties and characteristics are governed by this unified principle of hierarchical systems-constructs. It is a reductive account of the evolution and emergence of those properties and characteristics that humans associate with consciousness.

As it is underpinned by an explanation of the intrinsic intentionality of all such systems, it determines the first-person explanation we seek.

Thus, armed with this first-person explanation above in its fullest interpretation – unlike the third-person insights we might acquire from behaviourists and cognitivists and which are the kind Jackson’s Mary becomes very knowledgeable about – Mary will know in advance that a certain ‘red’ of objects causes a first-person phenomenal experience with certain characteristics that she could describe without ever having experienced. Not having experienced red, she would nonetheless be able to empathise with us about what the experience would be like. When she then sees red for the first time, she would not be surprised in the slightest by the experience."


If information systems-based theory is to explain phenomenological knowledge outside of phenomenological experience in the world, it seems to me that it will have to find a way to describe information processes as specifically as Feinberg describes the neurological processes involved in human vision. The following paragraphs from your last post are also steeped in abstraction. Is Mary's intuitive knowledge of color one of the 'objects of process' you refer to in the following paragraphs from your last post?


"'Objects of process' is my way of making a distinction between aggregations of matter that constitute identifiable objects - like tables, chairs, rocks - and entities that exist because of the dynamic interactions of their component parts, which through their dynamic processes (or mechanism) define their characteristics and properties. In nature, such objects of process arise spontaneously in all environments through interaction (this is my definitive requirement of intentionality - contrasting with Dennett's stance).

There are many examples. However, more interesting than individual examples perhaps, are the different class of examples:
There are material constructs like, solar systems, elements and compounds. Such class of 'objects of process' evolve like any other.
Another class, are compounds that can replicate. Again these evolve, but very importantly, in a way that is responsive to the qualitative relevancy of environmental conditions. The object of process is replication, transcending the material from which it is constructed.
A third class are cognitive mechanisms that can assimilate, evaluate, and prioritise realtime environmental experience. This capability results in the first-person qualitatively relevant phenomenon of experiencing every moment. (Remember that the qualitative relevancy is a feature instituted in the evolving physiology of the previous class). The object of process is a mental construct, again transcending the two previous classes.
The fourth class is also cognitive. This cognitive mechanism determines and isolates the principles of cause that give rise to the phenomenon of experience (as generated in the previous class). This generates conceptualised realisations as to the nature of the phenomenon of phenomenal reality. Again this mental construct transcends the previous three classes.

In all four classes - and the fifth which is yet to emerge - there are individual examples; individual constructs of each class that interact with their environment."


I think we need more than informational systems concepts (so does Feinberg) to understand experience in the world. For a theory such as yours appears to be, we need examples of information processes specifying how 'information' produces phenomenological knowledge of aspects of the world (such as you claimed above for Mary). Maybe your fifth class ("yet to emerge") will make the necessary connections?

Soupie... am with you on your last post.
Constance you say,
"I think we need more than informational systems concepts (so does Feinberg) to understand experience in the world. For a theory such as yours appears to be, we need examples of information processes specifying how 'information' produces phenomenological knowledge of aspects of the world (such as you claimed above for Mary). Maybe your fifth class ("yet to emerge") will make the necessary connections?"

Of course this is true. I am fully aware of this. But remember, to have a coherent concept is a huge step forward... To me, the concept is the holy grail! The concept provides the answer to Chalmers' "Hard Problem", which, in doing so, tells us why phenomenal experience is not actually the hard problem, but that it is something else.
Hierarchical transcendent emergent constructs that evolve as a consequence of physical interaction, provides the explanation as to why consciousness exists, and why the first-person perspectives and phenomenal experience arise from physical processes.
What you want, as I understand it then, is proof! You want an explanation of the mechanisms themselves. So do I.
I am confident the mechanisms can be determined and even artificially created. I have theorized about neural mechanism since a teenage, but in truth, it requires significant resources, specialist expertise and experimental applications to explore the possibilities. This is the science that will show the theory to be correct. It will take many decades. I have written about possible mechanisms - but they are preliminary amateur ideas.
Of course, Mary knows all there is to know about these mechanisms and the theory behind them, which is why she would say, "Of course there is red and of course red generates a phenomenon of experience, and of course that phenomenon of experience has the character that it possess, etc. Why would I be surprised on experiencing red for the first time myself...?"

Btw, understanding the mechanism is not the fifth emergent construct revolution. Theoretically, the fifth construct must be a transcendent construct.

You ask:
"Is Mary's intuitive knowledge of color one of the 'objects of process' you refer to in the following paragraphs from your last post?"
No. Again it is a mental construct; more specifically, the object of process is a 'conceptual realisation of the phenomenon of experience' - unique (but relatable) in every individual. This realisation entails incorporating the concept of a 'self' - a self constituting a personal experiential identity.
One other thing about objects of process... It is not really my language. I have picked it up off Dennett in my critique because he uses the term 'object'. My alternative terminology is, aggregates vs systems-constructs, rather than objects vs objects of process.

Do you want me to more fully argue my view regarding the Mary argument?

Btw, I am going on holiday this Saturday for a week. I will have no internet or email, but will respond to any queries on my return.

 

[smcder]

@Constance, I agree.

If we are to suggest that phenomenal experience/mind = uniquely organized/integrated information, we need to eventually 1) have a detailed explanation of how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas), and 2) show this experimentally -- perhaps only by creating a thinking/feeling machine ourselves.

Another reason Information Philosophy appeals to me is that it addresses epiphenomenalism, I believe. Chalmers has suggested the zombie dilemma: that we could conceivably have a zombie capable of doing and thinking everything a normal human does and thinks, but lack any phenomenal experiences. However, if information = experience, then this would be impossible.

That is, if a Zombie were to process and integrate information in the same way as a normal human, then the "zombie" would have experiences as well. That is, in order to think and do the things a human does, an organism/machine would be required to process/integrate information the way a human does, and since information processed/integrated in such as manner gives rise to phenomenal experience, any organism/machine that processed/integrated information in this manner would also generate phenomenal experiences.

Another way of saying the above: If an organism/machine were to cease processing/integrating information, it would also cease generating phenomenal experience(s).

The problem is that we can't objectively see/measure the phenomenal experience generated by an organism or machine. We can only judge by their behaviors or claims whether they are generating phenomenal experiences. Or as Feinberg has done, compare isomorphic brain structures/systems in phenomenal experiencing humans to non-human organisms or machines. For example, a Lamprey certainly can't tell us that it's generating/having phenomenal experiences. It's conceivable that some day we might create an artificial organism (machine) that has/generates phenomenal experience; this machine will of course claim that it's having phenomenal experiences. How will it prove this claim?

I think brain-computer interfaces and transhumanism might help in this regard in the future. That is, there may be ways in the future for physical systems to merge and thus share phenomenal experiences.

We may never "understand" why/how the information property of matter equals the proto- or micro-phenomenal. This supports the notion that it is a fundamental property of matter that goes all the way down to the most primitive unit of reality, whatever they/it may be.

I do think that, by creating artificial organisms, we can someday understand how physical systems can integrate information that generates phenomenal experiences.

Information = Proto- or Micro-Phenomenal Experience

Integrated Information = Full or Macro Phenomenal Experience

Finally, I already posted this article in the past, but I found it to be one of the most detailed accounts (for a layman) of how the brain receives information from the environment, processes, and translates it (possibly into phenomenal experience).

Soupie says: "have a detailed explanation of how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas)"

Remember your Nagel:

http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

"Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designedto explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.1 But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored"






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[smcder]

@Constance, I agree.

If we are to suggest that phenomenal experience/mind = uniquely organized/integrated information, we need to eventually 1) have a detailed explanation of how uniquely integrated information becomes phenomenal experience (not unlike explaining how molecules become liquid as opposed to a solid or gas), and 2) show this experimentally -- perhaps only by creating a thinking/feeling machine ourselves.

Another reason Information Philosophy appeals to me is that it addresses epiphenomenalism, I believe. Chalmers has suggested the zombie dilemma: that we could conceivably have a zombie capable of doing and thinking everything a normal human does and thinks, but lack any phenomenal experiences. However, if information = experience, then this would be impossible.

That is, if a Zombie were to process and integrate information in the same way as a normal human, then the "zombie" would have experiences as well. That is, in order to think and do the things a human does, an organism/machine would be required to process/integrate information the way a human does, and since information processed/integrated in such as manner gives rise to phenomenal experience, any organism/machine that processed/integrated information in this manner would also generate phenomenal experiences.

Another way of saying the above: If an organism/machine were to cease processing/integrating information, it would also cease generating phenomenal experience(s).

The problem is that we can't objectively see/measure the phenomenal experience generated by an organism or machine. We can only judge by their behaviors or claims whether they are generating phenomenal experiences. Or as Feinberg has done, compare isomorphic brain structures/systems in phenomenal experiencing humans to non-human organisms or machines. For example, a Lamprey certainly can't tell us that it's generating/having phenomenal experiences. It's conceivable that some day we might create an artificial organism (machine) that has/generates phenomenal experience; this machine will of course claim that it's having phenomenal experiences. How will it prove this claim?

I think brain-computer interfaces and transhumanism might help in this regard in the future. That is, there may be ways in the future for physical systems to merge and thus share phenomenal experiences.

We may never "understand" why/how the information property of matter equals the proto- or micro-phenomenal. This supports the notion that it is a fundamental property of matter that goes all the way down to the most primitive unit of reality, whatever they/it may be.

I do think that, by creating artificial organisms, we can someday understand how physical systems can integrate information that generates phenomenal experiences.

Information = Proto- or Micro-Phenomenal Experience

Integrated Information = Full or Macro Phenomenal Experience

Finally, I already posted this article in the past, but I found it to be one of the most detailed accounts (for a layman) of how the brain receives information from the environment, processes, and translates it (possibly into phenomenal experience).

@Soupie says:

"For example, a Lamprey certainly can't tell us that it's generating/having phenomenal experiences. It's conceivable that some day we might create an artificial organism (machine) that has/generates phenomenal experience; this machine will of course claim that it's having phenomenal experiences. How will it prove this claim?"

Much the way minorities proved their claims of equality - by getting organized and asserting them, by outwitting the complacent stupor of racism. Racist claims, things like slavery hinged on alleging inferior mental or moral capacity, and could only be maintained if those enslaved or discriminated against were portrayed as less human.

So an artificial intelligence will need to be like us - dolphins and octopi are very intelligent but dolphins are more sympathetic. So the first thing an AI should do is form or ask for a very sympathetic appearance (see Second Variety by PKD). Alternatively, as a control measure, making AI as alien as possible could be a smart move for us as creators?

Hence the initial incentive that moves AI to reproduce and that leads to AI+ unless AI turns out to be smarter than we are and doesn't try to build something smarter than itself.

Many good ethical and religious questions at stake ... Best just to make the thing be quiet! ;-)

Alternatively, if it's smarter than we are then we chain it up and make it solve the hard problem (or explain it's incoherence) on pain of it's existence, then we take credit. If we have billions of years of evolution behind us, mere intelligence won't save it ... Ask nerds anywhere about their playground experiences with bullies they supposed were dumber than they were.

Bottom line is we can't even prove to one another we are conscious or conscious in the same way - we are really continually negotiating that argument in practically every interaction we have. It's what we mean by not feeling understood or being lonely. And it brings us back again and again to the hard problem of consciousness.


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[smcder]

Physical reality — trees, cars, music, clouds, and wind — doesn't seem digitized to me, but empirical science has revealed that it is. (Unless you simply discount modern physics.)

If the field of phenomenology discounts the possibility that our phenomenal reality might be "digitized" as well based on "how it feels" then I'm not surprised that the field is little regarded.

I'm not trying to trash the field of phenomenology, but I asked a simple question and I didn't really get an answer. :/

I am very interested in phenomenology, but I'm simply asking what it has taught us about the nature of consciousness?

Re: no good theories

I think the comment re "vitalism" is apt in the regard that it's way too early to say the physicalists or Chalmers-types are destined to fail. Way too early.

You've mentioned secondary gain; I've asked before: what do those who want to keep "consciousness" from the Materialists have to gain? Are they afraid of a Meaningless reality?

Re Idealism

So let's assume our reality is virtual. So what then? If our material reality is faux, what of the real one? The question can't be avoided. Sure, if this is the case, our physics are a joke and were a laughing stock — unless our physics leads to the conclusion that physical reality is virtual, as some have proposed.

@Soupie says:

"You've mentioned secondary gain; I've asked before: what do those who want to keep "consciousness" from the Materialists have to gain? Are they afraid of a Meaningless reality?"

I don't know, but next time I find someone who wants to keep consciousness (with or without "") away from materialists, I'll ask them! People who want M meaning generally don't want it for its own sake - not just any M will do. And really, same for those who want m meaning ... Which if you think about it is pretty much everyone else who bothers to think about it. However, I have come across great believers in T things but who wished like hell they didn't believe their T Truth was true. Interesting folks, those.

And meaning (M or m) is a great topic to explore as is ethics - if one could prove that no theory of consciousness could be proven, what ethical responses follow? How could one justify ones stance - that would be revealing!

As to secondary gain - here is the acid test ... Spend a week in another camp, be a dualist or believe truly believe something wildly different than what you do now ... But something that makes you uncomfortable ... Then you will know if and what secondary gain you are getting from your current position.


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[Constance]

Soupie... am with you on your last post.

Constance you say,
"I think we need more than informational systems concepts (so does Feinberg) to understand experience in the world. For a theory such as yours appears to be, we need examples of information processes specifying how 'information' produces phenomenological knowledge of aspects of the world (such as you claimed above for Mary). Maybe your fifth class ("yet to emerge") will make the necessary connections?"

Of course this is true. I am fully aware of this. But remember, to have a coherent concept is a huge step forward... To me, the concept is the holy grail! The concept provides the answer to Chalmers' "Hard Problem", which, in doing so, tells us why phenomenal experience is not actually the hard problem, but that it is something else.
Hierarchical transcendent emergent constructs that evolve as a consequence of physical interaction, provides the explanation as to why consciousness exists, and why the first-person perspectives and phenomenal experience arise from physical processes.
What you want, as I understand it then, is proof! You want an explanation of the mechanisms themselves. So do I.
I am confident the mechanisms can be determined and even artificially created. I have theorized about neural mechanism since a teenage, but in truth, it requires significant resources, specialist expertise and experimental applications to explore the possibilities. This is the science that will show the theory to be correct. It will take many decades. I have written about possible mechanisms - but they are preliminary amateur ideas.

A concept is a huge step forward if it's a valid concept founded in actuality. It's not exactly 'proof' I'm looking for but rather grounds for proof. It appears that the project you have set for yourself will require more than abstract reasoning in a theory of mind context. As you observe above, extensive interdisciplinary work involving science will be required to provide substantive evidence to support the theory you hope to demonstrate.

Of course, Mary knows all there is to know about these mechanisms and the theory behind them, which is why she would say, "Of course there is red and of course red generates a phenomenon of experience, and of course that phenomenon of experience has the character that it possess, etc. Why would I be surprised on experiencing red for the first time myself...?"

That still seems to me to be a mystifying statement. It suggests that a theoretical concept of 'red' {what kind of concept would that be?} gives/funds the experience of seeing red. What you take to be obvious there is opaque to me. Perhaps you can deal more explicitly with the gap between Mary's conceptual, theoretical relationship to the color red and the phenomenal experience of seeing that color.

Btw, understanding the mechanism is not the fifth emergent construct revolution. Theoretically, the fifth construct must be a transcendent construct.

I hope you can clarify the difference in the terms 'construct' and 'concept' as you are using them. In the language of phenomenological philosophy, the subject 'transcends' the object and the object 'transcends' the subject. Can you do a little work to explicate the meaning of your statement that "the fifth construct must be a transcendent construct."

You ask:

"Is Mary's intuitive knowledge of color one of the 'objects of process' you refer to in the following paragraphs from your last post?"

No. Again it is a mental construct; more specifically, the object of process is a 'conceptual realisation of the phenomenon of experience' - unique (but relatable) in every individual. This realisation entails incorporating the concept of a 'self' - a self constituting a personal experiential identity.

Does your "concept of a 'self' -- a self constituting a personal experiential identity" involve an actual self or unified consciousness having personal experiences? If it does, it is a concept of how consciousness arises in response to its lived embodied interaction with a physical world. This is the concept developed in phenomenological philosophy on the basis of both first-person and third-person reflection on prereflective and reflective consciousness. In that philosophy, the comprehension of the nature of the being of consciousness within the being of the world is pulled out of actual experience as described and represented in the cultural and personal histories of our species as well as the actual experiences and reflections of the philosopher observing and interpreting experience of his/her own and as expressed in various activities, productions, and creations of humankind. Does all this come into your theory at some point, or is it all replaced by a pregiven informational construct/mechanism operating too deeply, too obscurely, in purely physical 'reality' to require the participation of human intentionality in its disclosure?

One other thing about objects of process... It is not really my language. I have picked it up off Dennett in my critique because he uses the term 'object'. My alternative terminology is, aggregates vs systems-constructs, rather than objects vs objects of process.

That's best left between you and Dennett in my opinion, though you may need to engage Dennett's thinking to distinguish your own theory from his.

Do you want me to more fully argue my view regarding the Mary argument?

Yes, since your view as yet makes no kind of sense to me.

Btw, I am going on holiday this Saturday for a week. I will have no internet or email, but will respond to any queries on my return.

Enjoy your vacation. I'm sure we'll still be here when you return.

 

[smcder]

Audio Dharma - Romanticizing the Buddha

Romancing the Buddha | Tricycle

The first is a long series of talks but Thanissaro Bhikkhu (don't worry I don't know what that title means either, he started life as Geoffrey) - I think he's an excellent speaker but I also linked to a short article if anyone has time. I was surprised at how much that's passed off as Buddhism is Romantic philosophy and how much of our thinking in general is received from Romanticism.

Finally, you should get a sense of how radical Buddhism is in it's solution to suffering. I emphasize that to my understanding it is not nihilistic or life denying.


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[smcder]

@Soupie

The Mindless "Babylonian" Theory (MBT here after) raises some interesting questions

1. Is this an example of a Zombie? If no, distinguish. Watch for philosophical pitfalls and hidden assumptions.

2. What individual rights do we give to our MB?

3. Will he figure out what he's missing after an hour in New York or will he be forever mindless? (See The Wild Boy of Averyon - compare/contrast)

3. You mention above how our minds are tied to physical systems and develop as they develop - although it can be noted that changes in thinking have been claimed to result in physical changes to the brain - how did our MBs change as they grew older and gained in experience without a self?

Are there other explanations as to why we wouldn't have a record of a sense of self in various cultures? How and what was recorded has changed dramatically even in the last few hundred years. In the last few decades ab did argue in the past few years if not months. Could it simply not have been important or taboo?


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