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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4


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If I remember correctly he just wanted to test HCT experimentally - he wanted HCT to predict the outcome of experiments in a way that differentiated it from other theories - ie good theories are tested by making more (and more accurate) predictions.

I'll see if I can find the text.

What does your brother think of HCT? What is his field?
@smcder Paul is not interested in HCT and has no inclination to know anything about it. His field is breast and ovarian cancer, genetics, epidemiology.
Panksepp: I thought I knew what he wanted. I was wrong. Besides, I like Barrett's appraisal of Panksepp. Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard and have detailed this in my latest submission to JCS.
@Constance I discovered my theory before I had read any philosophy. When I stayed over at Peter Strawson's house, I had no idea who he was nor had I knowledge of his stature. But knowing he was a philosopher, I asked him to read my work as it was then. I asked him whether it was philosophy, and he said "yes, I think it is, given its broad scope". He added, much to my embarrassment that I needed to improve my spelling and to learn to write in a cool clinical rather than emotional style. I have been forced into philosophy and into trying to write to articulate my theory. It has never been a natural process, a course I would have chosen, nor a project that I have relished, until fairly recently.
The mastermind details were sent via private messages I think...
Sorry I am not responding to the posts... I am busy at the mo.
 
Conscious Cogn. 2005 Mar;14(1):81-8.
Panksepp's common sense view of affective neuroscience is not the commonsense view in large areas of neuroscience.
Watt DF1.
Author information

Abstract

Jaak Panksepp's article 'Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and Humans' is a excellent review and summary by a leading empirical contributor whose work for many years has been running counter to reigning behavioristic premises in neuroscience. It may unfortunately be true that he could not get this review published in many neuroscience journals because it attacks too many sacred (behavioristic) cows. Panksepp has given readers of Consciousness and Cognition a nicely condensed summary of much of his classic 1998 textbook, Affective Neuroscience. I'm reasonably confident that future neuroscience students will look on that textbook as one of the seminal publications on the subject of emotion and the brain, much as we might now look back on Luria's Higher Cortical Functions in Man, or Paul MacLean's classic work, The Triune Brain. There is probably little that I can add to his elegant presentation of the basic affective neuroscience findings, but I would like to highlight a few key issues for the reader.

Comment on
PMID:
15766891
[PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
 
Conscious Cogn. 2005 Mar;14(1):30-80.

Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans.
Panksepp J1.
Author information

Abstract


The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional "gift of nature" rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic ("instinctual"), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

 
The abstract for the above^^:

IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID?
PLURALIST THOUGHTS ON
GRAHAM HARMAN'S MONIST IDEALISM

(This paper conducts a critical discussion of the object-oriented ontology of Graham Harman, and compares it with the similar ontology of Louis Althusser, and with the radically different ontology of Paul Feyerabend.)

Abstract

I begin by 'deconstructing' the title and explaining that Feyerabend does not really use the word 'ontology', though he does sometimes call his position ontological realism. Feyerabend calls his position indifferently a 'general methodology' or a 'general cosmology', and he seems to be hostile to the very enterprise of ontology, as a separate discipline forming part of what he critiques as 'school philosophy'. I then go on to say that there is a concept of a different type of ontology, that I call a 'diachronic ontology' that perhaps Feyerabend would have accepted, and that is very different from ontology as ordinarily thought, which I claim to be synchronic ontology (having no room for the dialogue with Being, but just supposing that Being is already and always there without our contribution). I discuss Althusser's structuralist epistemology and ontology as a predecessor of Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology, and analyse both as exemplifying synchronic ontology, giving a reading of Harman's recent book THE THIRD TABLE. I then discuss Feyerabend's ideas as showing a different way of doing philosophy and of thinking about Being, that of a diachronic ontology, in which there is no stable framework or fixed path.
 
@smcder Paul is not interested in HCT and has no inclination to know anything about it. His field is breast and ovarian cancer, genetics, epidemiology.
Panksepp: I thought I knew what he wanted. I was wrong. Besides, I like Barrett's appraisal of Panksepp. Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard and have detailed this in my latest submission to JCS.
@Constance I discovered my theory before I had read any philosophy. When I stayed over at Peter Strawson's house, I had no idea who he was nor had I knowledge of his stature. But knowing he was a philosopher, I asked him to read my work as it was then. I asked him whether it was philosophy, and he said "yes, I think it is, given its broad scope". He added, much to my embarrassment that I needed to improve my spelling and to learn to write in a cool clinical rather than emotional style. I have been forced into philosophy and into trying to write to articulate my theory. It has never been a natural process, a course I would have chosen, nor a project that I have relished, until fairly recently.
The mastermind details were sent via private messages I think...
Sorry I am not responding to the posts... I am busy at the mo.

Did that make sense what I said about "differential predictions"?
 
@smcder yes what you say makes sense to me, but my responses did not seem to align with Panksepp. It seemed clear what was required, but it turned out to not hit the button.
So reading between the lines I would say, he was offering encouragement like a good teacher and providing pointers for me. I got halfway through his recommended tome on emotion/feeling/mood, and understand that theory—from his (and colleagues) research orientated leanings—is empty without research. I disagree... I think electroculting animals in order to come up with theories to explain their effects is just as problematic. I think HCT demonstrates the limitations of his theories which have come about from research. Another way of seeing this is that HCT does support his rival's stance (Barrett) in many respects—Panksepp must realise this. I don't think either are wrong as such... they have just become entrenched in their views. I would say that Panksepp and Barrett are referring to different levels in the (HCT) hierarchy but think they are talking about the same thing (simply put).
 
The abstract for the above^^:

IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID?
PLURALIST THOUGHTS ON
GRAHAM HARMAN'S MONIST IDEALISM

(This paper conducts a critical discussion of the object-oriented ontology of Graham Harman, and compares it with the similar ontology of Louis Althusser, and with the radically different ontology of Paul Feyerabend.)

Abstract

I begin by 'deconstructing' the title and explaining that Feyerabend does not really use the word 'ontology', though he does sometimes call his position ontological realism. Feyerabend calls his position indifferently a 'general methodology' or a 'general cosmology', and he seems to be hostile to the very enterprise of ontology, as a separate discipline forming part of what he critiques as 'school philosophy'. I then go on to say that there is a concept of a different type of ontology, that I call a 'diachronic ontology' that perhaps Feyerabend would have accepted, and that is very different from ontology as ordinarily thought, which I claim to be synchronic ontology (having no room for the dialogue with Being, but just supposing that Being is already and always there without our contribution). I discuss Althusser's structuralist epistemology and ontology as a predecessor of Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology, and analyse both as exemplifying synchronic ontology, giving a reading of Harman's recent book THE THIRD TABLE. I then discuss Feyerabend's ideas as showing a different way of doing philosophy and of thinking about Being, that of a diachronic ontology, in which there is no stable framework or fixed path.

reading this .... also looking at Manzottis neo-relist and externalist views

Here is Blake presenting his paper ...


Not finished with it yet, but he seems to make several side long remarks toward Harmon and the OOO crowd, the Twitter link I posted above by Blake bothered me a lot by its nastiness - this doesn't make Blake wrong or OOO right but it may keep Blake from effectively making his point and it may also discinline responses not only from Harmon but others who don't care for OOO ... my own prejudice is against the stereotypical infighting among academics.
 
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So reading between the lines I would say, he was offering encouragement like a good teacher and providing pointers for me. I got halfway through his recommended tome on emotion/feeling/mood, and understand that theory—from his (and colleagues) research orientated leanings—is empty without research. I disagree... I think electroculting animals in order to come up with theories to explain their effects is just as problematic.

(?? What are you referring to in your last sentence above?)


I think HCT demonstrates the limitations of his theories which have come about from research. Another way of seeing this is that HCT does support his rival's stance (Barrett) in many respects—Panksepp must realise this. I don't think either are wrong as such... they have just become entrenched in their views. I would say that Panksepp and Barrett are referring to different levels in the (HCT) hierarchy but think they are talking about the same thing (simply put).

Re the statement in blue, what do you mean specifically about the "limitations of his theories" and what is the research you're referring to in the next clause:
"which have come about from research"? Whose research? Panksepp's or someone else's?

I posted two articles on Panksepp's affectivity theory in the last day or two, one presenting an overview of his research and its significance by two neuroscientists and another article by Panksepp himself entitled "Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans." Have you read either of them? I wish you would do so, so that you might discuss with us how you understand the differences between his and Barrett's approach to emotions. You wrote above:

"I don't think either are wrong as such... they have just become entrenched in their views. I would say that Panksepp and Barrett are referring to different levels in the (HCT) hierarchy but think they are talking about the same thing (simply put)."

As I understand it, they are not talking about the same thing and Panksepp surely knows they're not. If you're persuaded by Barrett, though, and not by Panksepp, would you please state the reasons why you find Barrett persuasive, aside from your own sense that Barrett's theory provides a better fit with your HCT theory? That is, can you show that Barrett does in fact comprehend Panksepp's theory and its grounds in the first place, and that she provides sound reasons for rejecting it in favor of the general theory of emotions accepted in her field as being based in cognition? I hope you're amenable to revisiting this discussion, which was not continued far enough when we made the temporary shift to the google forum.
 
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reading this .... also looking at Manzottis neo-relist and externalist views

Here is Blake presenting his paper ...


Not finished with it yet, but he seems to make several side long remarks toward Harmon and the OOO crowd, the Twitter link I posted above by Blake bothered me a lot by its nastiness - this doesn't make Blake wrong or OOO right but it may keep Blake from effectively making his point and it may also discinline responses not only from Harmon but others who don't care for OOO ... my own prejudice is against the stereotypical infighting among academics.

Yes, I'm put off by Blake's harshly judgmental remarks about Harman and some other philosophers. Then again, I don't know how long these bullish exchanges have been going on in the philosophy blogs. Do you? Harman is not sweetness and light either, btw. What would you expect from someone who titles one of his first books Guerilla Metaphysics? ;) Re academic infighting, I've seen a lot of it but it rarely gets down to the gang-warfare level seen in some of these encounters over OOO.

Re Blake's paper as a whole, I do think he makes a significant point in distinguishing synchronic from diachronic ontologies and finding Harman's OOO in the former category.
 
Here are the first half-dozen paragraphs from the Panksepp paper I just asked Pharoah to read with the rest of us so we can finish our discussion of the opposition of Barrett to his theory and research program.

Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans
Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans

“1. Toward a science of animal consciousness

Do other animals have internal experiences? Probably, but there are no mindscopes to evaluate the existence of consciousness in either animals or humans. If we are going to entertain the existence of experiential states (i.e., consciousness) in other animals, we must be willing to work at a theoretical level where arguments are adjudicated by the weight of evidence rather than definitive proof. Such approaches are easier to apply for certain aspects of animal consciousness than for others. My focus here will be on primary-process affective consciousness, many aspects of which may be homologous in humans and other animals. I will proceed from the premise that progress in achieving a deeply scientific human psychology lies in our ability to specify which neuropsychological tendencies evolution constructed within the genetically dictated brain organization and psychobehavioral potentials of the intrinsic neurodynamics of ancestral species (Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000). A detailed neuroscientific understanding of basic human emotions may depend critically on understanding comparable animal emotions.1 As I have noted many times “As long as psychology and neuroscience remain more preoccupied with the human brain’s impressive cortico-cognitive systems than subcortical affective ones, our understanding of the sources of human consciousness will remain woefully incomplete” (Panksepp, 2004a, p. 58).

I will advance the case that one widely neglected form of animal/human consciousness—one that creates internally experienced emotional feeling states—is now sufficiently well understood to permit an affirmative answer to my opening question. Other mammals do have affective experiences. Such states may be a common denominator for a detailed cross-species analysis of relevant brain functions because scientific variants of anthropomorphism can guide the study of integrative mind–brain functions in other animals. I will explore the possibility that basic emotional feelings—a primary process type of phenomenology—may be grounded on instinctual action systems that promote unconditional emotional behaviors. Although such “ancestral voices of the genes” (Buck, 1999, p. 324) undergo a great deal of elaboration epigenetically, the fundamental similarity of core affective processes across mammalian species may permit neuro-ethological work on animal-models to reveal the bedrock of human consciousness. My own work proceeds from a Spinozan-type dual-aspect monism premise—namely that primary-process affective consciousness emerges from large-scale neurodynamics of a variety of emotional systems that coordinate instinctual emotional actions ( Panksepp, 2001a, Panksepp, 2001b and Panksepp, 2004b).

Before proceeding, let me provide a few terminological clarifications. I use the term emotion as the “umbrella” concept that includes affective, cognitive, behavioral, expressive, and a host of physiological changes. Affect is the subjective experiential-feeling component that is very hard to describe verbally, but there are a variety of distinct affects, some linked more critically to bodily events (homeostatic drives like hunger and thirst), others to external stimuli (taste, touch, etc). Emotional affects are closely linked to internal brain action states, triggered typically by environmental events. All are complex intrinsic functions of the brain, which are triggered by perceptions and become experientially refined. Psychologists have traditionally conceptualized such “spooky” mental issues in terms of valence (various feelings of goodness and badness—positive and negative affects), arousal (how intense are the feelings), and surgency or power (how much does a certain feeling fill one’s mental life). There are a large number of such affective states of consciousness, presumably reflecting different types of global neurodynamics within the brain and body. Even though there is currently no agreed upon taxonomy of affective states ( Ostow, 2004 and Panksepp and Pincus, 2004), in this essay I will largely focus on the emotional, action-oriented affects, as opposed to sensory pleasures and displeasures, and the various background bodily feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. I will continue to advance the view that specific emotional affects largely reflect the operations of distinct emotional operating systems that are concentrated in sub-neocortical, limbic regions of the brain ( MacLean, 1990 and Panksepp, 1998a).

For present purposes, the term consciousness refers to brain states that have an experiential feel to them, and it is envisioned as a multi-tiered process that needs to be viewed in evolutionary terms, with multiple layers of emergence. Primary-process consciousness may reflect raw sensory/perceptual feelings and the types of internal emotional/motivational experiences just discussed. Secondary-consciousness may reflect the capacity to have thoughts about experiences, especially about how external events relate to internal events. Although animals surely do not think about their lives linguistically, they may think in terms of perceptual images. Finally, there are tertiary forms of consciousness—thoughts about thoughts, awareness of awareness—much of which is unique to humans and requires expansive neocortical tissues that permit linguistic–symbolic transformation of simple thoughts and remembered experiences.

Those who are not willing to give animals any consciousness are probably thinking about the tertiary human-typical linguistic variants. They may also be generalizing too readily from human perceptual consciousness, which is clearly dependent on neocortical functions, to an affective consciousness whose locus of control is largely sub-neocortical (Liotti & Panksepp, 2004). There are reasons to believe that affective experience may reflect a most primitive form of consciousness (Panksepp, 2000b and Panksepp, 2004b), which may have provided an evolutionary platform for the emergence of more complex layers of consciousness.

Core emotional affects may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic “energetic” action systems—e.g., SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY—which need to be defined in neural terms (Fig. 1).2 These highly overlapping state functions share many neuropsychological components (e.g., biogenic amines), and they energize and are reciprocally regulated by cortico-cognitive activities (information-processing systems that perceive and discriminate environmental events). Through such reciprocal interactions and embeddings, secondary and tertiary forms of extended consciousness emerge. However, attempts to utilize work on animal affective states to understand the corresponding human feelings remain a revolutionary activity in consciousness studies. This is because affects cannot be unambiguously visualized or well operationalized, unless one is willing to take the emotional actions of other organisms as the necessary starting points of empirical inquiries (Panksepp, 1998a). . . ."
 
@Constance: Yes, I'm put off by Blake's harshly judgmental remarks about Harman and some other philosophers. Then again, I don't know how long these bullish exchanges have been going on in the philosophy blogs. Do you?"

@smcder: at least 2011 ... Blake mentions Harmon many times in his blogs and papers ... I found three references to Blake on Harmon's blog,

for now Harmon seems to be in the ascendant and Blake nipping at his heels. Blake and others do criticize OOO and SR with a lot of energy and there would probably be many historical parallels ... I don't know enough but my guess is these movements ooo/sr with or without critics is time limited and will prove footnotish as a corrective to a stagnant field ... as both sides are playing out that script word for word.

Blake is Dantonesque or better Salieri ... but Harmon I don't think can rightly compare to their counter-parts ... but he is comfortably enthroned for the moment in his metaphorical Tuileries.

@Contance: Harman is not sweetness and light either, btw. What would you expect from someone who titles one of his first books Guerilla Metaphysics? ;)

@smcder absolutely ... and I can sympathize with Blake - with the haggard and hungry look of the obsessed pursuant:

image.jpg

@Constance Re academic infighting, I've seen a lot of it but it rarely gets down to the gang-warfare level seen in some of these encounters over OOO.

@smcder this is another reason to remind me of Dadaism or probably better examples ... to think of it as a movement more than a school.

@Constance Re Blake's paper as a whole, I do think he makes a significant point in distinguishing synchronic from diachronic ontologies and finding Harman's OOO in the former category.

@smcder yes!
 
Yes, but what is this about "electrocuting animals" in Pharoah's post? Perhaps a joke. Surely Pharoah realizes that Panksepp is administering minor electrical shocks to limbic and other subcortical areas of animals' brains to evoke and compare raw affects (primordial responses).

I'll go google 'declarations of consciousness' and see what's up with that.
 
I just want to repeat that quotation from Panksepp and thereby underline it again, with love.
Constance I share your appreciation for this hypothesis. From what Pharoah has said in the past, i think he agrees with the notion that phenomenal consciousness (in this case, affective consciousness) preceeded "conceptual" consciousness.

What do you think the above implies? Do you think it is a notion that hasnt been recognized by those participating in this discussion? As noted, i think at least pharoah and i have recognized it.

As ive outlined at length in the past, i feel that both panksepp's and barretts approaches to affectivity are needed to explain human emotion.

However, constance, im still not sure that panksepp is implying such affectivity preceeded the evolution and action of neurons. (If that is what youre thinking.)
 
@Pharoah

You seem to have an odd stance toward the hard problem that i dont understand.

In any case, what does htc "say" about consciousness (feeling) and neurons?

Does htc suggest consciousness/feeling/what its like can exist in the absence of neurons, or are neurons a necessary (albeit not sufficient) component in the process of consciousness?
 
Yep... I know it isn't electrocuting animals. I was just writing shorthand (sorry).

For fear of sounding like a broken record (or CD) you should have a fairly good idea of how I might appraise Panksepp v Barrett:

1. physiological mechanisms are innate and qualitatively relevant—consistent with Panksepp's primal affective areas. These are not "emotions" as I would define them but then there is no consensus on emotion anyway. [insects have thes primal areas too—Panksepp agrees with me, and is a ripe area for research... this is a differential prediction (As I understand it). The reseachers in this area have not even dreamt of the possibility that insects might have these primal affective sites.]
2. These primal qualitative areas are utilised through realtime appraisal and reflection of sensory inputs (in animals that have more than innate behaviours, i.e. in animals that can learn) to evoke a subtle experientially changing landscape of phenomenal impressions about the world.
3. Humans alone, conceptualise about these impressions and classify various phenomenal feelings; calling them emotions. The concepts drive subtle distinctions, for example, what one believes (beliefs being conceptually constructed) should be an appropriate emotion given certain cultural/social contexts etc.

Point 1 aligns with Panksepp whilst point 3 aligns with Barrett; each arguing about their stance for want of a single narrative (to explain all).

So, Barrett resonates with HCT with the following:
The conceptual act model,
"is not strictly dimensional because it integrates both dimensional and categorical perspectives. The dimensional aspect can be found in the suggestion that all emotional events, at their core, are based in a psychologically primitive kind of affective response to events in the world as positive or negative, helpful or harmful … . The categorical aspect can be found in the suggestion that people automatically and effortlessly categorize the ebb and flow of core affect using conceptual knowledge for emotion. To categorize something is to render it meaningful: to determine what it is, why it is, and what to do with it. … In the conceptualization of emotion, categorizing core affect as anger (or as any other emotion) performs a kind of figure-ground segregation, so that the experience of an emotion will pop out as a separate event from the ebb and flow in ongoing core affect (in which core affect is associated with the direction and urgency of initial behavioral responses). "
(Barrett, L. F., Lindquist, K. A., Bliss-Moreau, E., Duncan, S., Gendron, M., Mize, J., & Brennan, L. (2007) Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(3), pp. 297–312., p. 12)

I have read about 5 papers by Panksepp and 1 by Barrett.
@Constance I don't want to pursue this issue at present. It is something I will return to but I am knuckling down on other stuff at mo. My stance is fairly obvious I think... they both are exciting scientists and this is a field that will yield important discoveries (particularly with insects and in medical advances)... there is value in both to be had.

One of the points I was making is that the experimental neuroscience seemed to be done first, and then a theory matched to the observations (a technique borrowed from psychology perhaps).
Another approach in science is to have a theory (e.g. there is a thing called a higgs boson) and then to use experiments to confirm the theory.
I am not so kean on the first of the two approaches... and so often, so very often, the theoretical models derived from observation are fraught with problems. (on this point, read the intro to Fodor's "The language of thought" 1975ish pdf). Analytic Philosophy has a similar problem, using rational argument, using logic to come to 'unassailable' theoretic conclusions... which are false because the inferences are made through a restricted tunnel-like scope, despite pretences to develop counter arguments.
 
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