I've just come across an interesting post by @Soupie in Part 4 related to the idea of views from nowhere or everywhere:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4
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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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Here's a link I posted in Part 4 to a paper by Dan Zahavi on Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. I don't remember whether we discussed it at that point (will soon find out), but I think we should look into it now since this project is very much alive in consciousness studies and we've recently linked to several other papers concerning it.
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/Phenomenology-naturalization.pdf_copy
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/Phenomenology-naturalization.pdf_copy
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
A new framework has occurred to me just lately...*squirrel*!!
The universe (inner world model) that we've constructed has been construed by our own faculties as having independent "meaningful" relations withing its own objects we've identified with our own mapped in toy conceptual models. We project the independence of interrelated independence of objects from our own mechanism of relations. In short, we are trying to construct a "meaningful" domain of being that has no user...a computer with no interface to a user (analogy--rough). What I am saying is that we ourselves have the key to meaning and being and yet the program we install to represent being to ourselves demands independence in its relations. We act as thought our own decisions and actions and responses to the world are universal to all other sentients, but since we ourselves cannot comprehend the unity of ourselves with the environment, we divide the world into objects which "exist unto themselves for a greater purpose." What if we are simply trying to describe the unity of DNA replicants with the world without having the necessary longevity of DNA egoism? Dawkins says we are "survival machines" created by our ancient (billions...) DNA replicants (Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen based nanobots). Are we simply the oldest "AI" in existence? Even better, what if the world "artificial" was useless in describing the emergency (yes, I am using this word) of "intelligence."
Matter is the mother of all being, intelligence and consciousness..this statement is incontrovertible. Analysis of our own experience of consciousness by the lower methods of relationships necessary for that emergence may never fully "explain" itself the the same individual exercising their questioning...inquiry.
Heidegger starts with a question...and the more we dissolve the question of being and make concrete the constituents the less we understand being...but the more we question the questioning...that's a step toward understanding the mis-understanding...we must examine our own methods of confusion before we dissolve the confusion itself. In Zen terms, the problem must vanish in a higher order of thinking. But this higher order of thinking cannot be experienced by focusing on your own thoughts.
Edit: Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen (Hydrogen, proton electron a given)...I mention as a plug to the Emerald Tablet thesis CNO cycle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia but this is a whole other story to be reserved for another thread
DNA Star stuff: DNA - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The universe (inner world model) that we've constructed has been construed by our own faculties as having independent "meaningful" relations withing its own objects we've identified with our own mapped in toy conceptual models. We project the independence of interrelated independence of objects from our own mechanism of relations. In short, we are trying to construct a "meaningful" domain of being that has no user...a computer with no interface to a user (analogy--rough). What I am saying is that we ourselves have the key to meaning and being and yet the program we install to represent being to ourselves demands independence in its relations. We act as thought our own decisions and actions and responses to the world are universal to all other sentients, but since we ourselves cannot comprehend the unity of ourselves with the environment, we divide the world into objects which "exist unto themselves for a greater purpose." What if we are simply trying to describe the unity of DNA replicants with the world without having the necessary longevity of DNA egoism? Dawkins says we are "survival machines" created by our ancient (billions...) DNA replicants (Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen based nanobots). Are we simply the oldest "AI" in existence? Even better, what if the world "artificial" was useless in describing the emergency (yes, I am using this word) of "intelligence."
Matter is the mother of all being, intelligence and consciousness..this statement is incontrovertible. Analysis of our own experience of consciousness by the lower methods of relationships necessary for that emergence may never fully "explain" itself the the same individual exercising their questioning...inquiry.
Heidegger starts with a question...and the more we dissolve the question of being and make concrete the constituents the less we understand being...but the more we question the questioning...that's a step toward understanding the mis-understanding...we must examine our own methods of confusion before we dissolve the confusion itself. In Zen terms, the problem must vanish in a higher order of thinking. But this higher order of thinking cannot be experienced by focusing on your own thoughts.
Edit: Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen (Hydrogen, proton electron a given)...I mention as a plug to the Emerald Tablet thesis CNO cycle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia but this is a whole other story to be reserved for another thread
DNA Star stuff: DNA - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
humans represent only the tiniest fraction of the earths typical self-replicating entities (conscious or otherwise). Our own powerful self-referencing module (awareness) makes us think we are special, but in fact we are only the tiniest fraction (infinitesimal if you consider other worlds, planets, galaxies) of self-replicants. Our consciousness is as ubiquitous as the sand and dirt under our feet (produced by the same stellar nucleosynthesis that powers all being)...
Welcome back, Michael. I'll have to read your posts several times (as usual) to begin to grok what you're getting at. It feels similar to what you've expressed before but coming from a greater distance, a maybe cosmic perspective? Each of us is of course no more than (far less than) a grain of sand in the larger senses and awareness of the universe or cosmos we entertain in our time, but then again, it is out of our consciousnesses that we entertain these senses, this awareness, these ideas. That in itself suggests that consciousness along with life itself is seeded by the stars [eta: though we don't know how or why].
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Still reading in Part 4 I've come across this post linking further thinking by Max Velmans and a video lecture on this subject:
Max Velmans, "From West toward East in Five Simple Steps".
Abstract : Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential primacy. No alternative metaphysical view is espoused (not even a variety of Spinoza’s attractive double-aspect theory). Instead, an alternative stance, inspired from F. Varela’s neurophenomenology is advocated. This unfamiliar stance involves (i) a complete redefinition of the boundary between unquestioned assumptions and relevant questions ; (ii) a descent towards the common ground of the statements of phenomenology and objective natural science : a practice motivated by the quest of an expanding circle of intersubjective agreement. Keywords : Consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, quantum mechanics, neurophysiology, neurophenomenology
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4
Max Velmans, "From West toward East in Five Simple Steps".
Abstract : Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential primacy. No alternative metaphysical view is espoused (not even a variety of Spinoza’s attractive double-aspect theory). Instead, an alternative stance, inspired from F. Varela’s neurophenomenology is advocated. This unfamiliar stance involves (i) a complete redefinition of the boundary between unquestioned assumptions and relevant questions ; (ii) a descent towards the common ground of the statements of phenomenology and objective natural science : a practice motivated by the quest of an expanding circle of intersubjective agreement. Keywords : Consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, quantum mechanics, neurophysiology, neurophenomenology
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4
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The post that follows it refers to this paper:
Is Consciousness primary?
Michel Bitbol CREA, CNRS / Ecole Polytechnique, 1, rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France NeuroQuantology, vol. 6, n°1, 53-72, 2008
Abstract : Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential primacy. No alternative metaphysical view is espoused (not even a variety of Spinoza’s attractive double-aspect theory). Instead, an alternative stance, inspired from F. Varela’s neurophenomenology is advocated. This unfamiliar stance involves (i) a complete redefinition of the boundary between unquestioned assumptions and relevant questions ; (ii) a descent towards the common ground of the statements of phenomenology and objective natural science : a practice motivated by the quest of an expanding circle of intersubjective agreement. Keywords : Consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, quantum mechanics, neurophysiology, neurophenomenology
Is Consciousness primary?
Michel Bitbol CREA, CNRS / Ecole Polytechnique, 1, rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France NeuroQuantology, vol. 6, n°1, 53-72, 2008
Abstract : Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential primacy. No alternative metaphysical view is espoused (not even a variety of Spinoza’s attractive double-aspect theory). Instead, an alternative stance, inspired from F. Varela’s neurophenomenology is advocated. This unfamiliar stance involves (i) a complete redefinition of the boundary between unquestioned assumptions and relevant questions ; (ii) a descent towards the common ground of the statements of phenomenology and objective natural science : a practice motivated by the quest of an expanding circle of intersubjective agreement. Keywords : Consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, quantum mechanics, neurophysiology, neurophenomenology
From the Conscious Entities blog I linked above (from Part 4), here is a succinct expression of a vexing conceptual knot that I think we can untie together (residing at the core of 'physicalist' presuppositions in standard neuroscience). Let's see if we can untie it just from these statements below. If not, perhaps reading the Bitbol paper linked in my preceding post can untie the knot for us, or it may be that we will have to read Varela diligently and thoroughly in order to witness the untying of the knot. In any case, if we untie the knot we will likely all obtain an understanding of the core insight of phenomenological philosophy.
"50. Tom Clark says:
Arnold: “Tom, how can you say that ‘the fundamental laws/entities of physics don’t supervene on anything’? Don’t they supervene on the internal representations of the human brain that invents these laws and entities. We believe that they exist independently of any cognizing creature, but because scientific understanding is always provisional, we can only assert that the so-called fundamental laws are our best current model of physical reality.”
We *represent that* the fundamental laws of nature don’t supervene on anything since *in our model of reality* they are fundamental – that on which everything else depends in 3rd person explanations and descriptions. In our model of reality, the fundamental laws don’t supervene on our brains, rather our *model of reality* supervenes on our brains, and thus we understand our model to be fallible, as you say. The idea of a representation-independent reality is built into the very idea of representation itself, and along with it the idea that our models are better or worse representations of that reality.
March 11, 2011, 3:49 pm
51. Arnold Trehub says:
Tom, I agree that the idea of representation-independent reality is built into the concept of transparent representation. But even the proposition that “the fundamental laws of nature don’t supervene on anything” is itself a brain model of an unexplained reality. It asserts something (e.g., the fundamental forces), but is not an explanation of what it asserts; i.e., there is no logical derivation. It seems to me that justification for proposing the sheer existence of such fundamentals is a pragmatic one; they enable explanation and prediction of things that interest us. As far as I can see, physics is a product of biology and is absolutely constrained (supervenience?) by the structure and dynamics of the human brain.
March 11, 2011, 7:08 pm
52. Charles Wolverton says:
Tom –
“I wouldn’t call phenomenal experience (PE) an illusion since it’s undeniably real.”
I have been rather surprised at the number of people who use that argument. Perhaps I’m missing something, but to me it seems obviously bogus. After all, the definition of “illusion” is:
Something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
It’s admittedly tricky to put the idea into clear language, so perhaps we’re actually in agreement but just using different descriptive metaphors. I’m not arguing that we don’t have PE – the sense of watching a “movie” of the ego-centered environment in the Cartesian Theater and acting in response, only that all of that is an illusion. I speculate that as language users, we have an ability to verbally describe the content of whatever models of the environment reside in whatever processors there are, and that ability becomes manifest via the illusion of PE.
The how and why of that illusion is, of course, TBD. And while it is a fascinating problem, I don’t see that it warrants anything like the borderline religious devotion it is accorded as long as no one can even offer viable speculations about the why, never mind the how. Anyway, since we seem to agree that whatever else PE is or isn’t, it isn’t causal, we can probably move on with no loss.
Although the conscious subject is not in an observational, epistemic relation to experience (a point Arnold makes as well), it’s still the case that as organisms we observe our environment”
Although I think I understand the distinction you want to make, the language just doesn’t work for me. Even ignoring that I don’t know what it would even mean to be “in an observational, epistemic relation to experience“, by distinguishing between the stimulus-response processing that doesn’t involve PE and the PE itself we have created an ambiguity in all visual metaphors – which part of the dichotomy does “observing” refer to?. Consequently, describing either part using such metaphors seems unnecessarily confusing, since not everyone (apparently, hardly anyone so far) is on-board with that dichotomy. Although it’s somewhat awkward to say it without them, it seems well worth the extra effort if doing so avoids such confusion. For example, although I agree with the sentiment of:
we have a 1pp on the world, that is, we observe it from an egocentric spatial and temporal perspective tied to our bodies.”
the visual metaphors undesirably mix the “real” stimulus-response processing and the “illusory” PE while adding nothing to a description purely in terms of sensory inputs, environment modeling, and resultant outputs. If PE isn’t causal, what is gained by language that implies that it is, or at least causes readers mistakenly to infer that it is?
it’s a public fact about the chair that its blue, even though I can’t specify a private fact about blueness as a quale. I know the chair is blue even though I don’t know any private facts about blue.”
I think what you’re addressing here is what I tried to address (even by my standards, quite ineptly – mea culpa) in comment 31 above. My problem is with the word “fact”, which for me has to do with knowledge. We can “know facts” about some things – ie, make assertions about the thing that we can justify within a specified community. As you note, one can assert “That chair over there, viewed from here in this ambient light, appears to be (is) blue” – “appears to be” or “is” depending on the level of confidence in the assertion – and give reasons for believing that assertion to be “true” based on consensus within the community about information and/or observations accessible to everyone in the community. Members of the community can also discuss their own PEs of the chair, but no one in the community can “know facts” (in the stated sense) about any individual’s PE, including their own, because there is no such commonly accessible basis for justifying assertions about that PE.
Does that capture your position?
March 11, 2011, 10:23 pm
53. Vicente says:
It seems to me that the lack of a clear definition of what is a causal agent in the consciousness problem arena, and how do the cause-effect chains work as human behaviour drivers (understanding the decision making process) is a major impediment to understand[ing] the role that phenomenal experience plays in our existence."
Ephaptic consciousness?
ETA: We do need to read beyond post 53 to observe the subsequent grappling with this 'knot' on the part of the four conversants in aid of our own grappling.
"50. Tom Clark says:
Arnold: “Tom, how can you say that ‘the fundamental laws/entities of physics don’t supervene on anything’? Don’t they supervene on the internal representations of the human brain that invents these laws and entities. We believe that they exist independently of any cognizing creature, but because scientific understanding is always provisional, we can only assert that the so-called fundamental laws are our best current model of physical reality.”
We *represent that* the fundamental laws of nature don’t supervene on anything since *in our model of reality* they are fundamental – that on which everything else depends in 3rd person explanations and descriptions. In our model of reality, the fundamental laws don’t supervene on our brains, rather our *model of reality* supervenes on our brains, and thus we understand our model to be fallible, as you say. The idea of a representation-independent reality is built into the very idea of representation itself, and along with it the idea that our models are better or worse representations of that reality.
March 11, 2011, 3:49 pm
51. Arnold Trehub says:
Tom, I agree that the idea of representation-independent reality is built into the concept of transparent representation. But even the proposition that “the fundamental laws of nature don’t supervene on anything” is itself a brain model of an unexplained reality. It asserts something (e.g., the fundamental forces), but is not an explanation of what it asserts; i.e., there is no logical derivation. It seems to me that justification for proposing the sheer existence of such fundamentals is a pragmatic one; they enable explanation and prediction of things that interest us. As far as I can see, physics is a product of biology and is absolutely constrained (supervenience?) by the structure and dynamics of the human brain.
March 11, 2011, 7:08 pm
52. Charles Wolverton says:
Tom –
“I wouldn’t call phenomenal experience (PE) an illusion since it’s undeniably real.”
I have been rather surprised at the number of people who use that argument. Perhaps I’m missing something, but to me it seems obviously bogus. After all, the definition of “illusion” is:
Something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
It’s admittedly tricky to put the idea into clear language, so perhaps we’re actually in agreement but just using different descriptive metaphors. I’m not arguing that we don’t have PE – the sense of watching a “movie” of the ego-centered environment in the Cartesian Theater and acting in response, only that all of that is an illusion. I speculate that as language users, we have an ability to verbally describe the content of whatever models of the environment reside in whatever processors there are, and that ability becomes manifest via the illusion of PE.
The how and why of that illusion is, of course, TBD. And while it is a fascinating problem, I don’t see that it warrants anything like the borderline religious devotion it is accorded as long as no one can even offer viable speculations about the why, never mind the how. Anyway, since we seem to agree that whatever else PE is or isn’t, it isn’t causal, we can probably move on with no loss.
Although the conscious subject is not in an observational, epistemic relation to experience (a point Arnold makes as well), it’s still the case that as organisms we observe our environment”
Although I think I understand the distinction you want to make, the language just doesn’t work for me. Even ignoring that I don’t know what it would even mean to be “in an observational, epistemic relation to experience“, by distinguishing between the stimulus-response processing that doesn’t involve PE and the PE itself we have created an ambiguity in all visual metaphors – which part of the dichotomy does “observing” refer to?. Consequently, describing either part using such metaphors seems unnecessarily confusing, since not everyone (apparently, hardly anyone so far) is on-board with that dichotomy. Although it’s somewhat awkward to say it without them, it seems well worth the extra effort if doing so avoids such confusion. For example, although I agree with the sentiment of:
we have a 1pp on the world, that is, we observe it from an egocentric spatial and temporal perspective tied to our bodies.”
the visual metaphors undesirably mix the “real” stimulus-response processing and the “illusory” PE while adding nothing to a description purely in terms of sensory inputs, environment modeling, and resultant outputs. If PE isn’t causal, what is gained by language that implies that it is, or at least causes readers mistakenly to infer that it is?
it’s a public fact about the chair that its blue, even though I can’t specify a private fact about blueness as a quale. I know the chair is blue even though I don’t know any private facts about blue.”
I think what you’re addressing here is what I tried to address (even by my standards, quite ineptly – mea culpa) in comment 31 above. My problem is with the word “fact”, which for me has to do with knowledge. We can “know facts” about some things – ie, make assertions about the thing that we can justify within a specified community. As you note, one can assert “That chair over there, viewed from here in this ambient light, appears to be (is) blue” – “appears to be” or “is” depending on the level of confidence in the assertion – and give reasons for believing that assertion to be “true” based on consensus within the community about information and/or observations accessible to everyone in the community. Members of the community can also discuss their own PEs of the chair, but no one in the community can “know facts” (in the stated sense) about any individual’s PE, including their own, because there is no such commonly accessible basis for justifying assertions about that PE.
Does that capture your position?
March 11, 2011, 10:23 pm
53. Vicente says:
It seems to me that the lack of a clear definition of what is a causal agent in the consciousness problem arena, and how do the cause-effect chains work as human behaviour drivers (understanding the decision making process) is a major impediment to understand[ing] the role that phenomenal experience plays in our existence."
Ephaptic consciousness?
ETA: We do need to read beyond post 53 to observe the subsequent grappling with this 'knot' on the part of the four conversants in aid of our own grappling.
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"Grappling hooks
A grappling hook is a device with multiple hooks (known as claws or flukes), attached to a rope; it is thrown, dropped, sunk, projected, or fastened directly by hand to where at least one hook may catch and hold. Generally, grappling hooks are used to temporarily secure one end of a rope. They may also be used to dredge for submerged objects. Historically, grappling hooks were used in naval warfare to catch ship rigging so that it could be boarded."
Grappling hook - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A grappling hook is a device with multiple hooks (known as claws or flukes), attached to a rope; it is thrown, dropped, sunk, projected, or fastened directly by hand to where at least one hook may catch and hold. Generally, grappling hooks are used to temporarily secure one end of a rope. They may also be used to dredge for submerged objects. Historically, grappling hooks were used in naval warfare to catch ship rigging so that it could be boarded."
Grappling hook - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Searle is speaking.
See this by Arnold Trehub:
http://people.umass.edu/trehub/where-am-i-redux.pdf
and this:
-Web Page-Trehub - Cognitive Brain -
http://people.umass.edu/trehub/where-am-i-redux.pdf
and this:
-Web Page-Trehub - Cognitive Brain -
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Here is the conclusion of the Trehub paper "Where am I (Redux)," at http://people.umass.edu/trehub/where-am-i-redux.pdf .
"9. Conclusion
Our phenomenal world is such an omnipresent and intimate presence that we fail to see it as the fundamental referent of our concept of consciousness. From the subjective first-person perspective (from within the brain), it is simply my being here in this world with all of its present and possible contents. From the objective third-person perspective, it is a transparent brain representation of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective. How does the brain create this singular kind of representation? My proposal is that the retinoid system is the key to understanding subjectivity and our phenomenal world. The retinoid mechanisms provide the essential perspectival representation. Within the structure and dynamics of the retinoid system there are two critical aspects of a unitary neuronal self:
1. The self is the spatiotemporal origin of the phenomenal world in which we live.
2. The self is the fixed neuronal coordinate of reference (the 0,0,0 coordinate) for the brain mechanisms that represent the egocentric volumetric property of our phenomenal world; i.e., 3D retinoid space.
All illusions of 3D depth and motion that are induced when we look at two-dimensional figures are generated by the capacity of the retinoid mechanisms to segregate selected parts of 2D visual patterns onto separate Z-planes within the plenum of retinoid space.
Our phenomenal self-model (Metzinger, 2003) is a system of images and belief reflected in sentential propositions that can only be constructed on the neuronal foundation of the core self (I!) (Trehub, 2009). The out-of-body experience can be seen as a natural response to particular kinds of contrived visual and cutaneous stimuli because our sense of location in the physical world is determined by the perceptual contents of our retinoid space. Put another way, our phenomenal sense of where in physical space our physical body exists can be decoupled from our perspectival origin/self (I!), and when this happens, we can have the feeling of experiencing our self from outside of our own body.
Further reflection on the role of the retinoid system as a successful explanatory model for these and other empirical findings (Trehub, 1991, 2007) leads to the conclusion that neuronal activity within the brainʼs retinoid mechanisms and the content of phenomenal consciousness are dual aspects of the same underlying reality (Velmans, 2009).”
"9. Conclusion
Our phenomenal world is such an omnipresent and intimate presence that we fail to see it as the fundamental referent of our concept of consciousness. From the subjective first-person perspective (from within the brain), it is simply my being here in this world with all of its present and possible contents. From the objective third-person perspective, it is a transparent brain representation of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective. How does the brain create this singular kind of representation? My proposal is that the retinoid system is the key to understanding subjectivity and our phenomenal world. The retinoid mechanisms provide the essential perspectival representation. Within the structure and dynamics of the retinoid system there are two critical aspects of a unitary neuronal self:
1. The self is the spatiotemporal origin of the phenomenal world in which we live.
2. The self is the fixed neuronal coordinate of reference (the 0,0,0 coordinate) for the brain mechanisms that represent the egocentric volumetric property of our phenomenal world; i.e., 3D retinoid space.
All illusions of 3D depth and motion that are induced when we look at two-dimensional figures are generated by the capacity of the retinoid mechanisms to segregate selected parts of 2D visual patterns onto separate Z-planes within the plenum of retinoid space.
Our phenomenal self-model (Metzinger, 2003) is a system of images and belief reflected in sentential propositions that can only be constructed on the neuronal foundation of the core self (I!) (Trehub, 2009). The out-of-body experience can be seen as a natural response to particular kinds of contrived visual and cutaneous stimuli because our sense of location in the physical world is determined by the perceptual contents of our retinoid space. Put another way, our phenomenal sense of where in physical space our physical body exists can be decoupled from our perspectival origin/self (I!), and when this happens, we can have the feeling of experiencing our self from outside of our own body.
Further reflection on the role of the retinoid system as a successful explanatory model for these and other empirical findings (Trehub, 1991, 2007) leads to the conclusion that neuronal activity within the brainʼs retinoid mechanisms and the content of phenomenal consciousness are dual aspects of the same underlying reality (Velmans, 2009).”
Sixty-four publications of Arnold Trehub available at researchgate:
Arnold Trehub - Publications
Recommendations:
Evolution's Gift: Subjectivity and the Phenomenal World
Two arguments for a pre-reflective core self: Commentary on Praetorius (2009)
Space, Self, and the Theatre of Consciousness
The Science of Consciousness: Where It is and Where It Should be
A Foundation for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (on dual-aspect monism)
Alfredo Pereira Jr. Jonathan C.W. Edwards Dietrich Lehmann Chris Nunn Arnold Trehub and MaxVelmans, Understanding Consciousness A Collaborative Attempt to Elucidate Contemporary Theories
Arnold Trehub - Publications
Recommendations:
Evolution's Gift: Subjectivity and the Phenomenal World
Two arguments for a pre-reflective core self: Commentary on Praetorius (2009)
Space, Self, and the Theatre of Consciousness
The Science of Consciousness: Where It is and Where It Should be
A Foundation for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (on dual-aspect monism)
Alfredo Pereira Jr. Jonathan C.W. Edwards Dietrich Lehmann Chris Nunn Arnold Trehub and MaxVelmans, Understanding Consciousness A Collaborative Attempt to Elucidate Contemporary Theories
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As is obvious from the number of citations and links I've provided to published works by Arnold Trehub, I find his 'model' of consciousness to be persuasive, and I'm interested in hearing what @Soupie thinks about it as a 'model' as well as what others think about it as a theory of consciousness. I want to add one more link today to a discussion of Trehub's theory at the conscious agents site. Here is an extract:
"13. Vicente says:
Arnold: Up to what extent is the retinoid model compatible with other models of consciousness neurological foundation?
For example, the Global Workspace idea in which information has to be spawned to several areas synchronously is gaining acceptance, at least as a precondition for brain conscious states activation (fMRI and EEG recordings seems to match this model quite well). The extension of the retinoid structure to this broadcasting of information to several areas doesn’t seem easy to do. Could it be possible to consider a wide(whole) area retinoid network, build with several distributed subnetworks, or rather a central retinoid hub (multilayered) receiving information of different nature, multi-sensorial, emotional, memories, etc to build a whole egocentric space.
14. Arnold Trehub says:
Vicente: “Could it be possible to consider a wide(whole) area retinoid network, build with several distributed subnetworks, or rather a central retinoid hub (multilayered) receiving information of different nature, multi-sensorial, emotional, memories, etc to build a whole egocentric space.”
Yes. Retinoid space *is* a central hub and a global workspace. This is just what is shown in Fig. 8 in my paper *Space, self, and the theater of consciousness*. Notice, however, that a global workspace, as such, does not constitute consciousness. For example, a Google server center is a vast global workspace but we would not consider it to be conscious. What is lacking in the Google workspace (or Baar’s global workspace) is *subjectivity* — a locus of perspectival origin within a volumetric surround, namely a core self (I!). In conscious creatures like us, our phenomenal world as it is constituted by autaptic-cell activity in our egocentric retinoid space *is* our global workspace.
Put it this way:
Phenomenal world/consciousness = global activity in retinoid space = global workspace with subjectivity.
Here’s what I wrote in the *Edge* in response to a research presentation by Dehaene:
“Stan Dehaene has done excellent work in exploring the neuronal correlates of the brain’s global workspace. But we have to recognize that what he and his colleagues are measuring are the brain changes in response to a novel perception of a previously masked object by a person who is already conscious. I agree with Steve Pinker that a global workspace is a key function of consciousness, but it is not an explanation of consciousness. In order to understand consciousness we have to explain how the brain is able to represent a volumetric world filled with objects and events from our own privileged egocentric perspective — the problem of subjectivity. This challenge is compounded by the fact that we have no sensory apparatus for detecting the 3D space in which we live.”
Retinoid Consciousness
"13. Vicente says:
Arnold: Up to what extent is the retinoid model compatible with other models of consciousness neurological foundation?
For example, the Global Workspace idea in which information has to be spawned to several areas synchronously is gaining acceptance, at least as a precondition for brain conscious states activation (fMRI and EEG recordings seems to match this model quite well). The extension of the retinoid structure to this broadcasting of information to several areas doesn’t seem easy to do. Could it be possible to consider a wide(whole) area retinoid network, build with several distributed subnetworks, or rather a central retinoid hub (multilayered) receiving information of different nature, multi-sensorial, emotional, memories, etc to build a whole egocentric space.
14. Arnold Trehub says:
Vicente: “Could it be possible to consider a wide(whole) area retinoid network, build with several distributed subnetworks, or rather a central retinoid hub (multilayered) receiving information of different nature, multi-sensorial, emotional, memories, etc to build a whole egocentric space.”
Yes. Retinoid space *is* a central hub and a global workspace. This is just what is shown in Fig. 8 in my paper *Space, self, and the theater of consciousness*. Notice, however, that a global workspace, as such, does not constitute consciousness. For example, a Google server center is a vast global workspace but we would not consider it to be conscious. What is lacking in the Google workspace (or Baar’s global workspace) is *subjectivity* — a locus of perspectival origin within a volumetric surround, namely a core self (I!). In conscious creatures like us, our phenomenal world as it is constituted by autaptic-cell activity in our egocentric retinoid space *is* our global workspace.
Put it this way:
Phenomenal world/consciousness = global activity in retinoid space = global workspace with subjectivity.
Here’s what I wrote in the *Edge* in response to a research presentation by Dehaene:
“Stan Dehaene has done excellent work in exploring the neuronal correlates of the brain’s global workspace. But we have to recognize that what he and his colleagues are measuring are the brain changes in response to a novel perception of a previously masked object by a person who is already conscious. I agree with Steve Pinker that a global workspace is a key function of consciousness, but it is not an explanation of consciousness. In order to understand consciousness we have to explain how the brain is able to represent a volumetric world filled with objects and events from our own privileged egocentric perspective — the problem of subjectivity. This challenge is compounded by the fact that we have no sensory apparatus for detecting the 3D space in which we live.”
Retinoid Consciousness
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I too have a strong affinity for this model of how an organism might come to have subjective, phenomenal experience. However, I must admit surprise to hear you express the same as what follows from such a model is unpalatable to many.
For if the world as we experience it is a "representation" within the organism (ie within the brain), then as Lehar suggested: the dome of the sky is within the skull.
Now, this does not mean that objective, external reality is literally within the skull. Objective, external reality remains firmly outside the skull, but on this model, our experience of objective, external reality is firmly within the skull.
Why is this a big deal? A representation of objective reality is decidedly distinct from objective reality. Ex. An acrylic painting of a sunrise is very different from a sunrise.
Well, we think to ourselves, a table is a table, the breeze a breeze, water water, and solid matter is of course solid matter.
But we just agreed that what we experience of objective reality is a representation of reality, and not objective reality in-its-self. Indeed, Trehub using scientifically, empirically grounded data says that the 3D nature of phenomenal reality is created by the neural mechanisms that form retinoid space. This has to be so because there is no way for humans to acquire 3D data about objective reality via the nervous system. Thus, any experience of 3D space must be created within the organism.
This means that objective reality and our experience of objective reality are distinct. On Hoffman's model they are radically distinct.
On this model (and most mainstream models), experience of external reality is via internal representations within the brain. But we musn't lose sight of the fact that on this very model, the brain is a representation within the mind!
We must take these representations (experiences) seriously, but not literally.
Is it possible that by some miracle or by some design that humans have evolved to represent objective reality almost veridically? Let's imagine for a moment that we have. Even so, experience of external reality is not external reality (but it does, of course, take place within (external) reality).
So what I take from this model is not a Dual Aspect ontology in which mind and matter are two equal aspects of objective reality, but rather an ontology in which mind is primary while spacetime and matter become derivative representations within the mind.
Moreover, both scientific and contemplative investigations indicate that the experienced unity of the phenomenal self and mind is illusory. We might assume that the mind is forged by the brain, but we musn't forget that what we experience as brains are representations of "somethings somewhere" in external reality. So the brain is forged by the mind.
The brain contains the mind; the mind contains the brain.
A passage in a book I am currently reading conveyed the following (paraphrase): "we must not discard the past, but build upon it and correct it when necessary in the present, but do so in a way that leaves the present open to the same possibility of transcendence in the future."
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Trehub does not draw the conclusion you draw, that "the world as we experience it is a "representation" within the organism (ie within the brain)." You will recognize this as you engage his thinking in the analyses he provides in the papers I've linked. Trehub has looked for and found (in my opinion) a bridge over the gap between the physical and the mental recognized in the hard problem.
Before I saw your post I was about to post the following further extract from a discussion devoted to Trehub's 'model' at the consciousagents website, which I linked in my last post above. The exchange contained in this extract should clarify the way in which Trehub's 'model' expands the mental beyond 'representation' to recognize the foundational role of our direct, prereflective, experiential presence in and to the world in which we exist.
"20. Richard J R Miles says:
Arnold, re comment 14. I am puzzled by your last sentence where you say ‘we have no sensory apparatus for detecting 3D space.’ Surely our 3D bodies are covered with touch sensors, this with our eyes with peripheral vision, focusing, hearing and smell, linked with our nature/nurture memory of experience, all hopefully operational when we are conscious, enable us to sense our 3/4D world, plus you have also described the Z plane visual side of 3D sensing. So, what do you mean?
21. Arnold Trehub says:
Richard, what I mean is that *no* creatures, including humans, have sensory transducers that can *detect* the volumetric space they live in. Touch sensors, all of our visual sensory apparatus, audition, olfaction, and memory, can be in perfect working order, but if we had only these sensory systems and the memory of what they provide us, we would only have internal representations of events at the *proximal locus* of sensory stimulation — not a representation of the *surrounding egocentric space* in which the physical events that stimulate our sensors occur. The Z-planes of retinoid space do not *sense* the space we live in; they *constitute an innate phenomenal representation of the space we live in*. And it is into this phenomenal space of the retinoid system that our separate pre-conscious sensory signals are projected in spatio-temporal register as conscious perceptions. I hope this answers your question.
22. Richard J R Miles says:
Arnold, thank you. Yes it does answer my question, it is in fact the only answer I could envisage that you might give. There is however the fact that we do have knowledge and memory of movement from ourselves and other things that allow us to relate and make sense of our 3/4D world, which we learn from becoming self-aware after the age of 2 or 3 years through nature/nurture and knowledge of others past and present.”
Retinoid Consciousness
Recall MP's description of prereflective experience in and of the horizontal depth dimension of the environing world in which reflective consciousness arises. Prereflective experience grounds what MP called the "perceptual faith" out of which consciousness experiences the phenomenally experienced visible, audible, tactile, palpable world as real, actual, enabling the development of reflective thought and the works of mind produced in our species’ history. What Trehub provides is insight into how the biophysical affordances of the retinoid system develop from prereflective experiences in humans our capacity to envision ourselves as existing in a 3-D environment on the basis of which reflective thought about our situation in a physical world becomes possible in the first place. As the phenomenological philosophers have recognized all along, we are "always already" oriented to the environment in which we become reflectively conscious of our existential situation in a real world.
Trehaub has a commentary in the journal Consciousness and Cognition concerning Zahavi's work concerning prereflective consciousness in Husserl and some reactions to it that is brief but clarifying and might be a good place to start. It is entitled "Two arguments for a pre-reflective core self: Commentary on Praetorius (2008)" (linked through the researchgate compendium of Trehub's publications that I cited yesterday).
Trehub’s ‘model’ of the relationship of consciousness/mind and physical/biological world is analogical – encompassing both a} direct phenomenal (and prereflective) experience in and of the palpable environing 'world' and b} the identification of developing neurological affordances [in the retinoid system] that enable reflective consciousness and cognition on the basis of what is sensed in prereflective experience [self and 3D situation].
This post by Trehub in the first linked discussion at the consciousagents website should be helpful:
"What I suggested in #132 is that science is a pragmatic enterprise that takes explanation and successful prediction of “objective” events as its standard of success. This is a limiting factor in trying to understand the biophysical mechanisms responsible for the private 1pp [first-person] experience of any phenomenal content, qualia of any kind."
I hope this helps in approaching what Trehub offers. I've only been reading him for two days now, so I might not yet be explicating his model with precision, but I do see its epistemological and ontological significance for our project of understanding consciousness.
You continued in your post today:
As you say, "A representation of objective reality is decidedly distinct from objective reality." And likely our representations of 'objective reality', in the physical sciences as well as in philosophy, will remain incomplete and imperfectly understood. I personally do not understand why the undisclosed nature of 'objective reality' is so vexing a problem for you. I don't mean to be glib when I say "it is what it is." Biological being and the degrees of awareness, consciousness, and mind that develop out of our actual being-in-the-world provide us with access to increasing understanding of our nature and the nature of the Being within which we exist, but that access is positional, partial, and will not yield access to what you refer to as 'objective reality' in itself. My impression is that you have been encouraged by the still-dominant physicalist paradigm of contemporary science to hope that this science will ultimately reveal to us a wholly 'objective' description of reality, of 'what-is'. But our own experience in and of the world tells us that that is an unattainable goal.
That is not what Trehub says, as you will see if you engage his work. I find his 'model' productive for our increasing understanding of 'consciousness' to the extent that it provides a bridge across the gap [recognized as the hard problem] between what we can know on the basis of our experience and what we would like to know about the purported 'objective' reality that is supposed to generate what we experience and on that basis think.
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For anyone seeking an understanding of what is meant by 'prereflective consciousness', I recommend the following chapter from a book by Dan Zahavi on Husserl's phenomenology.
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publi...ousness_and_pre-reflective_self-awareness.pdf
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publi...ousness_and_pre-reflective_self-awareness.pdf
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Models of consciousness - Scholarpedia
Retinoid model
Trehub (1991, 2007) has proposed a set of minimal neuronal specifications for a system of brain mechanisms that enable it to model the world from a privileged egocentric perspective, arguing that neuronal activity in this ‘retinoid structure’ constitutes the phenomenal content of consciousness and provides a sense of self. The retinoid model can be viewed as a neural implementation of Baars' global workspace with additional emphasis on perspectivaleness (the unique spatiotemporal ‘origin’ of all of one's phenomenal experience), as emphasized by Revonsuo (2006) and Metzinger (below). According toTrehub, a phenomenal self model (Metzinger's PSM) cannot exist without the prior existence of the ‘self locus’, a neuronal entity constituting the ‘core self’ which is the origin of egocentric space. In the model, an innate core self is an essential part of a larger cognitive brain system which enables (among other important functions) a PSM to be constructed and reshaped as we mature and engage with the world (Trehub, 2007).
Retinoid model
Trehub (1991, 2007) has proposed a set of minimal neuronal specifications for a system of brain mechanisms that enable it to model the world from a privileged egocentric perspective, arguing that neuronal activity in this ‘retinoid structure’ constitutes the phenomenal content of consciousness and provides a sense of self. The retinoid model can be viewed as a neural implementation of Baars' global workspace with additional emphasis on perspectivaleness (the unique spatiotemporal ‘origin’ of all of one's phenomenal experience), as emphasized by Revonsuo (2006) and Metzinger (below). According toTrehub, a phenomenal self model (Metzinger's PSM) cannot exist without the prior existence of the ‘self locus’, a neuronal entity constituting the ‘core self’ which is the origin of egocentric space. In the model, an innate core self is an essential part of a larger cognitive brain system which enables (among other important functions) a PSM to be constructed and reshaped as we mature and engage with the world (Trehub, 2007).
The above paragraph presents an incomplete and inaccurate description of Trehub's model and misses the most significant elements of that model. If you substitute this paragraph for reading Trehub yourself you will not be able to comprehend what his model has to offer the field of consciousness studies. Your choice.
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