Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[smcder]

Thanks for your help Soupie.I've got a break coming up that will give me plenty time for some reading.

Let us know what you think, Ron. This thread itself is a good resource obviously and @Constance @Pharoah @Soupie bring good minds and other good qualities to it - a sustained conversation of this length online is a rarity and takes more than thought.

Once you find key terms - come back and search and see what's been touched on here and let us know what we've missed.

The only other thing is to note that it can be a dizzying topic, I won't say the standard advice not to look down is applicable, but you might mind what Nietzsche had to say on monsters and abysses, that , I believe, is applicable.

 

[smcder]

Yep, I follow all that. And I am aware of your appeal to nomological reasoning.

The issue you seem to be ignorant of (which I doubt) or seem to be side-stepping is the question of downward causation.

It's one thing to say that consciousness emerges (hierarchically) within nature; it's another thing to say that this ontologically new substance/property/construct can causally influence the substrate from which it emerged.

Note, I'm not saying it cannot; I'm only saying that we don't currently have models of how this might be the case.

I think it's safe to say, Pharoah, that most mainstream thinkers in philosophy would agree that consciousness emerges from living organisms. However, those same philosophers would stop at the notion that consciousness causally influences the organism. This seems to be a tenant of HCT. I think you need to own it and address it. I would lump most physicists and neuroscientists into this category as well. (Note that I'm saying "most " not all.)

Interestingly and not-without-confusion, the field of psychology/psychiatry seems—on the whole—to grant that consciousness emerges from the physical brain, while at the same time holding that consciousness can causally influence the body.

The fields of psychology and psychiatry are fundamentally a mess at their core for this very reason: we have no working model of the "psychophysical nexus" although it seems self-evident!

Approaches to, say, mental illness either appeal to physical, neurological processes or conceptual, social-emotional processes. There are no good models which combine the two. The reality is that there is a psychophysical nexus when it comes to mental health and mental illness, but there are no working, explanatory models!

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

name names?

 

[Constance]

The issue you seem to be ignorant of (which I doubt) or seem to be side-stepping is the question of downward causation.

It's one thing to say that consciousness emerges (hierarchically) within nature; it's another thing to say that this ontologically new substance/property/construct can causally influence the substrate from which it emerged.

Why must consciousness "causally influence the substrate" to satisfy your concept of the structure of reality/what-is. And what do you mean by 'the substrate' -- everything that has happened in nature prior to the beginning of the evolution of consciousness?

I think it's safe to say, Pharoah, that most mainstream thinkers in philosophy would agree that consciousness emerges from living organisms. However, those same philosophers would stop at the notion that consciousness causally influences the organism.

I doubt that. What do you base this claim on?

This seems to be a tenant [tenet] of HCT. I think you need to own it and address it. I would lump most physicists and neuroscientists into this category as well. (Note that I'm saying "most " not all.)

Interestingly and not-without-confusion, the field of psychology/psychiatry seems—on the whole—to grant that consciousness emerges from the physical brain, while at the same time holding that consciousness can causally influence the body.

The fields of psychology and psychiatry are fundamentally a mess at their core for this very reason: we have no working model of the "psychophysical nexus" although it seems self-evident!

It is self-evident that a 'psychophysical nexus' exists. It's also self-evident that no discipline has yet understood and explained fully how it develops and how it works in various species, nor will any single discipline in the near future likely be able to do so. The neuroscientific and informational 'models' you have brought to this discussion are merely hypothetical and preliminary to establishing a comprehensive model that is acceptable to all researchers working in the interdisciplinary field of CS. 'Models' are always constructed from current and limited knowledge. They can guide research and do, at the price that they often obscure what-is as a whole through lack of comprehension of the whole. It's all a work in progress and will be for a very long time.

Approaches to, say, mental illness either appeal to physical, neurological processes or conceptual, social-emotional processes. There are no good models which combine the two. The reality is that there is a psychophysical nexus when it comes to mental health and mental illness, but there are no working, explanatory models!

Exactly, and that's an example of what I was trying to say above.

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

Would love to have the link so we can discuss it.

 

[Constance]

How wonderful to see you back, Steve!!!

{Note to @Ron Away -- Steve is @smcder and a major contributor to this discussion since it began.}

 

[smcder]

thanks constance, it's good to be back

 

[Constance]

You've been missed, greatly missed. We might be honing in on some critical issues at this point and we will need your input. Happy day. I think I'll have a drink to celebrate.

 

[Soupie]

SEP says of mental causation:

"In metaphysics mental causation is said to be “at the heart of the mind-body problem” (Shoemaker 2001, p. 74),"

This is basically saying that the problem of mental causation is about the bridging of the mind/body chasm—what direction is the traffic flowing on the bridge? That is to say, it is about the problem of the two categories of mind and body conceived as two ontologically distinct realms.

Correct. I've asked you about the mind-body problem several times because it's central to HCT.

In the past you've rejected the above (standard) conception of the MBP. But can we now agree for the sake of discussion on the above conception of the MBP?

SEP says, "It's plausible to think that if the mental has any casual powers at all, it can affect the physical world." which is to imply that the mental, so conceived, is distinct from the physical world, or in some way separated from it.

I reject this notion of causation as it relates to the mental.

If I follow, you seem to be rejecting the notion that the mind is distinct or in some way separated from the physical substrate. So you think consciousness is physical? So if I follow, you might say that consciousness is physical, but that it is a distinct level of the hierarchy.

Might downward causation still need to be addressed in this case? Having the mind and body consist of the same ontological substrate would certainly make it an easier problem to address however.

 

[Soupie]

'Models' are always constructed from current and limited knowledge. They can guide research and do, at the price that they often obscure what-is as a whole through lack of comprehension of the whole. It's all a work in progress and will be for a very long time.

I don't disagree but I wonder: Do you think it's conceivable that we humans could understand/explain how consciousness relates to living organisms and yet fail to understand what-is as a whole?

 

[Soupie]

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

name names?

I'm in the process of reading two longish papers before I get to the one proposing causal dialogue between the mind and body. Will post here as I'm reading it or soon after.

 

[Constance]

{to @Pharoah}If I follow, you seem to be rejecting the notion that the mind is distinct or in some way separated from the physical substrate. So you think consciousness is physical? So if I follow, you might say that consciousness is physical, but that it is a distinct level of the hierarchy.

Soupie, why not accept that consciousness evolves in living beings out of the ground of incipient bodily 'self'-awareness -- 'affectivity' in Panksepp -- recognizable in primordial organisms and evolving in increasing complexity in prereflective/subconscious worldly experiences of organisms and animals?

By minute degrees in evolving species, reflective consciousness is added to prereflective consciousness, the latter a continuing fund of experience and memory that continues to be essential to every kind of organic being, including us.

Mind is a gradual achievement in our species and in some others such as whales, elephants, dolphins, birds, and it does not separate any of us from the physical world from which we have emerged. How could it when half of our being, even now, maintains and remembers (at a subconscious level that affects our waking consciousness) all that nature has endowed us with through our and our forebears' experiences in the physical world? Mind does not separate us from the physical world but enables us to stand slightly apart from it and learn about it -- and about the difference that mind makes, the responsibilities it lays upon us.

 

[Soupie]

Soupie, why not accept that consciousness evolves in living beings out of the ground of incipient bodily 'self'-awareness -- 'affectivity' in Panksepp -- recognizable in primordial organisms and evolving in increasing complexity in prereflective/subconscious worldly experiences of organisms and animals?

By minute degrees in evolving species, reflective consciousness is added to prereflective consciousness, the latter a continuing fund of experience and memory that continues to be essential to every kind of organic being, including us.

Mind is a gradual achievement in our species and in some others such as whales, elephants, dolphins, birds, and it does not separate any of us from the physical world from which we have emerged. How could it when half of our being, even now, maintains and remembers (at a subconscious level that affects our waking consciousness) all that nature has endowed us with through our and our forebears' experiences in the physical world? Mind does not separate us from the physical world but enables us to stand slightly apart from it and learn about it -- and about the difference that mind makes, the responsibilities it lays upon us.

Constance, that is well said, and I agree with that overall picture. I too believe that consciousness evolved within the natural, physical world.

What I have been exploring in this discussion is how, why, and when. There are many interesting questions (mysteries even) we've been exploring. Of particular interest is the so-called Hard Problem.

Most processes, phenomena, structures, and systems that have evolved within nature are objective; consciousness is at least one process that is not objective.

What follows from this are questions regarding how objective processes and subjective processes relate, and whether there are other processes in nature analogous to consciousness.

While you, Pharoah, and I appear to have an affinity for the above, overall picture of the place of consciousness in nature, we don't necessarily agree on the how, why, and when. A wonderful, informative discussion has followed from our exploration of these questions.

 

[Soupie]

Just an fyi to everyone, the forum has been kind of buggy lately when I've tried to "post reply." Make sure you "select all" and "copy" what you've written before trying to post. Otherwise it might not get saved. It's happened to me twice in the past couple days.

 

[Constance]

Constance, that is well said, and I agree with that overall picture. I too believe that consciousness evolved within the natural, physical world.

What I have been exploring in this discussion is how, why, and when. There are many interesting questions (mysteries even) we've been exploring. Of particular interest is the so-called Hard Problem.

Again, I think Panksepp offers the most productive line of inquiry into the how and when. The why is the hard problem, which concerns the whole development of reflective mind out of phenomenal experience in and of the world, and later in evolution the phenomenal experience of the unified 'self' and its continually open-ended contact with things and with other selves in the world, producing the challenges of constructing mutually satisfactory and moral, ethical, 'worlds' in which we construct cultural worlds upon the bare earth.

Most processes, phenomena, structures, and systems that have evolved within nature are objective; consciousness is at least one process that is not objective.

'Phenomena' exist only in the presence of beings for whom the world and things in it appear phenomenally, are sensed -- felt, seen, heard -- to be 'there' in relation to the individual. Consciousness is being-there, being-in-the-world in awareness that the self exists in a world not fully comprehended but calling for interpretation and action/interaction that is justifiable given the considerations that come to mind -- e.g., that one exists among others, involved with others, resonsible for the well-being of others and of oneself. Camus wrote, "the only mistake is to cause suffering," which is the foundation of human ethics.

What follows from this are questions regarding how objective processes and subjective processes relate, and whether there are other processes in nature analogous to consciousness.

'Objective processes' can be understood only through subjective presence in the world. Things in the world are unthinkable as objects in the first place without conscious awareness of and reflection upon them. When we analyze perception phenomenologically we recognize it as the confluence into a single stream of the objective and subjective poles of what-is. We are not isolated from the world, and the world becomes thinkable as a world in the first place because we are here, protoconsciously and consciously, bringing it into realization through our combined individual perspectives upon it. All of these perspectives are situated and partial, requiring that we think and investigate what-is through the multiplication of perspectives in order to recognize what is common, shared, within them, in science, philosophy, art, and other activities of our species. We can't describe the world 'objectively', as an object, because we are involved in it by virtue of our role in its emergence as 'world'.

While you, Pharoah, and I appear to have an affinity for the above, overall picture of the place of consciousness in nature, we don't necessarily agree on the how, why, and when. A wonderful, informative discussion has followed from our exploration of these questions.

Yes, we've made progress in understanding one another's perspectives, points of view, but the larger task is before us, involving more than the hard problem. The hard problem is the most demanding question raised by our attempt to understand what our consciousness, and the consciousness of other animals, is, and what it signifies for our understanding of the world in which we exist..

 

[Soupie]

Again, I think Panksepp offers the most productive line of inquiry into the how and when. The why is the hard problem, which concerns the whole development of reflective mind out of phenomenal experience in and of the world, and later in evolution the phenomenal experience of the unified 'self' and its continually open-ended contact with things and with other selves in the world, producing the challenges of constructing mutually satisfactory and moral, ethical, 'worlds' in which we construct cultural worlds upon the bare earth.

I agree that Panksepp offers a lot. And in the last paper of his that I read, he offered a pretty radical, hypothetical "how" the mind and body may relate. I'll post that excerpt here in the near future.

I would say that the Hard Problem is both the "how" and "why." For if we can't see how the mind and body relate causally, then we must ask why body's have minds at all. Which is exactly what the Hard Problem asks. Also, the HP doesn't begin with the emergence of reflective mind, but extends back to the first emergence of phenomenal experience, including affectivity.

As far as your other musings on the role that consciousness plays for organisms, I wonder. It seems to me that consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg of the mind. That is, the vast majority of the goings on in the mind are unconscious; and the conscious goings on may not actually be doing the work they appear to, but may instead be "reporting" on it.

 

[smcder]

As far as your other musings on the role that consciousness plays for organisms, I wonder. It seems to me that consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg of the mind. That is, the vast majority of the goings on in the mind are unconscious; and the conscious goings on may not actually be doing the work they appear to, but may instead be "reporting" on it.

The iceberg model seems to me inadequate to the evidence: at least the idea that everything below the waterline is inaccessible.

With biofeedback and other training methods we seem to be able to bring (some, many, most, all?) aspects of experience and bodily function under conscious control - I can give examples.

Similarly we are able to move complex, conscious processes (calculation, driving, athletic performance, foreign languages) into subconscious control but the quality of that performance depends to some degree on the quality of the conscious learning on the front end and in my experience, we have some conscious control and experience of moving the material from the conscious to the sub/un conscious and complex performance is always a result of both - we hold someone responsible for an accident if they never paid attention in drivers ed and/or if they arent paying attention at the moment of the accident as well as being responsible for any indications they have that they are generally a bad driver - and we say we are responsible for seeking that information deliberately.

The cost to me as a responsible person and to my experience makes me reject the idea that my conscious experience and intentions are passive reportings.

 

[Soupie]

With biofeedback and other training methods we seem to be able to bring (some, many, most, all?) aspects of experience and bodily function under conscious control - I can give examples.

I don't entirely disagree, but it does raise the question of how those processes/functions are controlled when not under 'conscious' control.

So I think it's fair to ask—when those processes seem to be under 'conscious control'—whether control has truly been wrested from the typically subconscious control mechanisms or whether something more nuanced is happening. I'm not suggesting that consciousness of these typically subconscious processes doesn't have an effect them, but I question whether 'consciousness' is an entity/process capable of doing autonomously what typically subconscious processes do.

I think pathological and altered-states of consciousness are very informative here. In what little breathing meditiation I have done, I have experienced—if only for a brief moment before I ruined it—my own thoughts arising from somewhere as if 'on their own.' And we've all experienced moments where we do or say—sometimes complex—things without consciously willing it.

And though I've yet to try it myself, I'm reminded of the illusion you mentioned Smcder, in which one wills a pot of water to boil, and when it does one experiences a strong sense that they caused the water to boil.

The control over our bodies and the world that we sometimes consciously perceive may not be reflective of reality. Again, that's not to say that consciousness has not influence on the body, but I wonder if it's as direct as we consciously perceive it to be.

Similarly we are able to move complex, conscious processes (calculation, driving, athletic performance, foreign languages) into subconscious control but the quality of that performance depends to some degree on the quality of the conscious learning on the front end and in my experience, we have some conscious control and experience of moving the material from the conscious to the sub/un conscious and complex performance is always a result of both

Viewed from a larger timeframe, I would actually characterize this as the reverse: We move complex, subconscious processes into the stream of consciousness.

Throughout the course of a day, week, or month, there are a myriad of internal processes and external behaviors that our bodies execute outside of consciousness. Indeed, the vastness of the subconscious goings on in the body (and the world) are mindboggling and even scary haha.

While with much practice in many cases we can bring aspects of the typically subconscious into the conscious, typically the conscious seems occupied with novelty and danger. Maybe not to directly intervene itself, but to aide the subconscious brain processes that typically handle such stimuli.

In this approach, consciousness isn't an all-powerful, autonomous process, but a flexible element embedded within the overall global brain, meta-process of moving skillfully and successfully within the world.

 

[smcder]

I don't entirely disagree, but it does raise the question of how those processes/functions are controlled when not under 'conscious' control.

So I think it's fair to ask—when those processes seem to be under 'conscious control'—whether control has truly been wrested from the typically subconscious control mechanisms or whether something more nuanced is happening. I'm not suggesting that consciousness of these typically subconscious processes doesn't have an effect them, but I question whether 'consciousness' is an entity/process capable of doing autonomously what typically subconscious processes do.

I think pathological and altered-states of consciousness are very informative here. In what little breathing meditiation I have done, I have experienced—if only for a brief moment before I ruined it—my own thoughts arising from somewhere as if 'on their own.' And we've all experienced moments where we do or say—sometimes complex—things without consciously willing it.

And though I've yet to try it myself, I'm reminded of the illusion you mentioned Smcder, in which one wills a pot of water to boil, and when it does one experiences a strong sense that they caused the water to boil.

The control over our bodies and the world that we sometimes consciously perceive may not be reflective of reality. Again, that's not to say that consciousness has not influence on the body, but I wonder if it's as direct as we consciously perceive it to be.


Viewed from a larger timeframe, I would actually characterize this as the reverse: We move complex, subconscious processes into the stream of consciousness.

Throughout the course of a day, week, or month, there are a myriad of internal processes and external behaviors that our bodies execute outside of consciousness. Indeed, the vastness of the subconscious goings on in the body (and the world) are mindboggling and even scary haha.

While with much practice in many cases we can bring aspects of the typically subconscious into the conscious, typically the conscious seems occupied with novelty and danger. Maybe not to directly intervene itself, but to aide the subconscious brain processes that typically handle such stimuli.

In this approach, consciousness isn't an all-powerful, autonomous process, but a flexible element embedded within the overall global brain, meta-process of moving skillfully and successfully within the world.

 

[smcder]

I don't entirely disagree, but it does raise the question of how those processes/functions are controlled when not under 'conscious' control.

So I think it's fair to ask—when those processes seem to be under 'conscious control'—whether control has truly been wrested from the typically subconscious control mechanisms or whether something more nuanced is happening. I'm not suggesting that consciousness of these typically subconscious processes doesn't have an effect them, but I question whether 'consciousness' is an entity/process capable of doing autonomously what typically subconscious processes do.

I think pathological and altered-states of consciousness are very informative here. In what little breathing meditiation I have done, I have experienced—if only for a brief moment before I ruined it—my own thoughts arising from somewhere as if 'on their own.' And we've all experienced moments where we do or say—sometimes complex—things without consciously willing it.

And though I've yet to try it myself, I'm reminded of the illusion you mentioned Smcder, in which one wills a pot of water to boil, and when it does one experiences a strong sense that they caused the water to boil.

The control over our bodies and the world that we sometimes consciously perceive may not be reflective of reality. Again, that's not to say that consciousness has not influence on the body, but I wonder if it's as direct as we consciously perceive it to be.


Viewed from a larger timeframe, I would actually characterize this as the reverse: We move complex, subconscious processes into the stream of consciousness.

Throughout the course of a day, week, or month, there are a myriad of internal processes and external behaviors that our bodies execute outside of consciousness. Indeed, the vastness of the subconscious goings on in the body (and the world) are mindboggling and even scary haha.

While with much practice in many cases we can bring aspects of the typically subconscious into the conscious, typically the conscious seems occupied with novelty and danger. Maybe not to directly intervene itself, but to aide the subconscious brain processes that typically handle such stimuli.

In this approach, consciousness isn't an all-powerful, autonomous process, but a flexible element embedded within the overall global brain, meta-process of moving skillfully and successfully within the world.

I don't entirely disagree, but it does raise the question of how those processes/functions are controlled when not under 'subconscious' control.

So I think it's fair to ask—when those processes seem to be under 'subconscious control'—whether control has truly been wrested from the typically conscious control mechanisms or whether something more nuanced is happening. I'm not suggesting that subconscious processes doesn't have an effect on these typically conscious processes, but I question whether 'subconsciousness' is an entity/process capable of doing automatically what typically conscious processes do.

I think normal and non altered-states of consciousness are very informative here. In what little breathing meditiation I have done, I have experienced—if only for a brief moment before I ruined it—my own thoughts arising from somewhere as if I had consciously summoned them. And we've all experienced moments where we do or say—sometimes complex—things while intentionally, consciously willing it.

The lack of control over our bodies and the world that we sometimes sub-consciously perceive may not be reflective of reality. Again, that's not to say that the subconscious has not influence on the body, but I wonder if it's as direct as we subconsciously perceive it to be?

 

[smcder]

Again, I think Panksepp offers the most productive line of inquiry into the how and when. The why is the hard problem, which concerns the whole development of reflective mind out of phenomenal experience in and of the world, and later in evolution the phenomenal experience of the unified 'self' and its continually open-ended contact with things and with other selves in the world, producing the challenges of constructing mutually satisfactory and moral, ethical, 'worlds' in which we construct cultural worlds upon the bare earth.



'Phenomena' exist only in the presence of beings for whom the world and things in it appear phenomenally, are sensed -- felt, seen, heard -- to be 'there' in relation to the individual. Consciousness is being-there, being-in-the-world in awareness that the self exists in a world not fully comprehended but calling for interpretation and action/interaction that is justifiable given the considerations that come to mind -- e.g., that one exists among others, involved with others, resonsible for the well-being of others and of oneself. Camus wrote, "the only mistake is to cause suffering," which is the foundation of human ethics.



'Objective processes' can be understood only through subjective presence in the world. Things in the world are unthinkable as objects in the first place without conscious awareness of and reflection upon them. When we analyze perception phenomenologically we recognize it as the confluence into a single stream of the objective and subjective poles of what-is. We are not isolated from the world, and the world becomes thinkable as a world in the first place because we are here, protoconsciously and consciously, bringing it into realization through our combined individual perspectives upon it. All of these perspectives are situated and partial, requiring that we think and investigate what-is through the multiplication of perspectives in order to recognize what is common, shared, within them, in science, philosophy, art, and other activities of our species. We can't describe the world 'objectively', as an object, because we are involved in it by virtue of our role in its emergence as 'world'.



Yes, we've made progress in understanding one another's perspectives, points of view, but the larger task is before us, involving more than the hard problem. The hard problem is the most demanding question raised by our attempt to understand what our consciousness, and the consciousness of other animals, is, and what it signifies for our understanding of the world in which we exist..

Consciousness is being-there, being-in-the-world in awareness that the self exists in a world not fully comprehended but calling for interpretation and action/interaction that is justifiable given the considerations that come to mind -- e.g., that one exists among others, involved with others, resonsible for the well-being of others and of oneself. Camus wrote, "the only mistake is to cause suffering," which is the foundation of human ethics.

This is the kind of truth, subjective and participatory but not arbitrary, the kind(s) of truth(s) that we can make - the possible worlds we can select from that we can call good, that interests me - puzzles beget puzzles, words beget words, experiences beget both. Truth is a kind of doing.

 

[Constance]

Most processes, phenomena, structures, and systems that have evolved within nature are objective;

Are they? Or do we (Westerners) tend to describe them in 'objective' terms, as if we can thereby stabilize and reify the temporally unfolding 'world' we actually experience as open-ended and characterized by change? Your statement makes an immense claim that I think begs for analysis. What 'processes' do you have in mind? What 'phenomena'? What 'structures'? What 'systems'? A half a dozen examples from each category you think of as 'mostly objective' will help to clarify what you mean.

...consciousness is at least one process that is not objective.

I wonder about this claim too. Consciousness -- as a multivalenced opening to the experienced world (and which includes personal subconsciousness and collective consciousness) -- exists in continual interaction with the multivalenced 'world' in which we find ourselves existing and which exceeds us on every side. Consciousness constitutes (once again) the means by which we make what progress we can in understanding 'what-is' as a whole and decide what responsibilities we have within it, what possibilities (individual and social) we can and should pursue, what we should do with our existence.