There are in Plato identifiable traditional myths, such as the story of Gyges (
Republic 359d–360b), the myth of Phaethon (
Timaeus 22c7) or that of the Amazons (
Laws 804e4). Sometimes he modifies them, to a greater or lesser extent, while other times he combines them—this is the case, for instance, of the Noble Lie (
Republic 414b–415d), which is a combination of the Cadmeian myth of autochthony and the Hesiodic myth of ages. There are also in Plato myths that are his own, such as the myth of Er (
Republic 621b8) or the myth of Atlantis (
Timaeus 26e4). Many of the myths Plato invented feature characters and motifs taken from traditional mythology (such as the Isles of the Blessed or the judgment after death), and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish his own mythological motifs from the traditional ones. The majority of the myths he invents preface or follow a philosophical argument: the
Gorgias myth (523a–527a), the myth of the androgyne (
Symposium 189d–193d), the
Phaedo myth (107c–115a), the myth of Er (
Republic614a–621d), the myth of the winged soul (
Phaedrus 246a–249d), the myth of Theuth (
Phaedrus274c–275e), the cosmological myth of the
Statesman (268–274e), the Atlantis myth (
Timaeus21e–26d,
Critias), the
Laws myth (903b–905b).
Plato refers sometimes to the myths he uses, whether traditional or his own, as
muthoi (for an overview of all the
loci where the word
muthos occurs in Plato see Brisson 1998 (141ff.)). However,
muthos is not an exclusive label. For instance: the myth of Theuth in the
Phaedrus(274c1) is called an
akoē (a “thing heard”, “report”, “story”); the myth of Cronus is called a
phēmē (“oracle”, “tradition”, “rumour”) in the
Laws (713c2) and a
muthos in the
Statesman(272d5, 274e1, 275b1); and the myth of Boreas at the beginning of the
Phaedrus is called both
muthologēma (229c5) and
logos (d2).
The myths Plato invents, as well as the traditional myths he uses, are narratives that are non-falsifiable, for they depict particular beings, deeds, places or events that are beyond our experience: the gods, the daemons, the heroes, the life of soul after death, the distant past, etc. Myths are also fantastical, but they are not inherently irrational and they are not targeted at the irrational parts of the soul.
The Cave, the narrative that occurs in the
Republic (514a–517a), is a fantastical story, but it does not deal explicitly with the beyond (the distant past, life after death etc.), and is thus different from the traditional myths Plato uses and the myths he invents. Strictly speaking, the Cave is an analogy, not a myth. Also in the
Republic, Socrates says that until philosophers take control of a city “the politeia whose story we are telling in words (
muthologein) will not achieve its fulfillment in practice” (501e2–5; translated by Rowe (1999, 268)). The construction of the ideal city may be called a “myth” in the sense that it depicts an imaginary polis (cf. 420c2: “We imagine the happy state”). In the
Phaedrus (237a9, 241e8) the word
muthos is used to name “the rhetorical exercise which Socrates carries out” (Brisson 1998, 144), but this seems to be a loose usage of the word.
Most (2012) argues that there are eight main features of the Platonic myth. (a) Myths are a monologue, which those listening do not interrupt; (b) they are told by an older speaker to younger listeners; (c) they “go back to older, explicitly indicated or implied, real or fictional oral sources” (17); (d) they cannot be empirically verified; (e) their authority derive from tradition, and “for this reason they are not subject to rational examination by the audience” (18); (f) they have a psychologic effect
leasure, or a motivating impulse to perform an action “capable of surpassing any form of rational persuasion” (18); (g) they are descriptive or narrative; (h) they precede or follow a dialectical exposition. Most acknowledges that these eight features are not completely uncontroversial, and that there are occasional exceptions; but applied flexibly, they allow us to establish a corpus of at least fourteen Platonic myths in the
Phaedo,
Gorgias,
Protagoras,
Meno,
Phaedrus,
Symposium,
Republic X,
Statesman,
Timaeus,
Critias and
Laws IV. The first seven features “are thoroughly typical of the traditional myths which were found in the oral culture of ancient Greece and which Plato himself often describes and indeed vigorously criticizes” (19).
Dorion (2012) argues that the Oracle story in Plato’s
Apology has all these eight features of the Platonic myth discussed by Most (2012). Dorion concludes that the Oracle story is not only a Platonic fiction, but also a Platonic myth, more specifically: a myth of origin. Who invented the examination of the opinions of others by the means of
elenchus? Aristotle (see
Sophistical Refutations 172a30–35 and
Rhetoric 1354a3–7) thought that the practice of refutation is, as Dorion puts it, “lost in the mists of time and that it is hence vain to seek an exact origin of it” (433). Plato, however, attempts to convince us that the dialectical
elenchus “were a form of argumentation that Socrates began to practice spontaneously as soon as he learned of the Oracle” (433); thus, Plato confers to it a divine origin; in the
Charmides he does the same when he makes Socrates say that he learned an incantation (a metaphor for the
elenchus) from Zalmoxis; see also the
Philebus 16c.