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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12


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Here is a link to another of Renaud Barbaras's books available in English translation, entitled Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception, in which Barbaras further develops phenomenology in ways that might respond to some of @Michael Allen's approaches or presuppositions.

Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception (Cultural Memory in the Present): Renaud Barbaras, Paul B. Milan: 9780804746458: Amazon.com: Books

Amazon description: "Desire and Distance constitutes an important new departure in contemporary phenomenological thought, a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though it departs in significant and original ways from their work. Barbaras's overall goal is to develop a philosophy of what "life" is-one that would do justice to the question of embodiment and its role in perception and the formation of the human subject. Barbaras posits that desire and distance inform the concept of "life." Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes's notion of the infinite. For Barbaras, desire and distance are anchored not in meaning, but in a rethinking of the philosophy of biology and, in consequence, cosmology. Barbaras elaborates and extends the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of "life" and the "life-world," which are prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson. Barbaras then filters these notions (especially "life") through Merleau-Ponty."

Extracts from reviews:

"As an attempt to grasp the specificity of the phenomenon as it comes to be, that of the world within which it appears, and that of the subject to whom it becomes apparent, Desire and Distance is an ambitious, dense, rigorously argued work of philosophy in the phenomenological tradition, certainly amongst the most original of recent years." (Philosophy in Review/Comptes Rendus philosophiques)

"Desire and Distance is based on recent research and presents new ideas on the problem of perception―ideas that are quite enticing. Barbaras is the world's leading Merleau-Ponty scholar, but what makes this book remarkable and philosophically important is that Barbaras distances himself from Merleau-Ponty and develops his own set of concepts with a high level of originality. In my opinion, Barbaras' book is remarkable."―Leonard Lawlor, University of Memphis

Review for Amazon:


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StreetlightReader
5.0 out of 5 starsOn the Life of Perception
October 7, 2015
Format: Paperback
Although best known in the English speaking world for his ground-breaking study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology (cf. The Being of the Phenomenon), Renaud Barbaras has been vibrantly forging his own path among the phenomenological thicket for the better part of the last two decades. Desire and Distance - his only other full-length publication translated into English so far - gives us a valuable glimpse into the philosophical expanse since treaded by this remarkable thinker. While the presence and influence of Merleau-Ponty still bears heavily upon the work, it's clear that Barbaras here has struck out on his own, renovating and extending the insights previously gleaned from his studies into new investigative terrain. As such, although billed as an 'introduction' to a phenomenology of perception, the introductory nature of the book lies less in its pedagogic value - this isn't at all a book for beginners - so much as in its attempt to lay down anew the principles of any future phenomenological investigation.

In line with this goal, Barbaras begins by reconceptualizing the methodological lynch-pin which, from Husserl onwards, has grounded the practice of any phenomenological enterprise worthy of the name: the phenomenological reduction, or the 'epoche' otherwise known. If, as Barbaras notes, the whole point of phenomenology is to pay strict attention to the specificity of appearance without bringing into it any extraneous categories of analysis which would compromise that specificity, Husserl unfortunately makes just such a compromise in his conception of the epoche. By formulating the reduction as he does - in terms of the suspension [of] judgment with regard to the existence of the world - Husserl ultimately sneaks in presuppositions about appearance that do not in fact stay true to the domain of experience to which phenomenology owes its fidelity - namely, that the being of the appearance is an 'all or nothing' deal, one in which appearance is 'pre-judged' as that which simply does not exist, or exists only in terms of a sheer positivity set off against a background of pure nothingness.

In laying down this critique, Barbaras enlists the services of Henri Bergson, whose critique of metaphysics famously charged the privileging of nothing over something as a 'retrograde movement of the true' (and dismantling the metaphysical question 'why is there something rather than nothing?', right at its core). Yet unlike Bergson however, Barbaras does not so much reject negativity so as to valorise the positivity of being so much as he attempts to reinscribe the negative right into the heart of being itself; as he puts it, "it is not a question of a dimension that would be added to being or that would carve out its constitutive density, but of a negativity that is constitutive of being itself, that is inherent in appearance." It is, in other words, nothing less than an irreducible 'Distance' written into the very structure of phenomenality itself. Following the lead of Jan Patocka, who is the other protagonist of the book (along with Merleau-Ponty), Barbaras thus provocatively draws the conclusion that, in an exact inversion of the classical Husserlian understanding of the epoche, the latter "does not lead from the suspension of the world... to the thing; rather, it leads from suspension of the thing, via negation of nothingness, to recognition of the world."

While the precise logic of Barbaras's reading of the epoche can only be gleaned in passing here, his exacting analysis in fact only serves as the spring-board from which he launches into an incredible phenomenological recognition of the primacy of movement with respect to perception. For Barbaras, it is in fact movement - or rather, 'living movement' - which provides key to perception. It is ultimately living bodies, animate forms who, being able to reorient themselves with respect to the differing profiles of the world, give body to the 'concrete nothingness' that structures all perception. This phenomenological cashing out of negativity in terms of movement leads then to Barbaras's ultimate claim: that a phenomenology of perception, in the last analysis, resolves into a phenomenology of life. Neither life, nor movement, nor perception can be thought without the other, insofar as it is living, and thus motile organisms who are the subjects of perception. The last chapter of Desire and Distance will go on to further explicate this in terms of an originary Desire that Barbaras specifies as the 'essence of subjectivity'.

A brilliant achievement in its own right, the prescience of Desire and Distance can be drawn out even further when placed side by side with a book like Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's The Primacy of Movement, which, although approaching the topic from an evolutionary-developmental standpoint, reaches much the same conclusions, even if pitched in an entirely different idiom. My only wish is that Barbaras's essays on Hans Jonas - elsewhere translated into English - could have also made their way into this book, insofar as they extend and flesh out many of the themes and concerns elaborated upon here (search for them if you've read this book!). In any case, anyone who is eager to see the relevance of a twenty-first century phenomenology, or indeed, interested in the nexus between perception and life, ought to look no further than this excellent volume."
 
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Still awaiting publication of an English translation of this recent work by Renaud Barbaras: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Life. Here is a link to the book in French:

Amazon.com: Introduction a Une Phenomenologie de la Vie (Problemes & Controverses) (French Edition) (9782711619702): Renaud Barbaras: Books

Here is a google translation of the book's description at amazon:

"The question of the correlation between the transcendent and its subjective modes of data, which is at the heart of the phenomenological enterprise, inevitably leads to the problem of the sense of being of the subject of correlation as this one both belongs to the world and is a condition of its appearance. In accordance with this double requirement, the subject must be characterized as living, which amounts to saying that phenomenology only makes sense as a phenomenology of life. Life here must be understood in an original sense, deeper than the distinction between being in life (leben) and the test of something (erleben): it escapes the alternative of an intransitive life and a transitive life. The purpose of this book is to lay the foundations of this phenomenology. Such an undertaking requires, first of all, to highlight the limits and presuppositions of the philosophies, phenomenological or not, which confront the question of life. It leads to a positive characterization of living as Desir, another name for correlation, relating to one another a subject that is Realization and a Being that is Incomplete."


The core of this work also appears as a chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, ed. Dan Zahavi (2012), described briefly at this link: Phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject - Oxford Handbooks

"The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject"
Renaud Barbaras

Abstract and Keywords

"This chapter discusses the phenomenology of life. The a priori of correlation characterises the being as what presents itself in its appearances only by being absent from them, as offering itself up to an exploration, in the face of which it continuously steps back or withdraws. Transcendental life must contain something living in order to be able to characterise itself as life. Desire never meets its object except in the mode of the object's own absence, and this is why nothing stops it. The link between desire and the world is the truth of the relation between consciousness and object. The phenomenological dynamic that sees in desire the essence of the subject leads to a dynamic which has a truly ontological scope. In truth, ‘Life’ is the name given to the sense of Being: nothing that claims to be can stand outside life's embrace."
Keywords: phenomenology, life, desire, correlation, object, world, consciousness

 
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As I struggle to understand what you write in this post ...

I'll take a quick stab at this: To me it seems like an obvious dichotomy. If we assume that consciousness is a phenomenon that is transcendent of the material brain, then consciousness cannot know what it's like to be a material brain, as doing so would require that it de-emerge back to the state from which it came.
 
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Thanks for this clarification, @Soupie.

I'm still struggling with comprehending @Michael Allen's last post. Can you, or perhaps @smcder, tell me if what MA writes can be interpreted in the same way that you both understand the 'transcendent brain'? Thanks.
No, I can’t tell you. Sorry.

I think we are saying similar things to an extent, namely that self-reference is a stumbling block when it comes to investigating the nature of consciousness.

For me, this stumbling extends to the nature of the mbp and the hp, namely the materialist assumptions underlying these problems. However I’m not sure he sees it that way.
 
Pharoah, I’m reading a very nice book right now called “neurodynamics of personality.” It’s very reminiscent of your model in that the authors pull knowledge from many different fields and stitch it together into a beautiful picture of how the staggering complexity of self-organizing brain activity gives rise to psychological phenomena, including behavior.

I haven’t read yet exactly how they deal with phenomenal consciousness. however it’s not really want they are interested in. They acknowledge the hard problem and essentially say that for now, they just assume some type of strong emergence. It’s a “type” of strong emergence because they show how neurodynamics (physiology) parallel psychodynamics.

I’m going to say that same thing that I’ve said several times before: The reason many scientists and philosophers assume that consciousness must be strongly emergent from the brain—as opposed to being ontologically identical to brain processes, ie weakly emergent, despite all the abundant evidence that it is—is the _assumption_ that phenomenality somehow is created by the brain rather than being intrinsic to, or my preference, identical to that which is recognized as matter/energy.

In other words, your model makes perfect sense except for the part where you suggest phenomenality strongly emerges from brain activity.

We simply don’t know enough about what matter/energy is to say whether or not it has a phenomenal nature.

Your model (and the models of others) are more congruent when it is assumed that physiology (life) weakly emerges within a phenomenal background, and perceptual and conceptual properties weakly emerge within physiology.

When we assume phenomenality must strongly emerge from brain processes we introduce a duality that an abundance of evidence suggests isn’t there. We are forced to introduce an ontological duality due to an assumption we need not make.
 
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@Pharoah

What you and many others are doing is recognizing that properties of perception can be recognized in physiology. (What Chal refers to as the easy problem.) there is still a long way to go, but it’s absolutely true that many properties of perception can be directly connected to physiological (neurological) processes.

It’s when we get to the phenomenal/qualitative nature of perception (not to be confused with the representational nature) that we hit a brick wall.

That’s when strong emergence is called upon.



I also recognize that many features of perception can be connected to physiology. However, rather than summon strong emergence, I’m connecting an admitted speculative dotted line between this mysterious qualitative property of perceptions which emerge from neurological processes and the mysterious identity of that which physics recognizes as matter/energy.
 
@Pharoah

Another thing that your model fails to incorporate are the significance and ramifications of the investigation of perception being the phenomenon of a system of perception perceiving itself.

Likewise with conception: the human investigation of conception is the system that gives rise to human conceptions attempting to conceive itself.

There are challenges that such self-reference presents and your model (as with many models) doesn’t seem to address these challenges.
 
No, I can’t tell you. Sorry.
I think we are saying similar things to an extent, namely that self-reference is a stumbling block when it comes to investigating the nature of consciousness.
For me, this stumbling extends to the nature of the mbp and the hp, namely the materialist assumptions underlying these problems.
However I’m not sure he sees it that way.

Would you elaborate on what you refer to as 'the materialist assumptions underlying the mind-body problem and the hard-problem'? Thanks.
 
Yes; got that. What I'm wondering about is how wedded you presently are as a thinker to the assumptions/presuppositions of the materialism absorbed by some philosophers from the materialist paradigm in the modern 'hard' sciences. Your reference to "the materialist assumptions underlying the mbp and the hp" suggested to me that you might still stand at some distance from those assumptions and continue to take seriously both the mind/body problem and the hard problem recognized by Chalmers et al.
 
Yes; got that. What I'm wondering about is how wedded you presently are as a thinker to the assumptions/presuppositions of the materialism absorbed by some philosophers from the materialist paradigm in the modern 'hard' sciences. Your reference to "the materialist assumptions underlying the mbp and the hp" suggested to me that you might still stand at some distance from those assumptions and continue to take seriously both the mind/body problem and the hard problem recognized by Chalmers et al.
The two assumptions I’m mostly concerned with are that 1) reality just is pretty much as we perceive it to be, and 2) the phenomenal aspect of consciousness somehow arises from non-phenomenal, physiological processes.

The first is not necessarily a materialist assumption per se; however many materialists assume that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness must (strongly) emerge from the brain because they don’t see it when they look at the brain.

However materialists do believe that everything can be reduced to the movements and interactions of non-phenomenal matter/energy, which also contributes to their affinity for strong emergence of phenomenal consciousness. An assumption which I reject in the case of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.
 
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However materialists do believe that everything can be reduced to the movements and interactions of non-phenomenal matter/energy, which also contributes to their affinity for strong emergence of phenomenal consciousness. An assumption which I reject in the case of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.
It seems to me that the question hinges on one's interpretation of materialism, and in my efforts to sort that issue out, the simplistic definition above isn't useful for much beyond the most basic of introductions to the concept. I would suggest a better starting point is here: Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But of course we've already been there a number of times haven't we? We went through the concept of supervenience. Ultimately, it became my position that duality is simply a convenience term that illustrates the difference between two types of extant phenomena within the particular flavor of physicalism that happens when one matches the various criteria with what appears to be the situation. So far, I haven't seen anything new that would require a change to that approach.

So for me there is no "mind body problem". There are simply minds and bodies and waves and particles and whatever else. Just because we don't know how that situation can be fully explained, doesn't invalidate the circumstance that it is is the case we are dealing with.
 
It seems to me that the question hinges on one's interpretation of materialism, and in my efforts to sort that issue out, the simplistic definition above isn't useful for much beyond the most basic of introductions to the concept. I would suggest a better starting point is here: Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But of course we've already been there a number of times haven't we? We went through the concept of supervenience. Ultimately, it became my position that duality is simply a convenience term that illustrates the difference between two types of extant phenomena within the particular flavor of physicalism that happens when one matches the various criteria with what appears to be the situation. So far, I haven't seen anything new that would require a change to that approach.

So for me there is no "mind body problem". There are simply minds and bodies and waves and particles and whatever else. Just because we don't know how that situation can be fully explained, doesn't invalidate the circumstance that it is is the case we are dealing with.
Regardless of whether you call your position materialism or physicalism, it still entails strong emergence.

And that position would mean the MBP is still relevant (ie still a problem) for you.
Sure, you can simply say phenomenal consciousness just is emitted by a functioning brain, but this is hardly a solution to the mbp. Sure you can just say this phenomenal consciousness field just is material or just is physical, but we could just say it was made out of spaghetti.

It hardly makes the mbp irrelevant to you.

Just saying that phenomenal consciousness is emitted from the brain doesn’t solve or resolve the mbp. We would still be left asking the same question: How does the mind relate to the body? They seem to be related but how!?

I don’t know how one would even go about proving strong emergence. It’s seems to establish a correlation at best. But we already have that. When the brain is in state X the patient reports conscious state Y.

And if we are going to suggest a duality between the brain and this consciousness field, it raises a host of other issues such as over determination, epiphenominalism, the problem of mental causation, the nature of subjectivity, the qualia palette problem, and the binding problem.

In the end, getting lose with terms doesn’t help us.
 
EM wavelength between 590-625 nm

neural spikes trains

phenomenal orange

Which of these is most likely to be actual?
 
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