Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Soupie]

@smcder something else but may be related to your note above.

You've said the "hard problem" of CR is getting physics from it.

But I would/can argue that this is precisely the position we are currently in now.

As explained beautifully in the paper above which I can quote of need be, there is no such thing as true objectivity. We we call objectivitybis in reality intersubjectivity.

So, the physics we have today is technically physics from consciousness (CR). And I mean that literally.

 

[smcder]

@smcder something else but may be related to your note above.

You've said the "hard problem" of CR is getting physics from it.

But I would/can argue that this is precisely the position we are currently in now.

As explained beautifully in the paper above which I can quote of need be, there is no such thing as true objectivity. We we call objectivitybis in reality intersubjectivity.

So, the physics we have today is technically physics from consciousness (CR). And I mean that literally.

What is the cosmogny of CR?

 

[smcder]

Can you elaborate?

Whether you start with Idealism or Materialism you have the same set of problems.

Hoffman wants to deduce objectivity from CAs (mathematical formalisms that cannot borrow anything from the objective) and Nagel challenges the Physicalist to give an objective accounting of "what it is like"-ness.

 

[Constance]

The Fold and The Body Schema in Merleau-Ponty
and Dynamic Systems Theory
David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University,

Published in Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies
Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought
1 (1999): 275-286
Department of Philosophy - Philosophy - University of Memphis

Abstract:
Contemporary thought, whether it be in psychology, biology, immunology, philosophy of perception or philosophy of mind, is confronted with the breakdown of barriers between organism and environment, self and other, subject and object, perceiver and perceived. In this paper I show how
Merleau-Ponty can help us think about this problem, by attending to a methodological theme in the background of his dialectical conception of
embodiment. In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty conceives life as extension folding back upon itself so as to reveal Hegel’s ‘hidden
mind of nature.’ In the Phénoménologie de la perception, radical reflection elucidates the body schema as an essence that reveals itself within embodied existence, qua shaping the natural perceptual dialogue in which the perceiver and the perceived permeate and separate from one another. In these two conceptions of embodiment, we progressively see how the dialectical principle of embodiment must reveal and conceive itself within embodiment itself. Science, on the other hand, follows the phenomena of the body to a certain point, but refuses to allow that embodiment is self-conceptual. I illustrate this using the example of
dynamic systems theory, an inheritor of the tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. In this way, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the dialectic of embodiment as self-conceptual is
important to problems in contemporary thought.

http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/6444/1/Fold_and_Body_Schema_Open_Access_Preprint.pdf

 

[smcder]

@smcder I read this a few days ago. I found it helpful.

However I'm still not sure I grok the phenomenologist approach to perception.

Section 2 of the above paper was unclear to me. I'm not sure if a) I'm not understanding the approach or 2) I simply disagree with the approach.

Can we discuss section 2 in regard to perception.

My main question is: does the approach to perception outlined in section 2 contradict the approach to perception outlined by Strawson's in the paper we all read and discussed a while back.

That is, that perception by an organism entails some physiological change X1 when organism interacts with external stimulus X.

If I need to be more clear, I will try.

Can you quote a specific part of section 2?

 

[smcder]

(1) Substance is a category for which between a person (or sentient) and its "object," can discern "tangibility" from it's own ability to interact with the same. The intent is to show that somehow these relations exist independent of the special interactions required to "bring it up into being." We use the word to try to excise (or what Heidegger called "de-worlding") its being from the necessary relations (for us) which we had already found without noticing. The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world."

(2) The method we use cut our space of experience into "ourselves," "tools" and "not-ourselves" --- this methodical dualism is just as artificial as the very categories we are trying to interrogate. The fundamental relation is that of "questioner of being" and "being that is questioned" -- which leads to something we "experience" as consciousness. This is how "things" become "thinks" (Alan Watts).

(3) The above problems are what I mean by the "spectre of substance" since it is our own (but yet they themselves "seem" to be objects). By "objects" I mean anything that causes our bodies to actively interrogate what we consider to be. We forget the the very foundation of being lies in our ability to raise these apparitions and treat them as substances.

I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter...but I think we can probably work it out ourselves by looking at a dictionary definition of "substance" and working out the presumptions.

If we do that, what do we get?

The above seems an interesting "Mischung" of eastern philosophy (papanca) and phenomenology - which has its own acknowledgement of conceptual proliferation
... but what do you do with it?

 

[smcder]

The Fold and The Body Schema in Merleau-Ponty
and Dynamic Systems Theory
David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University,

Published in Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies
Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought
1 (1999): 275-286
Department of Philosophy - Philosophy - University of Memphis

Abstract:
Contemporary thought, whether it be in psychology, biology, immunology, philosophy of perception or philosophy of mind, is confronted with the breakdown of barriers between organism and environment, self and other, subject and object, perceiver and perceived. In this paper I show how
Merleau-Ponty can help us think about this problem, by attending to a methodological theme in the background of his dialectical conception of
embodiment. In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty conceives life as extension folding back upon itself so as to reveal Hegel’s ‘hidden
mind of nature.’ In the Phénoménologie de la perception, radical reflection elucidates the body schema as an essence that reveals itself within embodied existence, qua shaping the natural perceptual dialogue in which the perceiver and the perceived permeate and separate from one another. In these two conceptions of embodiment, we progressively see how the dialectical principle of embodiment must reveal and conceive itself within embodiment itself. Science, on the other hand, follows the phenomena of the body to a certain point, but refuses to allow that embodiment is self-conceptual. I illustrate this using the example of
dynamic systems theory, an inheritor of the tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. In this way, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the dialectic of embodiment as self-conceptual is
important to problems in contemporary thought.

http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/6444/1/Fold_and_Body_Schema_Open_Access_Preprint.pdf

I just started this so I don't know how relevant it'll be:

Some text here:

Chaos and Reductionism

 

[smcder]

The Fold and The Body Schema in Merleau-Ponty
and Dynamic Systems Theory
David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University,

Published in Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies
Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought
1 (1999): 275-286
Department of Philosophy - Philosophy - University of Memphis

Abstract:
Contemporary thought, whether it be in psychology, biology, immunology, philosophy of perception or philosophy of mind, is confronted with the breakdown of barriers between organism and environment, self and other, subject and object, perceiver and perceived. In this paper I show how
Merleau-Ponty can help us think about this problem, by attending to a methodological theme in the background of his dialectical conception of
embodiment. In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty conceives life as extension folding back upon itself so as to reveal Hegel’s ‘hidden
mind of nature.’ In the Phénoménologie de la perception, radical reflection elucidates the body schema as an essence that reveals itself within embodied existence, qua shaping the natural perceptual dialogue in which the perceiver and the perceived permeate and separate from one another. In these two conceptions of embodiment, we progressively see how the dialectical principle of embodiment must reveal and conceive itself within embodiment itself. Science, on the other hand, follows the phenomena of the body to a certain point, but refuses to allow that embodiment is self-conceptual. I illustrate this using the example of
dynamic systems theory, an inheritor of the tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. In this way, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the dialectic of embodiment as self-conceptual is
important to problems in contemporary thought.

http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/6444/1/Fold_and_Body_Schema_Open_Access_Preprint.pdf

"For phenomenology, to comport oneself in this way is to grasp how one’s existence already mires one in an ongoing dialogue with things; it is this dialogue that guides one’s ‘return."

What does "return" mean here?

 

[Soupie]

What is the cosmogny of CR?

If we take the CR of Kafatos and Theise, the cosmogony isn't radically different than that understood in current physics.

Hoffman's CR is different due to his inclusion of Interface Theory. The notion that our perceptions are radically different from reality in-itself.

I think Neutral Monist approaches could be conceived in ways that do not have radically different cosmogony as well.

By radically different, I mean in the sense that "being" is essentially something that is self-interactive and able to differentiate, develop, and evolve.

Whether you start with Idealism or Materialism you have the same set of problems.

Hoffman wants to deduce objectivity from CAs (mathematical formalisms that cannot borrow anything from the objective) and Nagel challenges the Physicalist to give an objective accounting of "what it is like"-ness.

There is a lot here. ... Don't want to rush it.

True objectivity may be (probably is?) impossible. In principle. But if not in principle, definitely in practice. Intersubjectivity is the best we can

 

[smcder]

"For phenomenology, to comport oneself in this way is to grasp how one’s existence already mires one in an ongoing dialogue with things; it is this dialogue that guides one’s ‘return."

What does "return" mean here?

Return to the things themselves?

 

[smcder]

If we take the CR of Kafatos and Theise, the cosmogony isn't radically different than that understood in current physics.

Hoffman's CR is different due to his inclusion of Interface Theory. The notion that our perceptions are radically different from reality in-itself.

I think Neutral Monist approaches could be conceived in ways that do not have radically different cosmogony as well.

By radically different, I mean in the sense that "being" is essentially something that is self-interactive and able to differentiate, develop, and evolve.


There is a lot here. ... Don't want to rush it.

True objectivity may be (probably is?) impossible. In principle. But if not in principle, definitely in practice. Intersubjectivity is the best we can

I'm looking for the story from Big Bang (at least) to now ... or, at the earliest, 1968

 

[smcder]

I'm looking for the story from Big Bang (at least) to now ... or, at the earliest, 1968

What does this look like with CR?

 

[Soupie]

I'm looking for the story from Big Bang (at least) to now ... or, at the earliest, 1968

Again, why does it have to be radically different than where we are right now? Consider QM and the measurement problem. Quantum mechanics are beginning to wonder how conscious decisions to measure reality affect reality.

Neutral Monism and/or the CR of Kafatos and Theise wouldn't radically change our intersubjectively established physics. A physics that certainly isn't complete. A physics that needs to incorporate subjectivity into sooner than later anyhow.

 

[smcder]

Again, why does it have to be radically different than where we are right now? Consider QM and the measurement problem. Quantum mechanics are beginning to wonder how conscious decisions to measure reality affect reality.

Neutral Monism and/or the CR of Kafatos and Theise wouldn't radically change our intersubjectively established physics. A physics that certainly isn't complete. A physics that needs to incorporate subjectivity into sooner than later anyhow.

I thought CR started with CAs? CAs are fundamental and matter is illusory?

 

[smcder]

I thought CR started with CAs? CAs are fundamental and matter is illusory?

So the physical story starts with physical forces and materials even though the physics isn't well understood:

"The Planck epoch is an era in traditional (non-inflationary) big bang cosmology wherein the temperature was so high that the four fundamental forces—electromagnetism, gravitation, weak nuclear interaction, and strong nuclear interaction—were one fundamental force. Little is understood about physics at this temperature; different hypotheses propose different scenarios. Traditional big bang cosmology predicts a gravitational singularity before this time, but this theory relies on the theory of general relativity, which is thought to break down for this epoch due to quantum effects."

The story continues along a more familiar narrative to a point where life starts:



And at some point consciousness "emerges".

Does it make sense to ask for a similar timeline for a CA based cosmogony? At what point did the illusion of "matter" appear?

 

[smcder]

Again, why does it have to be radically different than where we are right now? Consider QM and the measurement problem. Quantum mechanics are beginning to wonder how conscious decisions to measure reality affect reality.

Neutral Monism and/or the CR of Kafatos and Theise wouldn't radically change our intersubjectively established physics. A physics that certainly isn't complete. A physics that needs to incorporate subjectivity into sooner than later anyhow.

What role did consciousness play:

1. Pre Big Bang
2. At the Bang
3. In the first three minutes after?

 

[Soupie]

What role did consciousness play:

1. Pre Big Bang
2. At the Bang
3. In the first three minutes after?

If the approach is CR, then consciousness didn't play a "role," it just is consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

I thought CR started with CAs? CAs are fundamental and matter is illusory?

That's Hoffman's version which includes Interface Theory. See Kafatos and Thiese.

 

[smcder]

The Fold and The Body Schema in Merleau-Ponty
and Dynamic Systems Theory
David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University,

Published in Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies
Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought
1 (1999): 275-286
Department of Philosophy - Philosophy - University of Memphis

Abstract:
Contemporary thought, whether it be in psychology, biology, immunology, philosophy of perception or philosophy of mind, is confronted with the breakdown of barriers between organism and environment, self and other, subject and object, perceiver and perceived. In this paper I show how
Merleau-Ponty can help us think about this problem, by attending to a methodological theme in the background of his dialectical conception of
embodiment. In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty conceives life as extension folding back upon itself so as to reveal Hegel’s ‘hidden
mind of nature.’ In the Phénoménologie de la perception, radical reflection elucidates the body schema as an essence that reveals itself within embodied existence, qua shaping the natural perceptual dialogue in which the perceiver and the perceived permeate and separate from one another. In these two conceptions of embodiment, we progressively see how the dialectical principle of embodiment must reveal and conceive itself within embodiment itself. Science, on the other hand, follows the phenomena of the body to a certain point, but refuses to allow that embodiment is self-conceptual. I illustrate this using the example of
dynamic systems theory, an inheritor of the tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. In this way, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the dialectic of embodiment as self-conceptual is
important to problems in contemporary thought.

http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/6444/1/Fold_and_Body_Schema_Open_Access_Preprint.pdf

"Although the above analysis takes up the example of the human arm, it treats the arm in terms of merely vital behaviour, that is, it treats it on an organic level, in abstraction from the totality of the perceptual field and being in the world. The fact that dynamic systems theory veers away from the self-conceptuality of the phenomenon becomes clearer if we shift to a treatment of the full human dimension of motor-perceptual behaviour. So let me try and deepen the above by shifting into the world of perception, away from a discussion of the vital order in La structure du comportement, to a discussion of the body schema in Phénoménologie de la perception."

 

[Soupie]

At what point did the illusion of "matter" appear?

When human subjects appeared.